

The development of Indonesian national democratic institutions and compatibility with its national culture.



**Master thesis**

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Author

Administration number

E-mail address

Date

D. Schoofs

759809

d.schoofs@uvt.nl

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**Supervision**

**prof. dr. F. Hendriks**

Primary supervisor

Tilburg University

**dr. A. Maleki**

Secondary supervisor

Tilburg University

**On the cover:** *Monumen Nasional* (Monas), the national monument of the Republic of Indonesia. A 132m tower in the centre of Merdeka Square in Central Jakarta, build to commemorate the struggle for Indonesian independence. To me, it symbolises the first acquaintance of Indonesia with building a democratic state: The short democratic experience, right before Sukarno's Guided Democracy. As you can see, the picture on the cover is still quite blurry. After a long period of harsh ruling, Indonesia is granted a second chance in building a democratic state.

During my brief time in Jakarta, I met many people who still struggle, every day, in pursuit of their democracy. My hope is that they will continue to do so and that their democracy will be proven solid, casted in bronze as it were, as reflected by the second picture.

*Separated by many miles. My thoughts are with you and continue to be.*

*Tilburg University. Frans Seda Foundation. Universitas Katolik Indonesia Atma Jaya.  
Indonesia Mengajar. Perludem.*

*prof. dr. F. Hendriks. dr. A. Maleki. dr. T. Metze. Mr. Jaap van Gent. Mr. Dolf Huijgers.  
dr. Mikhael Dua. dr. E. Widodo. Mr. S. Simarmata. Ms. A. Dwifatma. Mr. A.M. Alizar. Ms. K.D. Sianipar.  
Ms. D. Arilaha. Ms. P. Chandrasari Kusuma. Ms. S. Margaretha. Mr. R. Roos.*

I did not write one page of it without thinking about the Netherlands and without having her, so to speak,  
before my eyes.

Inspired by Alexis de Tocqueville (1847): *Democracy in America*.

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## **Glossary**

### *Abbreviations*

CBIW: Central Bank Independence Unweighted.

CCS: Culturally Compatible Score.

CCT: Cultural Compatibility Thesis.

CVS: Chinese Value Survey.

DPD (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*): Regional Representative Council.

DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*): People's Representative Council/House of Representatives.

DPRD I (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*): Provincial Legislative Council for provinces.

DPRD II (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*): Regional Legislative Council for provinces.

ENPP: Effective Number of Parties in Parliament.

GBHN (*Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara*): Broad Outlines of State Policy.

GEP: General-Electoral Participation.

GERINDRA (*Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya*): Great Indonesia Movement Party.

GLOBE: Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness.

GOLKAR (*Partai Golongan Karya*): Party of the Functional Groups.

HANURA (*Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat*): The People's Conscience Party.

IDD: Integrative Dimension of Democracy.

LENP: Logarithm of Effective Number of Parties in Parliament.

LNPG: Logarithm of Number of Parties in Government.

MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*): People's Consultative Assembly.

NasDem (*Partai Nasional Demokrat*): NasDem Party.

NEP: Non-Electoral Participation.

NPG: Number of Parties in Government.

NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama*): Revival/Awakening of Religious Scholars.

PAN (*Partai Amanat Nasional*): The National Mandate Party.

PBB (*Partai Bulan Bintang*): Crescent Star Party.

PD (*Partai Demokrat*): Democratic Party.

PDD: Participative Dimension of Democracy.

PDI (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*): Indonesian Democratic Party (New Order).

- PDI-P (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan*): Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle.

PK (*Partai Keadilan*): Justice Party (1999).

- PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*): The Prosperous Justice Party.

PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*): The National Awakening Party.

PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*): Indonesian Communist Party.  
PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*): The United Development Party.  
PR: Proportional Representation.  
REP: Referendum-Electoral Participation.  
Rp. (*Rupiah*): Indonesia's currency.  
SPSI (*Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia*): All-Indonesia Workers' Union.  
TEP: Total Electoral Proportionality.  
VAP: Voting Age Population.  
WVS: World Value Survey.

#### *Translations*

*Badan Pekerja*: Working Body of the MPR.  
*Bapak/pak*: Father (literal, however commonly used to refer to a man with a higher authority).  
*Fraksi*: Faction.  
*Golongan Karya*: Functional group.  
*Hak angket*: Right of inquiry.  
*Hak interpelasi*: Right of interpellation.  
*Ibu*: Mother (literal, however commonly used to refer to a woman with a higher authority).  
*Kabupaten*: Regency.  
*Kota*: City.  
*Malari*: 15 January disaster.  
*Mufakat*: Consensus.  
*Musyawaharah*: Deliberation.  
*Orde Baru*: New Order.  
*Otonomi Daerah*: Regional Autonomy Initiative.  
*Pengajar Muda*: The Young Teacher.  
*Penjelasan*: Elucidation (of the Constitution).  
*Provinsi*: Province.  
*Reformasi*: Reform.  
*Rechtstaat*: Rule of law.  
*Sidang Istimewa*: Special Session of the MPR.  
*Sidang Tahunan*: Annual Session of the MPR.  
*Sidang Umum*: General Session of the MPR.  
*Utusan Daerah*: Regional representatives.  
*Utusan Golongan*: Functional group representatives.

### *Explanations*

*Pancasila*: The Indonesian state philosophy which literally means ‘five postulates’ (Tadjoeddin, 2014, p. 185). Pancasila consist of (1) Belief in the one and only god (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*), (2) Just and civilised humanity (*Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab*), (3) The unity of Indonesia (*Persatuan Indonesia*), (4) Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives (*Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan, dalam Permusyawaratan Perwakilan*), (5) Social justice for all the Indonesian people (*Keadilan Sosial bagi seluruh Rakyat Indonesia*).

*Penjelasan* (elucidation): Explanatory Memorandum to the Constitution. The elucidation is the formal explanatory memorandum that accompanies most Indonesian regulations and is usually read as part of the regulation itself.

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## Chapter 1      Setting the scene

Thirty years of authoritarian rule suddenly came to a halt in 1998 when President Suharto was forced from power (Crouch, 2010, pp. ix, 16). Suharto's 'New Order' authoritarian government was in power since 1966 and posed few opportunities for participation (Liddle, 1987, p. 127). After General Suharto defeated a coup of young army officers led by Lt-Col. Untung, President Sukarno gave Suharto all the power to 'secure order'. When Sukarno was stripped of his office, Suharto was formally installed as Acting President in March 1967 and appointed as full president a year later (Sen & Hill, 2006, p. 3). The New Order replaced Sukarno's 'Guided Democracy', characterised by charismatic leadership and intense ideological debates (Sen & Hill, 2006, pp. 2-3).

The backbone of the New Order regime was the military (Crouch, 2010, p. 16). The government used the premise that the Indonesian Communist Party: PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*), the military's main rival before 1965 (Crouch, 2010, p. 16), had staged the coup to justify total elimination of the party and all organisations associated with it. The month after Suharto's counter-coup, the army, together with anti-Communist groups, slaughtered approximately half a million people (Sen & Hill, 2006, pp. 3-4). Another half a million people were imprisoned without trial, many of whom for more than a decade and some of them were only released in 1999 (Sen & Hill, 2006, p. 4). Military officers dominated central and regional government under the regime. They were appointed key (cabinet) posts. At all levels of government were military officers appointed as members of the legislative (Crouch, 2010, p. 16).

The key policy doctrine of the New Order was economic development. It ushered in a period a remarkable economic growth and increasing links with the global economy (Sen & Hill, 2006, p. 4). Legislative elections were held every five years. They were, however, always conducted in circumstances that ensured overwhelming victories for the military-created Golkar that served as the government's electoral vehicle. The partly elected People's Consultative Assembly: MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*) was convened after each election and invariably re-elected Suharto unanimously as President. Although the Indonesian society transformed with the emergence of an educated middle class, the New Order's political structures, however, had been shaped in the late 1960s and early 1970s and had not kept pace with the rapid social and economic change (Crouch, 2010, pp. 16, 17).

In 1974, the first large-scale civil unrest since the anti-Communist massacres of 1966 took place. Anti-government student demonstrations on 15-16 January 1974 escalated into widespread looting. These events are referred to as *Malari*: 15 January Disaster (Sen & Hill, 2006, pp. 4-5). *Malari* signified a breach between the New Order leadership and students and intellectuals who had supported Suharto against Sukarno. However, rapid economic growth strengthened Suharto's position and Suharto reacted to

second student demonstrations in 1978 with a multitude of regulations to depoliticise campuses and implemented widespread *Pancasila* indoctrination programs (Sen & Hill, 2006, p. 5). Through *Pancasila* Suharto distinguished his regime from that of Sukarno (Tadjoeddin, 2014, p. 183).

In the early 1980s, when falling oil prices led to a restructuring of the economy, Suharto's personal hold on power was incontestable and remained so for the next decade. The economy recovered after 1986 and was now more diversified. Large Indonesian conglomerates given to Suharto's family and friends played a greater role. Deregulation of the economy progressed which allowed greater freedom of market forces. In 1997, the Asian monetary crisis hit Indonesia and wiped out years of growth. The value of the *Rupiah* (Rp.) plummeted (Sen & Hill, 2006, p. 5). The Indonesian financial system was unable to cope and the closure of sixteen banks on November 1 1997 undermined public confidence (Sen & Hill, 2006, pp. 5-6). The Suharto regime, being tied to a maze of patronage networks, was much less able than other regional governments to take the firm measures necessary. Indonesia's economy was in disarray. There was a virtual halt to investment and greatly rising unemployment, aggravated by the impact of drought caused by El Nino's climate conditions on agriculture (Crouch, 2010, p. 1).

Other critical events, among others, that mark the beginning of the end of the New Order are the banning of three popular news magazines in June 1994 (and resulting court cases) and the intervention of the government in one of the two opposition parties: the Indonesian Democratic Party: PDI (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*), removing the elected leader Megawati Sukarnoputri. Reports of an organised attack on the PDI's headquarters in Jakarta on July 27 1996 lead to a public outpour of anger and resentment towards the New Order on a scale unseen since 1974 (Sen & Hill, 2006, p. 6). Nonetheless, even in mid-1997, no observer, Indonesian or foreign, anticipated that the New Order had already entered its final year (Crouch, 2010, p. 2). In March 1998, the MPR re-appointed Suharto for a seventh term. The 1998 cabinet, including his daughter, long-time companions and his protégé Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie as vice president, was unacceptable to international markets and Indonesian dissidents. Student protests increased and popular support for them grew (Sen & Hill, 2006, pp. 6-7). Finally, massive student demonstrations in May 1998 triggered two days of anti-Chinese rioting in Jakarta forcing the resignation of President Suharto (Crouch, 2010, p. 1).

Suharto had ruled over one of the world's most durable authoritarian regimes for more than three decades. Suharto used, backed by the military, a combination of repression and co-optation to prevent the rise of organised political challenges. The Indonesian economy, blessed by an abundance of natural resources, particularly oil, had grown steadily until 1997 (Crouch, 2010, p. 16). The collapse of the New Order regime was accompanied by massive economic decline, widespread rioting, communal conflict, and fears that the nation was approaching the brink of disintegration (Crouch, 2010, p. ix).

In the years following the resignation of Suharto on May 21 1998 (Sen & Hill, 2006, p. 1) the political landscape of Indonesia transformed (Webber, 2006, p. 396). The period of *reformasi* started, a period of significant democratic transformation (Carnegie, 2010, p. 4). Indonesia still had a highly centralised authoritarian regime in April 1998. There was no effective separation of powers, the dominant power of the executive branch was concentrated in the hands of a single person who held the office of president for the preceding 32 years, political freedoms were vastly limited, elections and the few political parties permitted to compete for popular support were strictly controlled, and the military had great discretionary powers to intervene in political and other areas of Indonesian life (Webber, 2006, p. 396).

As of today, Indonesia has held multiple free, fair, and peaceful elections for the country's legislature and presidency as well as several rotations of government. Legislatures and courts are more independent of the executive than under the New Order. Indonesians enjoy numerous political freedoms. Multiple political parties compete freely for popular support. A wide range of pressure and interest groups and mass media exercise or try to exercise oversight over the behaviour of elected representatives and national and local governments (Webber, 2006, p. 396). However, it is not quite clear how the development of the Indonesian state should be described after the fall of Suharto in 1998 (Davidson, 2009, p. 293).

## Chapter 2 Problem posing

Analysts have struggled to understand the dynamics of the system that has taken its place since the fall of Suharto's authoritarian New Order regime. This becomes apparent by the failure to define clearly what has emerged since 1998, while all other political regimes in Indonesia are known by standard labels: 'parliamentary democracy' for the period between 1950 and 1957, 'Guided Democracy' for Sukarno's rule from 1959 to 1965 and the 'New Order' for Suharto's regime. The post-Suharto state has defied attempts to describe it in uniform and all-encompassing terms and scholars have yet to reach consensus on a term to describe the post-authoritarian regime (Mietzner & Aspinall, 2010, p. 1).

Nonetheless, it is generally accepted among comparative political scientists that Indonesia has undergone tremendous political change since the fall of the long-time autocrat Suharto in 1998. Indonesia has seen two consecutive changes in executive government through free and fair national-level elections (Mietzner, 2013, p. 1). Despite enormously positive changes, Indonesia still faces significant political hurdles (Freedman & Tiburzi, 2012, p. 136). Indonesian newspapers are full of blistering criticism of political parties, complaining about their corruption, laziness, self-involved politicking, and disinterest to the need of ordinary citizens. Moreover, citizens share these anti-party sentiments as shown by opinion surveys of key state institutions where parties almost consistently finish last (Mietzner, 2013, p. 3). The institutions of political parties and the national legislature are usually portrayed as corrupt, greedy, self-absorbed, isolated from society, and dominated by oligarchic elites. In assessing the quality of party organisation and institutionalisation, however, scholars produce more mixed findings than the overwhelmingly negative domestic media (Mietzner & Aspinall, 2010, pp. 8, 9, 10). Moreover, Indonesians continue to support democracy (Mietzner, 2013, p. 4).

In the evaluations of Indonesia in international democracy indices the changes are also reflected (Mietzner, 2013, p. 1). Being one of the organisations that measure the level (and presence) of democracy, Freedom House granted Indonesia between 2006 and 2013 the status of 'free'. In 2014 and 2015 the status became 'partly free' again<sup>1</sup>, nonetheless, making Indonesia the only country in Southeast Asia to hold such a categorisation in the late 2000s and early 2010s (Mietzner, 2013, pp. 1-2). In the Polity IV score, which codes authority characteristics of states<sup>2</sup>, Indonesia steadily worked up from a score of -5 in 1998 to a score of 9 in 2013<sup>3</sup> making it explicitly fall in the category of 'democracies'<sup>4</sup>. According to the data of the Economist's Democracy Index, Indonesia gradually improved their score from a 6,41 in 2006

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<sup>1</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2006/indonesia#.VZTkJvmqpBc>, 2006 and onwards.

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>

<sup>3</sup> Data retrieved from <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html> and <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.html>

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>

to a 6,95 in 2014, considering Indonesia as a ‘flawed democracy’. Although their scores differ quite much, Indonesia falls in the same category as countries like Greece, Italy and Belgium (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, pp. 4, 5, 12, 37, 38).<sup>5</sup>

These mixed findings suggest that it is not quite clear how the development of the Indonesian state should be described after the fall of Suharto in 1998 (Davidson, 2009, p. 293). In this study, I want to categorise the development of the Indonesian democratic institutions between 1990 and 2010. By studying the development of the specific set of democratic institutions it is possible to place Indonesia within a larger framework of ‘models of democracy’ (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 3). Interestingly, Indonesia has not been included often in these frameworks. Even Lijphart (1999 updated 2012), one of the prominent researchers on this subject, did not include Indonesia in his work *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* in which he connects models of democracy to their performance. I say interestingly, because Indonesia has seen a remarkable transition from autocratic despotism to the world’s third largest functioning democracy. Moreover, it has the world’s most fragmented geography (250 million people dispersed over 17500 island) and more than 200 ethnic groups (Hainsworth, Turner & Webster, 2007, p. 41).

Particularly, this study is interested in connecting the development of Indonesia’s model of democracy to its national culture. How do cultural orientations influence and codetermine the favouring of certain models of democracy (i.e. arrangements of democratic institutions)? This relationship between cultural orientations and models of democracy is highly understudied even though diversity in cultural orientations is likely to underpin the preference for different types of electoral systems and forms of government. Moreover, this relationship is distinguishable since differences in the level and functionality of democracy are not automatically related to it (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, pp. 3, 4). This study particularly includes the question whether the development of Indonesia’s model of democracy is compatible with dimensions of their national culture.

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<sup>5</sup> In chapter 3.2.1 are the measurements of Indonesia’s democracy discussed extensively.

## **2.1 Research goal**

The goal of this master thesis is to explore, analyse, and describe the development of the Indonesian national democratic<sup>6</sup> institutions between 1990 and 2010. This will be done, qualitatively, by examining Indonesia's model of democracy (i.e. its specific arrangement of national democratic institutions) over the entire period of time. The aim is to gain insight into this development by placing it into comparative frameworks of models of democracy.

Moreover, the development of Indonesia's model of democracy will be put in the context of dimensions of Indonesia's national culture. Particularly, whether the development of its model of democracy is compatible with these dimensions of national culture. All this is based on desk-research as well as field research.

## **2.2 Research question**

How did the national democratic institutions of Indonesia develop between 1990 and 2010 and is this development compatible with dimensions of their national culture?<sup>7</sup>

### **2.2.1 Sub questions**

1. What is (Indonesia's model of) democracy and how can it be measured?
2. How did the Indonesian national democratic institutions develop between 1990 and 2010?
3. What is national culture, how can it be measured, and what does compatibility mean?
4. What is the compatibility of Indonesia's model of democracy and dimensions of their national culture?
5. What model of democracy is practised by Indonesia Mengajar and Perludem and how does this relate to the Indonesian national model of democracy?

## **2.3 Relevance**

### **2.3.1 Scientific relevance**

Comparativists have usually dealt with Indonesia in a cursory manner, integrating it into multi-country and quantitative studies (e.g. Diamond, 2002; Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b; Maleki, 2015), but rarely focus on the country itself, despite the magnitude and importance of Indonesia's democratic transformation.

This is rather surprising, given that Indonesia's transition possesses striking features. Firstly, as the third

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<sup>6</sup> As described in chapter 1, the New Order regime is in no extent to be called 'democratic'. For the readability of this research, however, I refer to the scientific concept of models of democracy for the entire examined period.

<sup>7</sup> This research question will be answered by using a neo-Lijphartian analysis. In Hendriks (2010), Maleki & Hendriks (2014b; 2015), and Maleki (2015), frameworks are created and utilised that build on Lijphart's (2012) work. All of these frameworks will be discussed and used throughout chapters 3, 4, and 5.

most populous democracy in the world Indonesia is especially interesting for political scientists interested in democratic transitions affecting large, heterogeneous states. Secondly, as the state with the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia can offer insights in the relationship between Islam, democracy and development. In the late 2000s some senior comparativists began to take interest in the specific case of Indonesia (e.g. Diamond, 2010; Künkler & Stepan, 2013; Horowitz, 2013) (Mietzner & Aspinall, 2010, pp. 3, 4). This master thesis contributes to the body of scientific knowledge, first, because it purely focuses on Indonesia. It uses other multi-country studies that include Indonesia and places them in a qualitative context for the specific case of Indonesia. Secondly, as mentioned above, scholars have yet to agree on an all-encompassing description about the democratic transformation of Indonesia after the fall of Suharto in 1998. This master thesis tries to do exactly this from the perspective of models of democracy by placing the development in larger theoretical, statistical, and qualitative frameworks. Research on topics of which very little is known (white spots) have the highest scientific relevance, as the knowledge contribution is the greatest (Van Thiel, 2010, p. 21). As mentioned in the problem posing, the relation between culture and models of democracy is an understudied topic. This master thesis thus contributes to the body of scientific knowledge on this matter by studying exactly this topic.

### **2.3.2 Societal relevance**

Why do certain societies adopt and accept one particular model of democracy? Maleki & Hendriks (2014b, p. 20) show that the variance in models of democracy can be significantly explained through cultural orientations. This understudied theoretical notion, however, has great practical implications. It assumes that culture is a significant factor to take into account when looking at why and how countries adopt, accept, and develop their model of democracy. As Carnegie notes (2010, p. 4): *“We cannot simply assume that political agency operates in an unimpeded manner or that structural circumstances directly determine matters. Rather, the alteration and reconstitution of disarticulated political space is a form of (re)negotiation between culture and politics and of that between discourse and practice. That is to say, a country’s societal conventions, cultural practices, and developmental legacies affect an evolving post authoritarian grammar of political action.”*

For the case of Indonesia this means that cultural dimensions should be an important factor to take into account in developing their model of democracy. This means that when executives and political actors propose action and/or changes in the democratic landscape, they should include considerations about Indonesia’s cultural orientations, if, of course, they want their actions to be successful. This master thesis then, is not only valuable to executives and political actors, and policy makers in various organisations and ministries, but also for organisations promoting democracy in articulating their concerns and propose plans.

## **2.4 Research method and design**

### **2.4.1 Research method**

This master thesis adopts a Mixed Method Approach (Creswell, 2003, p. 19). To some extent, this study utilises datasets, as well as a relatively small questionnaire, to interpret the mostly qualitative information. One can think of quantitative datasets and analyses of Indonesia's electoral system, its party system as well as dimensions of Indonesia's national culture. Next to that, since this master thesis is mostly based on literature research, the strategy for this research is existing material, specifically scientific literature. The focus is on international English academic research, but to some extent Dutch academic literature will be used as well. To some degree this research will also make use of international organisations such as Freedom House and the National Democratic Institute, since they can provide interesting insights into measurements of democracy as well as the specific institutional developments of Indonesia. The central question of this research is how the national democratic institutions of Indonesia have been developing and to what extent this development is compatible with dimensions of their national culture. This research focuses on the period between 1990 and 2010 and hence the used (scientific) literature will also mostly fit in this timeframe.

#### *Finding the right literature*

To retrieve the right literature, sources, and information, I mostly used search engines such as WorldCat Discovery, Google Scholar, and Google. Examples of search terms used are democracy, democratic institutions, models of democracy, Indonesian democracy, electoral system Indonesia, etc. Within certain key sources I also used the technique of snow-balling (Soerensen, 2004, p. 5) in which I used the references of other authors to retrieve sources of my own. This technique produced a great amount of sources, such as Diamond (2002), Hofstede & Hofstede (2005), and Horowitz (2013).

Another adopted technique is the trusted-review strategy (Soerensen, 2004, p. 5) in which I used scientific journals to find the proper information. Examples of used journals are Pacific Affairs, Journal of Democracy, and Asian Survey. Lastly, I retrieved many great sources from my contacts in Indonesia and the Netherlands such as Hendriks (2010), Maleki (2015), and Mietzner (2013).

#### *Interviews and questionnaires*

Next to being based on a literature study, this master thesis also makes use of interviews and questionnaires conducted at two organisations in Jakarta Indonesia, namely Indonesia Mengajar and Perludem. Indonesia Mengajar was founded in 2010 by, among others, the current Minister of Education of Indonesia. Their main purpose is for best graduates of Indonesia to teach for one year in remote areas across Indonesia. As of today, they have send over 500 *Pengajar Muda* (the Young Teacher) across seventeen different districts in Indonesia (R. Andika, personal communication, April 2015). At Indonesia

Mengajar six semi-structured interviews were held of around 30 minutes. Nine questionnaires were filled in.

Perludem was founded in the beginning of 2005 and after a period of putting the right pieces together, fully launched in 2010. Perludem is dedicated to making the electoral system in Indonesia better by doing research and advocacy to all the policy-makers. Two aspects they are currently focusing on are campaign finance and an initiative law (compilation of all regulations regarding elections) (R. Sosiawaty, personal communication, April 2015). At Perludem four semi-structured interviews were held of around 30 minutes. Fifteen questionnaires were filled in.

#### **2.4.2 Research design**

##### *Literature study*

To be able to provide a sound answer to the mentioned research question it is important to distinguish between different aspects of the research question. The research question composes of multiple scientific concepts, which need to be explored and explained before it is possible to answer the main question of this research: *How did the national democratic institutions of Indonesia develop between 1990 and 2010 and is this development compatible with dimensions of their national culture?* In short, the concepts are: democracy, models of democracy, national culture, dimensions of culture, national democratic institutional development, and compatibility.

First (chapter 3), it's necessary to go deeper into the concept of democracy itself. After determining the conceptual meaning of democracy the attention will turn towards the operationalisation and measurement of democracy as well as models of democracy (i.e. a specific arrangement of democratic institutions (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 3)). The ability to measure a model of democracy is essential to be able to place the development of Indonesia's model of democracy into a larger comparative framework of models of democracy. This exploration includes making the connection with the specific case for Indonesia in the texts itself. Authors and organisations that will be used in this part of the research are Huntington (1991), Dahl (2000), Zakaria (2007), Norris (2008), Hendriks (2010), Lijphart (2012), Maleki & Hendriks (2015), Freedom House, Polity IV, and the Economist. Afterwards, the attention will be turned to the development of the Indonesian national democratic institutions between 1990 and 2010. Particular interest will be paid to the four rounds of constitutional amendments that have taken place after the fall of the New Order regime as well as analysing this with the work of Lijphart (2012). By looking at institutions such as the electoral system, the system of government, and the system of chambers, there arises a clear overview of the development of the Indonesian national democratic institutions between 1990 and 2010. This is also important as to place Indonesia in a larger comparative framework of models

of democracy and ultimately, to be able to provide a sound answer relating to the question of compatibility. Authors and organisations that will be used in this part of the research are Fukuyama (1995), the National Democratic Institute (1999-2004), Bourchier (2000), Tan (2006), Dagg (2007), Carnegie (2008), Indrayana (2008), Bünthe & Ufen (2009), Ziegenhain (2009).

Secondly (chapter 4), it's necessary to understand the concept of national culture, how it can be measured, and how it relates to (models of) democracy. This will be analysed by referring to dimensions of national culture. Dimensions of national culture are aspects of a national culture. Being able to relate to the dimensions of national culture is essential for placing Indonesia's development into a larger comparative framework of compatibility between models of democracy and dimensions of national culture. Authors that will be used in this part of the research are Schwartz (1999; 2006), Inglehart & Baker (2000), Hofstede (2001; 2006; 2010), House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman (2002), House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman & Gupta (2004), Hendriks (2010), Minkov & Hofstede (2012), Maleki & de Jong (2014), Maleki & Hendriks (2014b), and Maleki (2015).

The third part (chapter 5) of this research focuses on compatibility. Here, attention will be paid to the question what compatibility is, how it relates to models of democracy, and whether the development of Indonesia's national democratic institutions between 1990 and 2010 is culturally compatible (i.e. compatibility between models of democracy and dimensions of national culture). Authors used in this part of the research are Taagepera (1998), Lijphart (1999), Maleki (2015), Maleki & Hendriks (2015) as well as continuing with the information provided in the previous chapters.

The last part (chapter 6) of this master thesis consists of the field research.

### *Field research*<sup>8</sup>

In the previously explained part of this research I examine the development of Indonesia's model of democracy from a transcending viewpoint and discuss their national democratic institutions, their national culture, and the compatibility of Indonesia's model of democracy with dimensions of their national culture. In this part of this master thesis I start from within two Indonesian organisations operating within the democracy of Indonesia (i.e. contribute to the democratic society of Indonesia) as to grasp their 'model of democracy', their *modus operandi* including their organisational culture, and relate it to the bigger structures of the Indonesian model of democracy. This is the part where I really start utilising Hendriks's (2010) study, since it is one of the few explicitly posing a relationship between dimensions of culture and dimensions of democracy (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 4).

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<sup>8</sup> The filled out questionnaires, transcripts of the interviews, and audio clips can be retrieved via the secretariat of the Tilburg School of Politics and Public Administration: [frw.tspb.secretariaat@tilburguniversity.edu](mailto:frw.tspb.secretariaat@tilburguniversity.edu).

Hendriks (2010) theoretically clearly differentiates between relevant notions of democracy. He views political and societal cultures as the foundations underpinning different models of democracy. Patterns of citizenship and leadership are the visible expressions of the different models of democracy (Hendriks, 2010, p. 32). To be able to place the investigated organisations in the theoretical model of Hendriks (2010), I adopted a questionnaire and semi-structured interview. It is asserted that Hendriks's (2010) ideal types can be connected to democratic institutions at different levels, from entire states to democratic organisations (F. Hendriks, personal communication, March 2015).

The questionnaire and semi-structured interview (see appendix A and B) are largely similar since they are designed to complement each other. Firstly, it is difficult to provide a clear representative picture of an organisation based on a small amount of questionnaires. Therefore, the interviews complement the questionnaire in that they provide the results of the questionnaire with a more solid, qualitative fundament. Secondly, the interviews complement the questionnaire in that interviews provide the room for respondents to go into more depth than tightly framed response options.

Lastly, to be able to place the organisations as neatly into the model of Hendriks (2010) as possible, I strictly followed the author's narrative. For example, one dimension that places an organisation or country within the model is societal culture. A first distinction for societal culture, described by Hendriks (2010), is the question whether there exists a situation of 'roles ascribed' or 'roles achieved'. The explanation and justification is the ideal type low-grid culture (roles achieved) in which people themselves decide on the script they play out and are free and equal in doing so. In the ideal type of high-grid culture (roles ascribed) roles are allocated from the outside and are clearly specifying and guiding for people in certain social positions (Hendriks, 2010, p. 38). Accordingly, the relating question in the questionnaire and interview is constructed as such:

4. Tick the box that resembles the factual situation most closely (*one answer possible*).

In my organisation ...:

- peoples' roles are allocated from the outside and specify and guide people in particular social positions.
- people decide themselves about the script they play out and are free and equal in doing so.

**Figure 1:** Example question from the questionnaire underpinning one part of this master thesis.

- Can you tell me about roles (behaviour) in your organisation? (Requirements specifying how people are supposed to act in certain organisational positions).
  - o People themselves decide on the script they play out and are free and equal in doing so?
  - o Roles are allocated from the outside and clearly specifying and guiding for people in certain positions?

**Figure 2:** Example question from the interview underpinning one part of this master thesis.

The complete questionnaire and interview are to be found in appendix A and B.

### Chapter 3      The concept of democracy

*“Democracy has been discussed off and on for about twenty five hundred years, enough time to provide a tidy set of ideas about democracy on which everyone, or nearly everyone could agree. For better or worse, that is not the case” (Dahl, 2000, p. 3).*

Democracy is a contested concept. It gets a lot and sometimes quite contradictory meanings. In practice, there are many forms of democracy, which are all attempts to somehow take into account ‘the will of the people’ (Deschouwer & Hooghe, 2011, p. 89). It is often assumed that there exists only a single superior ‘true democracy’ whereas in reality democracy is a plural phenomenon. The simple contraction of *demos* and *kratia*, the people who rule, gives rise to various forms of thinking and operating. Democracy, therefore, is an essentially contested concept disguised as a commonplace (Hendriks, 2010, pp. xi, 16). As Dahl (2000, p. 3) states, ironically, the very fact that democracy has such a long history actually contributes to confusion and disagreement. Democracy means different things to different people at different times and places. To avoid confusion about ‘democracy’ then, this part of the research considers multiple definitions and conceptualisations of democracy in the hope to shed some light on this multifaceted concept called ‘democracy’.

#### 3.1                      Definitions and essentials

Most definitions of democracy have two aspects in common.<sup>9</sup> First, democracy is about popular influence on government: The rule of the people, either by themselves or through others that are elected, influenced, and controlled by the people. This aspect is central to virtually any general definition of democracy (Dahl, 1971, p. 1; Zakaria, 2007, p. 13; Hendriks, 2010, p. 21; Lijphart, 2012, p. 30). The idea behind this is that people are the driving force and the benchmark of everything that happens in the public domain. Second is the notion of equality in exercising that influence. In all democratic decision-making is the contribution of each citizen, in principle, equal to that of every other citizen (Dahl, 1971, p. 1; Hendriks, 2010, p. 21). These two notions combined lead to the following general definition of democracy:

*“Democracy is a political system in which citizens govern, either by themselves or through others that are elected, influenced, and controlled by the people, in a way that puts each citizen on a par with every other” (Hendriks, 2010, p. 22).*

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<sup>9</sup> Dahl (1971) assumes that a key characteristic of democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equal (Dahl, 1971, p. 1). Zakaria (2007) states that, from its Greek root, ‘democracy’ means ‘the rule of the people’ (Zakaria, 2007, p. 13). Lijphart (2012) states that the basic definition of democracy is: Government by the majority of the people (Lijphart, 2012, p. 30).

There are two aspects important to note when one discusses democracy. First, no actual democracy completely meets the used democratic criteria. Secondly, democracy refers to a goal or ideal as well as to an actuality that is only a partial realisation of the goal (Dahl, 2000, p. 83). However, in all the conceptualisations and definitions of democracy is the notion of electoral contestation the one core element. Having contested elections - free, fair, and frequent enough to legitimise elected officials - is the minimum requirement for democracy, at least at the country level (Huntington, 1991, p. 9; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub & Limongi, 2000, pp. 15, 16; Zakaria, 2007, p. 19; Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 4). As Huntington (1991) states: “*Elections, open, free, and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non*” (Huntington, 1991, p. 9). When a political system satisfies this criterion it is classified as electoral democracy (Diamond, 1996, p. 21; Zakaria, 2007, p. 18; Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 4). Dahl, in 1971 already, considered contestation and participation as the two main dimensions of democracy (Dahl, 1971, p. 4; Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 2). Current minimalist concepts of democracy generally accept the need for minimal levels of civil freedom in order for competition and participation to be meaningful (Diamond, 1996, p. 21).

Zakaria (2007, p. 19), however, deems this definition of democracy “meaningless”. He opts for ‘constitutional liberalism’ focusing not on the procedures for selecting government, but on government’s goals. He states that for people in the West, democracy means ‘liberal democracy’: A political system that next to free and fair elections, is marked by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property. He terms this bundle of freedoms ‘constitutional liberalism’ and states that it has nothing intrinsically to do with democracy and that the two have not always, and still today, gone together (Zakaria, 2007, p. 17).

Nonetheless, the question still remains: What does it mean to say that a country is governed democratically? There should at least be certain (political) institutions that go a long way towards meeting the ideal democratic criteria (Dahl, 2000, p. 83). These (political) institutions are (Dahl, 2000, pp. 85-86):

1. **Elected officials:** Control over government decisions constitutionally rests with officials elected by citizens.
2. **Free, fair, and frequent elections:** Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections.
3. **Freedom of expression:** Citizens have a right to express themselves on (political) matters without danger of severe punishment.
4. **Access to alternative sources of information:** Citizens have a right to seek out alternative and independent sources of information, which actually exist and are not under control of government. Moreover, alternative sources are effectively protected by law.

5. **Associational autonomy:** Next to various rights, including those required for the effective operation of democratic political institutions, citizens have a right to form relatively independent associations or organisations. These include independent political parties and interest groups.
6. **Inclusive citizenship:** No adult that is permanently residing in a country and is subject to its laws can be denied rights that are available and necessary to the five political institutions listed above, including the rights to vote in the election of officials in free and fair elections, to run for elective office, to free expression, to form and participate in independent political organisations, to have access to independent sources of information, and rights to other liberties and opportunities that may be necessary to the effective operation of the political institutions of large-scale democracy.

Thus, in becoming ‘democratic’, first democratic institutions must be established. Two major political institutions should be determined at the very first stage. First is the regime type or the type of political structure. This can be presidential, parliamentary, or a combination. Second is the electoral system. This can be proportional, majoritarian/plurality, or a mixed system. A variety of institutional settings and models of democracy will form as a result of combining these two main institutions as well as their sub-institutions (e.g. district magnitude, electoral threshold, term length) (Maleki, 2015, p. 9). There are many ways in which a democracy can be organised and run, in principle and practice. Modern democracies exhibit a variety of formal governmental institutions (Lijphart, 2012, p. 1). Putting together all the institutional differences of democracies, it is said that democracy is practiced in different models or patterns (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 3). But, as stated earlier, if probably no state ever will be fully democratic, why are all these criteria useful? The simple answer is that they are useful as standards ever can be, namely they provide standards to measure the performance of actual states that claim to be democratic (Dahl, 2000, p. 42).


#### *Definition and operationalisation of democracy*

Keeping in mind the various comments on defining democracy, this research follows the before mentioned definition of democracy: “*Democracy is a political system in which citizens govern, either by themselves or through others that are elected, influenced, and controlled by the people, in a way that puts each citizen on a par with every other*” (Hendriks, 2010, p. 22). I operationalise a country as being a democracy following the logic of Maleki & Hendriks (2015) of a country being an electoral democracy for at least seven consecutive years, including (1) if a country is recognised under concepts seven (restricted election) or eight (competitive election) of Polity IV, (2) if a country’s score of Freedom House’s political rights is lower or equal to four, and (3) if a country’s score of electoral process is higher than five in the Democracy Index (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, pp. 5, 23).

### 3.2 Measuring (models of) democracy

Three aspects have been focused on in the attempts to measure democracy. First is the presence and level of democracy. When can one classify a country as (more or less) democratic (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 2)? Examples of organisations and authors who contribute on this topic are: Freedom House, The Economist Intelligence Unit, the Polity IV project, and Przeworski et al. (2000). Second, the mapping of models of democracy in different countries (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 2). For this, one can look at authors like Lijphart (2012) and Hendriks (2010). Third is the performance of democracies. Research focusses here on, among others, measurements of good governance and effectiveness and legitimacy (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 2). One can turn to an organisation such as The Economist Intelligence Unit for this. The interplay between these three aspects is a repeatedly debated subject in comparative politics, especially the debate whether a superior model of democracy exists (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 2).

Another long lasting subject of interest in political science is the interplay between culture and democracy (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 1). Some scholars focus on the relationship between democratic performance and cultural values (e.g. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Others focus on different arrangements of democratic institutions, that is, models of democracy and its performance (e.g. Lijphart, 2012). Although each of these models have pro- and opponents, important is that there is no empirical evidence that shows the consequent outperformance of one particular model by another. Nonetheless, the interaction between culture and democracy can be studied in different ways, as shown in figure 3 (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, pp. 2, 3).



**Figure 3:** The triangular relations between culture, structure and performance (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 2).<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Figure adopted from Maleki & Hendriks (2014b), nonetheless, ‘this study’ also relates to this master thesis.

### 3.2.1 Measuring the presence, level, and performance of democracy

When democratic ideals are applied to the real world, two things become evident. First, no country satisfies the requirements perfectly and second, countries differ in the degree to which they fulfil them (Elklit, 1994, p. 89). Scholars engaged in comparative research on democratic regimes are in sharp disagreement over a dichotomous or a graded approach to the distinction between democracy and nondemocracy (Collier & Adcock, 1999, p. 537). Multiple questions are relevant to be asked in measuring democracy. Is it, for example, best to adopt a minimalist approach towards measurement by selecting a few key indicators? Should indicators of the concept of democracy be continuous, implying subtle gradations or categorical, suggesting that regimes cross a specific threshold after which they can then be considered democratic? Should the evidence rest on observable ‘objective’ data or subjective evaluations exemplified by expert judgments (Norris, 2008, p. 54)?

#### *Freedom House*

As the website of Freedom House states<sup>11</sup>: “*Freedom House is an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom around the world*”. Freedom, they state, is only possible in democratic environments where governments are accountable to their own people, the rule of law prevails, and freedom of expression, association, belief, as well as respect for the rights of minorities and women are guaranteed.<sup>12</sup> Their report: *Freedom in the World*, is an annual global report on civil liberties and political rights. It doesn’t assess governments or government performance, but the freedoms and rights individuals have. The report is based on the premise that the standards of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights pertain to all territories and countries. Freedom in the world operates from the assumption that liberal democratic societies best achieve freedom for all people.<sup>13</sup>

Before a country is assigned the designation of ‘electoral democracy’, in the 2015 Freedom in the World report, it must have met certain minimum standards for political rights. To be classified as an electoral democracy requires an overall political rights score of 20 or higher and a score of 7 or better in the subcategory of electoral process. Three main questions, divided in sub-questions, make up the subcategory of the electoral process. These are<sup>14</sup>:

- Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?
- Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
- Are the electoral laws and framework fair?

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<sup>11</sup> <https://www.freedomhouse.org/about-us#.VNI3WJ3F98E>

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.freedomhouse.org/about-us#.VNI3WJ3F98E>


<sup>13</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2015/methodology#.VNnCMPnF98E>

<sup>14</sup> [https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Methodology\\_FIW\\_2015.pdf](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Methodology_FIW_2015.pdf)

To be qualified as an electoral democracy a state must have satisfied the following criteria<sup>15</sup>:

- A competitive, multiparty political system;
- Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with exceptions for restrictions that states may legitimately place on citizens as sanctions for criminal offenses);
- Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud, and that yield results that are representative of the public will;
- Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning.

The use of ‘electoral democracy’ by Freedom House differs from ‘liberal democracy’. Liberal democracy also implies a substantial amount of civil liberties being present. Partly free countries can qualify as electoral, but not liberal, democracies.<sup>16</sup> A combination of scores on political rights and civil liberties make up the eventual designation to a country of free, partly free, or not free. A score of 1 is considered the best possible score and a score of 7 the lowest<sup>17</sup>. Indonesia, in the 2015 report, is defined as partly free, with, nonetheless, a score of 2 on political rights. Indonesia scores a 4 on civil liberties (Freedom in the World, 2015, p.23). In figure 4 are the scores of Indonesia listed from the year 1998 to the year 2015.



**Figure 4:** Freedom rating, civil liberties, and political rights of Indonesia, since 1998.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/methodology#.VNHK3p2-18E>

<sup>16</sup> [https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Methodology\\_FIW\\_2015.pdf](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Methodology_FIW_2015.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> [https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Methodology\\_FIW\\_2015.pdf](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Methodology_FIW_2015.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> Data missing for the year 2000. Table derived from <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/indonesia#.VZTiYvmqpBc> 1998 onwards.

## *Polity IV*

Polity IV is part of the Center for Systemic Peace. This centre is involved in research on the problem of political violence within the structural context of the dynamic global system. They record and report their findings freely and openly because of the conviction that an active and informed public is the guarantor of good governance.<sup>19</sup> Their global report: *Conflict, Governance and State Fragility*, monitors key trends in societal-system development, governance, and armed conflict.<sup>20</sup> The Polity IV Project codes authority characteristics of states in the world system. Their dataset covers all independent, major states in the world within the period 1800-2013. States must have a total population of 500,000 or more, which currently<sup>21</sup> are 167 countries.<sup>22</sup> The Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, focuses on annual, cross-national time-series, and polity-case formats coding democratic and autocratic ‘patterns of authority’ and regime changes.<sup>23</sup>

The Polity conceptual scheme examines simultaneous qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions on a range of governing authority spanning from fully institutionalised democracies, through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes (termed ‘anocracies’), to fully institutionalised autocracies.<sup>24</sup> The scheme is made up of six component measures which record key qualities of executive recruitment, and constraints on executive authority and political competition. Next to that, it records changes in the institutionalised qualities of governing authority. The data includes information on the institutions of the central government and on political groups (re)acting within that authority.<sup>25</sup>

The eventual score captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The score can be converted into regime categories in a three part categorisation. ‘Autocracies’ (-10 to -6), ‘anocracies’ (-5 to +5 and three values: -66, -77 and -88) and ‘democracies’ (+6 to +10).<sup>26,27</sup> In figure 5 are the Polity IV scores for Indonesia between 1945 and 2014 listed.

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<sup>19</sup> <http://www.systemicpeace.org/mission.html>

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.systemicpeace.org/globalreport.html>

<sup>21</sup> At the moment of writing this, the Polity IV project is developing a new “improved and enhanced” Polity 5 version, because in the ‘new order’ greater democratic authority is more widely employed. “*As autocratic authority grows obsolete, forward-looking research will require better information on processes of ‘democratization’*”. The Polity 5 Country Reports will include full ‘process tracing’ for every country within the entire contemporary period, 1945-present and a full, chronological record of every coded Polity change for that country.

<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html> ; <http://www.systemicpeace.org/csprandd.html>

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>


<sup>23</sup> <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>

<sup>27</sup> For a more extensive reading on Polity IV’s concepts see <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2013.pdf>



**Figure 5:** Regime trends Indonesia, 1945-2014.<sup>2829</sup>

*Democracy Index*

*“Free and fair elections and civil liberties are necessary conditions for democracy, but they are unlikely to be sufficient for a full and consolidated democracy if unaccompanied by transparent and at least minimally efficient government, sufficient political participation and a supportive democratic political culture. It is not easy to build a sturdy democracy. Even in long-established ones, democracy can corrode if not nurtured and protected.”<sup>30</sup>*

The Democracy Index argues that measurements reflecting the status of civil liberties and political freedoms are not ‘thick’ enough. These measurement don’t encompass the quality of a democracy or how substantive it is. In the view of the Economist Intelligence Unit, democracy is a social fabric composing of many and varied institutions, political organisations, and associations. Government is only one element of democracy (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, pp. 36-37). Their score snapshots 165 independent states and two territory’s state of democracy. On a range of indicators within these categories their score categorises each country as full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid regime, or authoritarian regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, p. 1).

<sup>28</sup>Data retrieved from <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html> ; <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>

<sup>29</sup>Polity data is used for the creation of this chart. For further information see (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2014, p. 17).

<sup>30</sup> [http://www.eiu.com/public/topical\\_report.aspx?campaignid=Democracy0115](http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=Democracy0115)

The Economist Intelligence Unit measures democracy on a 0 to 10 scale<sup>31</sup>, based on the ratings of 60 indicators. The indicators are grouped into five categories: political culture, political participation, the functioning of government, civil liberties, and electoral process and pluralism. Each category has a rating on the same 0 to 10 point scale, and the simple average of the five categories is the overall index of democracy. The index measures several features such as public opinion surveys, participation and voter turnout, and the legislative and executive branches (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, pp. 37, 39). The eventual index values are used to place countries within one of the four types of regimes (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, pp. 37-38):

- **Full democracies** (score 8-10): Countries where basic political freedoms and civil liberties are respected and supported by a political culture that is favourable to the prosperity of democracy. Also, the government functions in a satisfactory manner, there exists an effective system of checks and balances, the media are independent and diverse, the judiciary is independent, judicial decisions are enforced, and the functioning of democracy only shows limited problems.
- **Flawed democracies** (score 6 to 7,9): Countries where free and fair elections and basic civil liberties are respected. There are, however, significant weaknesses in different aspects of democracy, such as problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture, and low levels of political participation.
- **Hybrid regimes** (score 4 to 5,9): Countries where elections have substantial irregularities, which makes them mostly unfree and unfair. Government pressure on opposition may be common. There are serious weaknesses in political culture, functioning of government, and political participation. Corruption is usually widespread and the rule of law, as well as civil society, is weak. There is usually pressure on and harassment of journalists and the judiciary is not independent.
- **Authoritarian regimes** (below 4): Here, political pluralism is absent or heavily circumscribed. Mostly, these countries are dictatorships where some formal institutions of democracy may exist, but have little substance. Elections, if they occur, are not free and fair. Abuses and infringements of civil liberties are apparent. Media are usually (in)directly state-owned. Repression of criticism exists as well as pervasive censorship. The judiciary is not independent.

With an overall rank of 49 in the Democracy Index 2014, Indonesia falls in the category of ‘flawed democracies’ (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, p. 5). The score on different categories is shown in

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<sup>31</sup> For a more elaborate explanation of the methodology see (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, p. 37).

table 1. To put this score in perspective; the lowest score is for North Korea with a 1.08 and the highest score is for Norway with a 9.93 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, pp. 3-8).

	Rank	Overall score	Electoral process and pluralism	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties
Indonesia	49	6.95	7.33	7.14	6.67	6.25	7.35


**Table 1:** The score of Indonesia on the Democracy Index 2014 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, p. 5).

The development of the index value of Indonesian democracy since 2006 is shown in table 2.

	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	2008	2006
Indonesia	6.95	6.82	6.76	6.53	6.53	6.34	6.41

**Table 2:** Development of Indonesian democracy since 2006 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, p. 12).

The Indonesian democracy is since 2006 continuously defined by the Economist Intelligence Unit as a flawed democracy. Nonetheless, when the same table is presented in figure 6, it clearly shows an upward development of the Indonesian democracy, according to the data of the Economist Intelligence Unit.



**Figure 6:** Development of Indonesian democracy since 2006 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, p. 12).

### 3.2.2 (Models of) democracy and performance

If we look at figure 3, Lijphart (2012) investigated the relationship between ‘performance’ and ‘structure’ of democracy (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, pp. 3, 4). Relating to the structure, Lijphart (2012) differentiates between the majoritarian model and the consensus model of democracy. First, he asks himself the question: When democracy is defined as ‘government by and for the people’ it raises the fundamental question to whose interests should the government be receptive when the people have different preferences and are in disagreement and who will do the governing? Basically, there are two

answers possible. The first is: The majority of the people. This relates to the essence of the majoritarian (or Westminster) model of democracy. The second is: As many people as possible. This relates to the essence of the consensus model of democracy (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 1-2).

Lijphart (2012, pp. 3, 174) distinguishes between two dimensions of democratic institutions. The first is the executives-parties (joint-power) dimension that categorises five characteristics of organising executive power, the party and electoral systems, and interest groups. The second dimension is the federal-unitary (divided-power) dimension, which relates to the contrast between federalism and unitary government. The two dimensions are divided in ten dichotomies between the majoritarian and consensus model of democracy. The variables are logically connected and are expected to occur together in the real world. They are, however, all variables on which specific countries may be at a different point of the continuum. Below, the majoritarian characteristic is listed first with each point (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 2-4):

The executives-parties dimension:

1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions;
2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant versus executive-legislative balance of power;
3. Two-party versus multiparty systems;
4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional representation (PR);
5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competitions among groups versus coordinated and 'corporatist' interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation.

The federal-unitary dimension:

1. Unitary and centralised government versus federal and decentralised government;
2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature versus division of legislative power between two equally strong but different constituted houses;
3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities versus constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities;
4. Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation versus systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts;
5. Central banks that are dependent on the executive versus independent central banks.

Lijphart (2012) furthermore asks the question: Does the type of democracy make a difference, especially with reference to the quality of democracy and effective policy-making? He concludes that consensus

democracies score significantly higher on a range of indicators relating to democratic quality and that they also have better records with regard to governing effectiveness (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 7-8). He states that the consensus democracy clearly outperforms the majoritarian democracies with regard to the quality of democracy and democratic representation as well as with, what he calls kindness and gentleness<sup>32</sup> of, their public policy orientations. Moreover, consensus democracies have obvious advantages for large countries and for countries with deep religious and ethnic divisions (Lijphart, 2012, p. 295).

Looking at Lijphart's (2012) ten variables, nine relate to the internal state structure. Only the variable of interest group system relates to the institutionalised relations between the state and society (Hendriks, 2010, p. 51). However, the underlying logic of Westminster democracy also has quite a forceful effect on the external state structure. The logic – indirect and majoritarian – is more far-reaching than the formal structures at the macro-level. The same is true for the logic of consensus democracy, which goes beyond the structures of the national state in a formal sense (Hendriks, 2010, pp. 50, 51, 67).

Norris (2008) focuses on the impact of power-sharing institutions on patterns of democratisation (2008, p. 5). In her work *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?*, she also assesses the relation between democratic institutions and quality of democracy (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 3). Norris (2008) states that because of the stagnation of democratisation in the twenty-first century it is time to take a new look at the capacity of institutional reforms to facilitate sustainable democratic regimes, specifically if power-sharing institutions can reduce political instability in states experiencing internal conflict. By using global comparisons from 1972 to 2004 the study re-examines classic questions about the potential impact of political institutions in fostering sustainable democracy and aims to understand how the process of democratisation is strengthened by proportional electoral systems, federal and decentralised forms of government, parliamentary executives, and freedom of the press (Norris, 2008, p. xi).

The study of Norris (2008) focuses on two neighbouring states in West Africa: Benin and Togo, which took very different paths on the road to democracy although the similarities between the countries are great. Benin and Togo both come from French colonial rule. Moreover, both the countries are poor, multi-ethnic societies, both became independent in 1960, and both became military dictatorships after a few years of fragile parliamentary democracies. However, one made the transition to a relatively successful regime with elections rated by observers as free and fair and a peaceful and orderly transition of power from governing to opposition parties. The other remains an unreconstructed and corrupt military-backed autocracy (Norris, 2008, p. 3).

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<sup>32</sup> Consensus democracies are more likely to be welfare states, they have a better record relating to the protection of the environment, they have fewer people in prison, and they are less likely to execute the death penalty (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 274-275). Later, they are referred to as: A strong community orientation and social consciousness (Lijphart, 2012, p. 287).

The term of power-sharing regimes is accepted broadly in international relations and political science. It was derived from the concept of ‘consociational democracy’, ‘consensus democracy’, or ‘negotiation democracy’.<sup>33</sup> The primary idea of these concepts is that power-sharing institutions and procedures, in multi-ethnic societies that are divided into different linguistic, religious, or national communities, create a context in which political opponents are turned into cooperative partners by giving (communal) leaders a guaranteed part in the democratic process. Power-concentrating regimes, in contrast, offer these rival communities a ‘zero-sum game’, resulting in losers having fewer incentives to work within the conventional political structures and rules (Norris, 2008, pp. 3-4).

Norris (2008) defines and conceptualises power-sharing or power-concentrating regimes in terms of four formal institutional features (Norris, 2008, p. 5):

- The basic type of *electoral system* (shaping patterns of party competition and coalition governments);
- The horizontal concentration of powers in the type of *executive*;
- The vertical centralisation of power in *unitary or federal states*; and
- The structure and independence of the *mass media*.

Norris (2008) concludes that power-sharing arrangements in her study include four features that are the basic building blocks either used in combination or separately (Norris, 2008, pp. 209-210):

- Proportional electoral systems with low vote thresholds and reserved seats facilitate the inclusion of minority parties in the legislature, which opens the door to representation in multiparty coalitional cabinet government;
- Federal and decentralised arrangements allow minor parties to build a local power base and some degree of regional autonomy in the communities where their support is most concentrated;
- In parliamentary monarchies, prime ministers face many checks and balances on their decision-making authority. This includes the cabinet and the legislature with the ultimate sanction of removal from office;
- An independent pluralistic news media in civil society, free of state control, scrutinises the conduct of the powerful, expands transparency, accountability, and open government, and provides the foundation for informed choices by the electorate.

Norris (2008) concludes that electoral systems with proportional representation are more democratic, especially in divided societies, than majoritarian systems (Norris, 2008, p. 211). Next to that,

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<sup>33</sup> For a more extensive review on the subject see Andeweg (2000).

parliamentary monarchies are better at democratic consolidation compared with presidential republics. The incentives for cooperation and consultation between the legislative and executive in parliamentary systems are likely to promote accommodation and compromise which fosters stability (Norris, 2008, p. 212). Federal arrangements, compared to unitary states, are associated with a stronger force of democracy. Lastly, for strengthening democratic consolidation and transitions is the free press one of the main institutions (Norris, 2008, p. 213).

### **3.2.3 Models of democracy**

Figure 3 shows, however, that none of the above mentioned authors investigate the relation between models of democracy and cultural orientations. The most understudied side of the triangle is the relation between cultural orientations and models of democracy, although cultural orientations are likely to underpin different democratic tastes (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, pp. 3, 4). This is where I arrive at the work of Hendriks (2010) *Vital Democracy: A theory of Democracy in Action*. His study is one of the few explicitly posing a relationship between dimensions of culture and dimensions of democracy (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 4). He celebrates a multiform conception of democracy, arguing that democracy can take many forms: “*The universalist concept of ‘Western democracy’ – a concept that might be ‘bestowed’ or ‘forced’, depending on one’s point of view, on ‘non-Western countries’ – does not match the multiform reality of democracy*” (Hendriks, 2010, p. 30). In his study he theoretically argues that societal cultures and political cultures are the fundamentals underpinning different models of democracy (Hendriks, 2010, p. 32), hereby conceptualising the relation between compatible socio-political cultures and models of democracy (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 4).

I will return to the theoretical relation between political and societal culture and models of democracy, extensively, in the next chapters. First, I will discuss the typology of models of democracy of Hendriks (2010).

Hendriks (2010) developed an extended typology building on Lijphart (1999; 2012), introducing four basic models of democracy (Hendriks, 2010, p. xiv) by adding the distinction direct versus indirect democracy and using the distinction aggregative versus integrative, closely related to Lijphart’s (2012) majoritarian versus consensus dimension (Hendriks, 2010, p. 17). He distinguishes four models of democracy: pendulum democracy, voter democracy, participatory democracy, and consensus democracy. The four models are derived from interrelating two well-known dimensions in theories of democracy that are commonly kept apart (Hendriks, 2010, p. 26-28):

- **Aggregative versus integrative democracy:** Central here is the question: How are democratic decisions taken? Are they taken in an aggregative process (50%+1), even when there are sizeable minorities? Or are decisions taken in an integrative process where the widest possible agreement is attempted to be reached (Hendriks, 2010, p. 26)?
- **Direct versus indirect democracy:** Central here is the question: Who eventually takes the decision? Do citizens point out representatives or do they eventually take the decisions themselves (Hendriks, 2010, pp. 26-27)?

This leads to the four models of democracy listed in figure 7 below.

	<i>Aggregative</i> (majoritarian)	<i>Integrative</i> (non-majoritarian)
<i>Indirect</i> (representative)	Pendulum democracy	Consensus democracy
<i>Direct</i> (self-governing)	Voter democracy	Participatory democracy

**Figure 7:** Models of democracy (Hendriks, 2010, p. 27).

It is important to note that the four basic models of democracy in practise never occur in their unadulterated purity. Democracy is always a hybrid, drawing on different models of democracy (Hendriks, 2010, p. 29).

**Pendulum democracy:** In the pendulum model of democracy political power alternates between two competing political parties. It is fundamentally indirect and representative. Citizens periodically cast their vote on representatives and let them use their decision-making powers. Executive power is monopolised by the winning party by aggregative majoritarian rule. Citizen participation here, focusses on periodical elections (Hendriks, 2010, p. 27).

A movement that resembles a pendulum motion is mobilised and sustained, is institutionalised, in the pendulum democracy. From left to right, politico-administrative power follows the movement of the pendulum, which follows the movement of the electorate. ‘The winner takes all’. The one with the most votes receives everything even if the competitor only has a few less votes. If you don’t have the majority of the seats in parliament, your say in government will be little. This is accepted. One time the movement of the pendulum will benefit the one and the other time the other. However, in between elections and if they don’t have a majority, it’s more difficult for citizens to enforce movement (Hendriks, 2010, pp. 49-

50). Westminster democracy, with parliamentary sovereignty at its centre, is a powerful symbol of pendulum democracy. The Westminster democracy can be safely called an archetype of pendulum democracy as well as its best-known operationalisation. Concentration and centralisation of power are the main characteristics of the Westminster democracy (Hendriks, 2010, pp. 50-51).

**Consensus democracy:** This basic model of democracy is developed in the context of historically divided societies. The general model is indirect and integrative. Decisions are made by representatives aiming to establish consensus and the majority preferably does not overrule minorities by simply 'counting heads' (Hendriks, 2010, pp. 28-29).

Within the context of consensus democracy are the institutional patterns of power distribution and power sharing that supplement one another. With power being dispersed and power being segmental, governors are, as it were, institutionally condemned to each other, forced to establish forms of cooperation. In consensus democracy, to be able to accomplish anything at all, you need to secure the cooperation of others, because power is always contingent, always dependent on power that is based elsewhere. The others are often involved in a great many matters (Hendriks, 2010, pp. 67-68).

**Voter democracy:** This basic model of democracy combines aggregative decision-making with direct rule. Citizens here cast their votes e.g. in referenda or town meetings. Votes and preferences can be aggregated efficiently and numerically. Decisions are taken by majority rule (Hendriks, 2010, pp. 27-28).

In voter democracy, a direct, unmediated form of democracy, propelled by citizens themselves is favoured above an indirect form of democracy which is mediated by representatives. Measuring preference indicators by aggregation (i.e. by counting votes) takes preference over integration through discussion. Citizens take pride in their role as voters: Individuals who raise hands in town meetings, press buttons in referenda, tick preference boxes in questionnaires, etc. Public discourse for the sake of discourse, is less important (Hendriks, 2010, p. 86).

**Participatory democracy:** The participatory model of democracy combines self-governance with integrative decision-making. Here, a minority will be included, not excluded, and will never simply be overruled by a numerical majority. Decision-making is a process of deliberation to seek consensus. The widespread involvement of all in every stage of decision-making is considered the best way to ensure legitimacy (Hendriks, 2010, p. 28).

In participatory democracy, democracy is ideally shaped interactively through bottom-up processes. That democratic processes are driven by participants in the public domain takes preference over being driven

by representatives. Democratic processes are interactive, as well in the consideration of plans and in the implementation of plans. Democracy is decision-making as well as doing (Hendriks, 2010, p. 107).

### **3.2.4 The operationalisation of theory mapping democratic models**

While the work of Lijphart (2012) is one of the most comprehensive attempts to categorise models of democracy systematically, it has focused only on established democracies. There is no extensive operationalisation of models of democracy evaluating a broader range of countries in a systematic way, including new democracies<sup>34</sup> (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 1). Maleki & Hendriks (2015) attempt to fill this gap and take a new step in the measurement of models of democracy by operationalising 80 electoral democracies between 1990 and 2009 on two fundamental dimensions of democracy: Contestation and participation (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, pp. 1, 4).

Maleki & Hendriks (2015) use three distinguished studies evaluating country's level of democracy (Polity IV, Freedom in the World, and Democracy Index) and select 80 countries having enjoyed electoral democracy for at least seven consecutive years from 1990 to 2009. The seven consecutive years is chosen, because a country can have at least two elections in that period (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 5). They consider a country an electoral democracy in case of the following scores: (1) if a country is recognised under concepts seven (restricted election) or eight (competitive election) of Polity IV, (2) if a country's score of Freedom House's political rights is lower or equal to four, and (3) if a country's score of electoral process is higher than five in the Democracy Index (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 23).<sup>35</sup>


As mentioned earlier, electoral contestation is a core element in virtually all conceptualisations and definitions of democracy. There is, however, need for a second dimension. Regimes might permit opposition to a very small or very large proportion of the population, but they vary in the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal field in contesting the conduct of the government (i.e. to participate in the system of public contestation) (Dahl, 1971, p. 4). Contestation and participation (or inclusiveness Dahl, 1971, p. 4; Coppedge, Alvarez & Maldonado, 2008, p. 633) can be studied by two different approaches. In the first approach is the constitutional 'right' or facilitation of contestation and participation evaluated. This relates to institutional capabilities that establish the required degree or 'level of democracy'. Before a political system is recognised as an electoral democracy, a

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<sup>34</sup> V-Dem is an extensive collaboration working towards exactly this. However, at the moment of writing, their data has yet to be released: <https://v-dem.net/en/>

<sup>35</sup> In the occasional situation that Polity IV doesn't have a final assessment for a country or there is a lack of complete consensus between studies, the authors evaluate the case based on the highest consensus between the criteria. Moreover, there are some more electoral democracies in the world but because of the the lack of data required (i.e. non-electoral participation, election results) for multiple small countries, they couldn't include them in their study (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, pp. 23, 24).

certain threshold needs to be passed. The second approach measures the actual amount, or ‘rate’, of contestation and participation. This is about practical realities and is used to measure the particular ‘model of democracy’, i.e. the amount of contestation and participation determines the amount of differing variants of electoral democracy in practice (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, pp. 2-3). Figure 8 illustrates the difference between the two approaches.



**Figure 8:** The difference between measuring the ‘level of democracy’ (left) vs. variants of electoral democracy in practice (right) (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 3).

Lack of constitutional rights may obstruct actual participation and contestation, but the amount of these rights do not completely define the actual pattern or amount of participation and contestation, because the actual amount of participation (versus spectating) and contestation (versus pacification) varies in different democracies. Different models of democracy in action are produced by this variety and they are different for different countries. For the mapping of different models of democracy in action, contestation and participation need to be operationalised (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 3).

### *Contestation*

Contestation can be viewed as the necessary aspect of democracy, but the desire for it differs and thus can be institutionalised differently (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 5). Norris (2008) adopts the power-sharing versus power-concentrating regimes, while Lijphart (2012) differentiates between majoritarian and consensus forms of democracy. Power fragmentation and power distribution conceptualise contestation in practise. Power fragmentation becomes apparent through the independence and role of political bodies (i.e. executive and legislative as well as the number of parties that compete to take control of these

bodies). Power distribution becomes apparent through each party's power share and the power sharing of different bodies. The distribution of power is regulated through the electoral system (majoritarian, proportional representation, and mixed) and the types of regime ((semi-) parliamentary and (semi-) presidential) (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, pp. 5-6). Three attributes are used to operationalise contestation.

First, the Effective Number of Parties in Parliament (ENPP). The ENPP is the number of hypothetical equal-size parties that would have the same total effect on fractionalisation of the system as the actual parties of unequal size (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979, p. 4). The ENPP of a country has to be more than one to be democratic. Having multiple parties in parliament is a characteristic of integrative democracy. The Logarithm of Effective Number of Parties in Parliament (LENP) weighs an increase of for example the ENPP from two to three with higher relative importance than the increase from nine to ten (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, pp. 6-7). Secondly, the Number of Parties in Government (NPG).<sup>36</sup> The NPG differentiates between one-party and multi-party government by employing the Laakso & Taagepera (1979) formula (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 7). The NPG score of Maleki & Hendriks (2015) integrates the influence of presidentialism: In a country with a presidential system the president usually belongs to the party leading the cabinet. There are, however, also some countries that have a presidential system and a multi-party cabinet. Commonly, these are semi-presidential systems where a cabinet needs parliamentary support (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 24).

Thirdly, Total Electoral Proportionality (TEP). An essential determinant of power distribution in a country is the electoral system. Disproportionality is an important indicator of the electoral system, measuring the difference between the seats each party acquires in an election and the percentage of votes (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, pp. 7-8). Lastly, the Integrative Dimension of Democracy (IDD). By combining the three indicators of political contestation an index is developed for measuring the integrative (vs. aggregative) dimension of democracy. The IDD index is a replication of the executives-parties dimension of Lijphart (2012) using simpler, widely available, and updated measures and categorises a larger number of countries. The IDD-index operationalises the political cooperation (vs. contestation) dimension systematically (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, pp. 8- 9).

### *Participation*

Two aspects of participation are relevant here. A democracy must institutionalise and facilitate participation for its citizens (e.g. freedom of association, free and fair elections, freedom of speech) and people should use their participation rights. Other indices (e.g. Freedom House) assess political rights. However, an independent index is needed to measure the actual or 'realised participation' (Maleki &

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
<sup>36</sup> NPG also refers to fragmentation in the executive (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 7) and is also called cabinet inclusiveness (Ganghof, 2012, p. 116).

Hendriks, 2015, p. 10). Three forms of political action are assessed. First, General-Electoral Participation (GEP). For this the voter turnout is used. In (semi-)presidential systems the authors use the average turnout of parliamentary and presidential elections (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 11). The turnout is usually measured by using two different formulas. The first is the percentage of the total number of votes divided by the registered voters (voting eligible population). The second is called the Voting Age Population (VAP) turnout that includes all citizens above the legal voting age (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 24). For countries with a compulsory voting system, a reduction coefficient is applied (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 11). Secondly, the Referendum-Electoral Participation (REP). This indicator for measuring referendum-based participation, both at national and local level, constitutes the average number of referenda in a decade. Different weights are used for different types of referendums (top-down vs. bottom-up), different levels (national vs. local), and different effects (binding vs. advisory) for the period of 1990 to 2009 (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, pp. 12-13).

Thirdly, Non-electoral Participation (NEP). For this indicator the manifestation ‘political action’ (‘protest participation’) is used. Within multiple large-scale questionnaires (e.g. World Value Survey, European Value Survey) the authors look for political action through three forms as suitable measurements for non-electoral participation: ‘attending lawful demonstrations’, ‘joining in boycotts’, and ‘signing a petition’, because in different countries these can be considered as alternatives to each other. The score of the measure is assumed to be the number of respondents who indicate ‘have done’ for each action (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 13). Lastly, the Participative Dimension of Democracy (PDD). The PDD is measured through the three indicators using a 3:1:1 relationship as ratio of respectively the GEP, REP, and NEP. The IDD and PDD dimension of democracy are independent and non-integrable (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, pp. 14, 15).

#### **3.2.4.1 Indonesia’s model of democracy**

The main purpose of Maleki & Hendriks (2015) is the operationalisation of models of democracy on two dimensions, contestation and participation, and as a result the ability to construct a comparative map of electoral democracies for the years 1990-2009 (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 15). Henceforth, by extracting the empirical scores, they distinguish four typical combinations of types of democracy. The combinations are derived from two axes. Firstly, the integrative (vs. aggregative) dimension of democracy, which is represented by the horizontal axis in figures 9 and 10. Secondly, the participative (vs. spectative) dimension of democracy, which is represented by the vertical axis in figures 9 and 10 (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 15). Lastly, a fifth category is distinguished with countries having such a substantially low level of democratic participation that the category is called *abstention democracy*. Countries like Guatemala, Paraguay, Mali, Zambia, and Senegal fit in this category (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 18).



**Figure 9:** A two-dimensional map of democracy for 1990 to 2009 with the electoral system highlighted (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 16).

INS, in figures 9 and 10, is the country-code for Indonesia. Figure 9 shows the electoral system of each country and their model of democracy on two dimensions. It is quite clear that Indonesia falls in the integrative part of the distinction. For the participative/spectative distinction, however, Indonesia just falls within the participative part. Figure 9 shows that all countries with a majoritarian electoral system<sup>37</sup> are placed within the left side of the map and that the countries with a proportional system are dispersed on the horizontal axis. This indicates that institutions of proportional representation are favourable to the integrative model of democracy, but are not necessarily connected to it (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 18).

<sup>37</sup> Although India, supposedly, has a mainly majoritarian type of democracy, it displays crucial elements of power-sharing theory (Lijphart, 1996, p. 258).

Figure 10 shows all the countries with their regime type. Most of the presidential regimes are located within the left side of the map, being aggregative, but there are exceptions such as Indonesia. These cases show that for a country, regime type only doesn't determine the level of participative or integrative democracy (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 18). Indonesia, being a presidential regime, scores relatively high on the Integrative Dimension of Democracy.




Figure 10: A two-dimensional map of democracy for 1990 to 2009 with the regime type highlighted (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 17).

Maleki & Hendriks (2015) suggest that the level and performance of democracy in a country is not per se determined by the shape of a democratic model (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 21). After all, ‘full democracies’ like the United States, France, and the Netherlands all have different democratic institutions (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 4). From their operationalisation, one can conclude that the ‘model’ of democracy, as operationalised by them for a wide spectrum of electoral democracies on two dimensions

of democracy, is different than other aspects of democracy, being 'level' and 'performance' of democracy. The authors continue by stating that the acceptance and effectiveness of models of democracy are context-sensitive. This means that models of democracy can be effective and credible in one context, while being problematic and ineffective in another context. They argue that, in order to be vital, "*models of democracy should be compatible with the context of democracy*" (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 21).

One last interesting point to mention as a result of figures 9 and 10 concerns the placement of different models of democracies within the model. Looking at Indonesia's placing, we can see that it almost completely overlaps with Finland. Nonetheless, their democracies (in practise) are of course not the same. Their scores within the provided model are. For example, Finland ranks 8<sup>th</sup> on the Democracy Index 2014 with an overall score of 9,03 while Indonesia ranks 49<sup>th</sup> with an overall score of 6,95 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, pp. 4, 5). This simple observation proves the value of in-depth studies to truly understand Indonesia's model of democracy (i.e. the difference between the formal democratic institutions and informal institutions), outside the scope of larger frameworks categorising multiple (models of) democracies.

### 3.3 Indonesia's national democratic institutions between 1990 and 2010

#### *Institutions under Suharto (1967-1998)*

Suharto's New Order regime, established by the Indonesian military, came into existence in 1966 and lasted for more than 30 years until 1998 (Bünte & Ufen, 2009, p. 9). Its political structure was a steep pyramid dominated by the single office of the presidency (Liddle, 1985, p. 71). Using his political vehicle, functional group (*Golongan Karya*), or Golkar (Dagg, 2007, p. 47) and the military, he repressed political opposition, freedom of expression, other human rights, and local desires for greater political autonomy. Social stability was imposed by presidential decrees (Hainsworth, Turner & Webster, 2007, p. 42).

Six elections were held during the New Order, all of which organised under conditions that ensured Suharto's hold on power (Dagg, 2007, p. 47). Three parties were allowed to content in the elections: Golkar, The United Development Party (PPP), and the PDI (Emmerson, 1999, p. 346). Basically, parliament exercised no control over the government. Most of the members in parliament received seats for their loyalty to Suharto or the military leadership and, in general, the DPR did not challenge any of the policies of the government (Ziegenhain, 2009, p. 38). The manipulated electoral system as well as oil revenues to buy political legitimacy and international support helped him to stay in power for more than three decades (Hainsworth et al., 2007, p. 42). The rapid growth of urban industrial agglomerates focused on Java. Outside Java (foreign) investors benefitted from timber, mining, and palm oil at the expense of the local people (Emmerson, 1999, p. 104).

Democratic participation for civilians was limited to taking part in managed elections (Dagg, 2007, p. 47). Voting was compulsory and turnouts averaged around 92 per cent across the six elections (Tan, 2006, p. 105). The voter turnout for the 1992 and 1997 parliamentary elections was approximately 91 per cent and 89 per cent respectively. The VAP turnout was approximately 88 per cent and 93 per cent respectively.<sup>38</sup> In all of the Suharto years Golkar received around 62 per cent and 74,5 per cent of the seats in the DPR (Dagg, 2007, p. 48).

The MPR consisted of the DPR plus 500 regional (*Utusan Daerah*) and functional group representatives (*Utusan Golongan*) (e.g. peasants, entrepreneurs (Harijanti & Lindsey, 2006, p. 145)). Three kinds of appointed members seated in the MPR: Presidential appointees, representatives of provincial legislators, and party representatives (Dagg, 2007, p. 48). The job of the MPR was to elect the president every five years (Bourchier, 2000, p. 18). Next to that, the MPR was empowered to draw up the government's five-year mandate under the original 1945 Constitution; the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN: *Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara*) (Dagg, 2007, p. 48). The GBHN was drafted by the National Defence and

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<sup>38</sup> [http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=101#\\_\\_topdoc\\_\\_](http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=101#__topdoc__)

Security Council, which was military-dominated, and presented to the MPR as an unchangeable fact (NDI, 1999, p. 20). The MPR and the DPR being basically a rubber stamp and Suharto's ability to direct them, enabled him to hold the presidency and control all major policies for 32 years (Dagg, 2007, p. 48).

*Political reform after Suharto: Habibie's transition phase (1998-1999)*

With the fall of the New Order, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, Suharto's latest vice president, assumed the presidency in May 1998 (Thompson, 1999, p. 3). The fall of the New Order marked a crucial turning point for the legislature of Indonesia. Although important changes were made, the composition of the DPR basically remained unchanged for over a year. It passed the necessary laws to ensure free and fair elections (Ziegenhain, 2009, p. 38). Habibie embarked on a course of political reform, promising fresh elections for spring 1999. He released political prisoners, decentralised political power, allowed political parties to operate freely, and liberalised press laws. All this paved the way for the first free and fair parliamentary elections in Indonesia since 1955 on June 7<sup>th</sup> 1999 (Bünthe & Ufen, 2009, p. 3).

An early priority of the reform movement was to bring fundamental change to the structure of the government including the way leaders were elected. The aim was to create checks and balances to make sure that power could not again be concentrated by a small group of people (Dagg, 2007, p. 48).

Constitutional reform was one of the basic demands since many Indonesians believe that the 1945 Constitution was a contributing factor to the rise of authoritarian dictatorship. The MPR is the only body that can establish and amend the constitution according to the 1945 Constitution (NDI, 2000, p. i). The original 1945 Constitution was vaguely worded, since it was written as an emergency and temporary document. Non-democratic interpretations of it were therefore possible. The 1945 Constitution created a weak judiciary and legislature and a strong executive. Among the three sections of government were few checks and balances. Moreover, there were few guarantees on basic civil and political rights (NDI, 2000, p. 1). The 1945 Constitution to most Indonesians however, had strong enduring and emotional significance as a founding pillar of the Republic of Indonesia's unitary state and as a symbol of the struggle from colonialism for independence (Ellis, 2002, pp. 116-117).

A key demand of the opponents of Suharto's regime was that a package of five political laws introduced in 1985 to be scrapped. These laws made it impossible for any opposition to win power and structured the legislative institutions to keep belonging to Suharto. Habibie made it a priority to revise these laws and to work out a new system of elections and representation that could be accommodated within the existing 1945 Constitution (Bourchier, 2000, p. 17). A hybrid electoral system was created that combined proportional representation by province and assigned delegates to districts with district-level results having some importance. These regulations to determine the elected candidates were very complex and reduced the significance of Indonesia's district element in the hybrid electoral system (NDI, 1999, p. 5).

Habibie and his government also devised the regional autonomy (*Otonomi Daerah*) initiative. It comprised of two laws (Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999). These laws were substantially decentralising (Hainsworth et al., 2007, pp. 43-44). First, they eliminated the hierarchical relationships between the provincial and the district governments. Secondly, it made central government ministry offices at the province and the district level the responsibility of the respective subnational governments (except for defence and security, foreign policy, monetary and fiscal policy, and judicial and religious affairs). Thirdly, it changed the transfers received by local governments from the central government (Alm, Aten & Bahl, 2010, p. 85). Interestingly, the devolution of authority deliberately bypassed the provincial level of governance. It is argued that this was done to avoid secessionist or federalist proposals that endangered the hegemony of the unitary nation-state and in part by the idea that large numbers of smaller local governments could be controlled through a 'divide and rule' strategy. In fact, some provinces were split up and borders were redrawn (Fitriani, Hofman & Kaiser, 2005, pp. 60-61; Hainsworth et al., 2007, p. 44).

With the democratisation of the legislative electoral system, New Order restrictions on freedom of action and the right to contest in elections of political parties were removed. This opened the door to new parties. The new rules reduced the size of electoral districts and introduced an element of direct representation to increase the accountability of legislators (Dagg, 2007, p. 49). This democratisation created a proliferation of parties. Under certain conditions, anyone could form a political party. These conditions focused on the size and nature of a party's political base and had to be met in order to participate in the legislative elections. They were designed to keep the number of parties manageable and eliminates parties representing local, regional, or sectarian interests. Parties needed divisions in nine provinces and within those provinces half the districts (Dagg, 2007, p. 50).

148 parties emerged in the aftermath of Suharto's resignation. 48 qualified to participate in the 1999 elections (Dagg, 2007, p. 50). 21 of the 48 contesting parties won seats (NDI, 1999, p. 8). With the legislature becoming the centre of power struggles, this symbolised a new start for parliamentarism in Indonesia (Ziegenhain, 2009, p. 38). The 1999 general election did not produce a government. This was the job for the president that would be elected by the MPR (Bourchier, 2000, p. 23). Turnover for this election was much higher than under Suharto. Around 20 per cent of the New Order's legislature was elected into the new DPR (NDI, 1999, p. 12). The voter turnout for the elections was 93 per cent (VAP turnout: 86 per cent)<sup>39</sup>, typical for the New Order elections and even high by the standards of many 'euphoric' first-democratic elections (Tan, 2006, p. 105). After parties obtained representation in the DPR, they must create or join blocs (*fraksi*). Blocs have rights to make speeches on the floor, assign members to

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<sup>39</sup> <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=101>

commissions, and to nominate candidates for speaker. Blocs with 9 members or less lose certain rights such as nominating members for speaker or placing a member on all nine commissions (NDI, 1999, p. 8).

After being sworn in on October 1, the MPR met as a full body for four days to establish the membership of its Working Body (*Badan Pekerja*), pass its rules of procedure, and to choose its leaders (NDI, 1999, p. 15). The Working Body is a standing committee of 90 MPR members chosen from the eleven blocs in proportion to membership (NDI, 2000, p. 9). As the first truly independent elected parliament in Indonesian history it had a strong mandate to introduce reforms that would prevent the emergence of another dictatorial presidency (Lindsey, 2002, p. 246). Four rounds of Constitutional Amendments were started (Harijanti & Lindsey, 2006, p. 138). Between October 6 and October 21, the MPR's General Session (*Sidang Umum*) of 1999 produced a First Amendment to the constitution and elected the president and vice president. It made changes to nine of the 37 articles of the constitution<sup>40</sup> (NDI, 1999, pp. 5-6, p. 15).

The MPR was reduced in size to 700 (Dagg, 2007, p. 49). 500 members from the DPR and 200 appointed members (Thompson, 1999, p. 6). The authority to choose the 135 regional representatives (five from each of Indonesia's 27 provinces<sup>41</sup>) was devolved to the provincial level parliament (Thompson, 1999, p. 6; Bouchier, 2000, p. 18). The procedures for choosing provincial delegates through the provincial assemblies had majoritarian tendencies: All five provincial delegate seats could be swept away in a provincial assembly by a majority coalition (NDI, 1999, p.5). The regional delegates have party connections at the national level and join them in the MPR party factions. The remaining 65 appointed members were functional group representatives appointed by designated social groups which include officially recognised religions, ethnic minorities, women, and the disabled (Thompson, 1999, p. 6). Of the 700 members of the MPR 462 were elected DPR members (Dagg, 2007, p. 49). Here, another controversial issue emerged. Under Suharto the DPR consisted of 500 members with 75 seats reserved for appointed military representatives (Bouchier, 2000, pp. 17-18). In the 1999 DPR appointed seats were reduced from 75 to 38 and fixed representation in provincial and regional DPRDs (elected provincial/regional assemblies) was reduced from 15 per cent to 10 per cent (Dagg, 2007, pp. 48-49). The reform efforts targeted the composition of the DPR and the provincial and regional DPRDs. The MPR focused on eliminating non-elected members and at least reducing the political influence on their selection (Dagg, 2007, pp. 48-49).

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<sup>40</sup> In Indonesia 'constitutional issues' are settled in the formal constitution as well as in laws and MPR decrees (NDI, 2000, p. i).

<sup>41</sup> This number reduced to 130 following the East Timor independence referendum of August 30 making the composition of the MPR 695 (NDI, 1999, p. 30). In May 2002 East Timor achieved independence after the controversial referendum and vengeful reprisals from the Indonesian army and local militias (Hainsworth et al., 2007, p. 44).

One of the most important parts of the First Amendment is the assertion of the DPR's dominant role versus the president in the legislative process (NDI, 1999, p. 6). A significant transfer of power to the legislature from the executive took place (Ellis, 2002, p. 126; Indrayana, 2008, p. 132). The phrase stating that the president with approval of the DPR holds the power to establish legislation was changed to the phrase stating that the DPR holds the power to establish legislation. The president now only can present bills to the DPR. The president and the DPR discuss these bills to reach common approval. After approving, the bill is signed into law by the president. Lastly, the MPR limited the term of the vice president and president to two five-year terms (NDI, 1999, p. 18; Lindsey, 2002, p. 249). This was the removal of one of the main authoritarian characteristics of the 1945 Constitution (Indrayana, 2008, p. 133).

By the constitution, the MPR determined the GBHN for the coming five years (NDI, 1999, pp. 12, 20). It is one of the most important measures by which the president's performance is controlled at the end of his term, as summarised in his accountability speech. Within the months leading up to the 1999 General Session the political parties drafted their own Broad Outlines of State Policy after which they were compared and consolidated (NDI, 1999, p. 20). The MPR also elected the president and vice president (NDI, 1999, p. 12). The electoral rules of the MPR under the 1945 Constitution were vague for electing the president and vice president. It stated that individuals are elected by a vote of *suara yang terbanyak*, which has been differently interpreted as a plurality, a simple majority, and a special majority (NDI, 1999, pp. 18-19). The MPR adopted new rules stating that the vice president and president were now separately chosen and several rounds of voting were possible if necessary for a majority instead of a mere plurality (NDI, 1999, p. 6). Two-thirds of the MPR was the quorum for the election. Candidates must be nominated by a petition or a bloc of ten per cent of the MPR (70 members). If only one candidate had been nominated, that person would automatically be approved by the full body. Voting took place by secret ballot where every member could cast one vote (NDI, 1999, p. 19). A decree that authorised the Working Body to draft further amendments and continue to meet was issued by the MPR. These would be approved by the full body at its first Annual Session (*Sidang Tahunan*) in August 2000 (NDI, 1999, p. 6).

The direct election of the vice president and president was one the main issues. Constitutional reform also addressed the future of the MPR as well as the consideration if Indonesia should transform itself from a unitary to a federal state (NDI, 1999, p. 7). The mentioning of possible federalism broke a longstanding taboo in Indonesian politics, since the unitary state proclaimed in the 1945 Constitution had always been viewed as a central article of faith (Bourchier, 2000, p. 26). However, the MPR asserted its support for the unitary state (NDI, 2000, p. i). Regional autonomy was to be implemented in cultural, religious, legal,

political, and economic domains. The autonomy of regional governments needed to be empowered by the elected regional assemblies as watchdogs on these governments (NDI, 1999, p. 21).

There existed broad consensus that the preamble of the constitution should be left untouched, but that the explanations and the main body could be amended. Pancasila is established in the preamble (NDI, 1999, p. 18). Pancasila also outlines the principles of deliberation and consensus and are specifically included as the preferable decision-making process in MPR Standing Orders (Ellis, 2002, p. 125). The way the 1999 MPR General Sessions acted showed that in Indonesian democracy both majoritarian and consensual decision-making procedures have an important role. Consensus through extensive debate and negotiations seemed to be prioritised by the MPR. Nonetheless, turning to voting never seemed to make the MPR uncomfortable when consensus could not be achieved. This was particularly interesting, because, according to Suharto, majoritarian decision-making and voting were Western liberal democratic practises and alien to Indonesian culture. Collectivism and harmony, allegedly, are emphasized in Indonesian culture and in his view best effectuated through deliberation (*musyawarah*) and consensus (*mufakat*) (NDI, 1999, pp. 16-17).

The MPR also asserted its support for the presidential system (NDI, 2000, p. i). However, based on the 1945 Constitution, there were features that make the Indonesian system look somewhat parliamentary: The MPR being the highest state institution, the body in which popular sovereignty is vested, the body receiving the accountability speech, and the power to elect the vice president and president (NDI, 2000, p. 7; Lindsey, 2002, pp. 247-248). There is no comparison between other conventional presidential systems considering the indirect election of the president by the MPR. The MPR itself is a representative body, but it includes indirectly or appointed members (Ellis, 2002, p. 120). Unlike in many parliamentary systems, the executive in Indonesia doesn't have rights to remove the government. The legislature cannot be dissolved by the president and accordingly call for early elections as for example a prime minister can (NDI, 2001, p. 12). But, other features make the system look more presidential: The head of government and head of state being both the president, the inability to dissolve the DPR, and a fixed term of office. Being a system with a greater weight on the presidential side, it might be appropriate to call it 'presidential with parliamentary characteristics' (NDI, 2000, p. 7).

On October 20 1999, the presidential election was held and the vice presidential election the next day (NDI, 1999, p. 15). The elections resulted in the election of Abdurrahman Wahid as president (Bünthe & Ufen, 2009, p. 3). Megawati Sukarnoputri won the most seats in the parliamentary elections, but became vice president (Hainsworth et al., 2007, p. 43). Needless to say, by October 1999 Indonesia was in many respects a different place (Bourchier, 2000, p. 15).

*Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001)*

The New Order party Golkar, represented by, among others, Habibie, was at least tentatively reformed and preparing its return to power. However, Golkar lost the national elections in 1999 only receiving 22,5 per cent of the votes (Bünte & Ufen, 2009, p. 13). Significant numbers of DPR seats were spread among a number of larger parties and there was no majority party. The system of proportional representation thus produced a multi-party system that forced parties to negotiate and form coalitions (NDI, 1999, p. 22; Bünte & Ufen, 2009, p. 13). The internal decision-making process in the DPR is known as the *musyawarah mufakat* principle. Just like with the Working Body, it means debating (*musyawarah*) until a compromise is reached that everybody can accept (*mufakat*). Voting, counting, and recording the votes are rare (Ziegenhain, 2009, p. 46). The MPR elected Abdurrahman Wahid as president (Bünte & Ufen, 2009, p. 13). His election gave a great deal of power to the DPR, because the president became, in fact, dependent on the support of the legislature (Ziegenhain, 2009, pp. 38-39). Wahid's first cabinet was a grand coalition including all the key political powers (Bünte & Ufen, 2009, pp. 13-14). His National Unity Cabinet was largely the result of political compromises for the election as president and vice president and included at least one representative of all the seven major parties (NDI, 1999, p. 27).

2000 was also the year of the second round of Constitutional Amendments. The changes regarded, among others, a bill of rights, the decentralisation of power to the regions, checks and balances, and the separation of powers (NDI, 2000, p. ii). The question whether any democratic political system is presidential or parliamentary is one of the fundamental dimensions and subsequently the lack of clarity to define Indonesia's system as such was one of the main weaknesses of the original 1945 Constitution. The MPR wanted to explain the basic tendency of Indonesia's system as presidential (NDI, 2000, p. iii). Despite the all-party support for the presidential system, there was also a general eagerness to limit the powers of the presidency by the DPR and MPR, creating phenomena not usually seen in a presidential system. This includes the usage of the DPR's right of interpellation (*hak interpelasi*). Another difficulty in clarifying Indonesia's system as presidential is the lack of recognition of the principles, in the original 1945 Constitution, of checks and balances and separation of powers between the legislature, executive, and judiciary (NDI, 2000, pp. 7-8).

The Second Amendment also established that the DPR and provincial and regional legislatures would become a fully elected body in 2004 (NDI, 2001, p. 9). The DPR's oversight function on the executive as well as the separation of the legislative and executive branches is strengthened with the end of police and military representation in the legislature. The DPR's functions have been clarified including the oversight function, the legislative function, and the power to ratify the budget. The rights of immunity and inquiry (*hak angket*) have been constitutionalised, contributing to the parliament's right of interpellation. The

procedures by which a bill becomes law is determined by law instead of the constitution. Moreover, the presidential 'pocket veto' has been abolished (NDI, 2000, p. 8). However, since the First Amendment states that every bill should be agreed on by the DPR and the president, this presidential consent is basically a 'veto right', but once consent is given the president cannot withdraw it (Indrayana, 2008, p. 169). If the president refuses to approve a bill passed by the DPR, after 30 days, it automatically becomes law in any case (NDI, 2000, p. 8; Lindsey, 2002, p. 250). Nonetheless, bills cannot be passed in parliament without presidential approval. This means that presidential approval is a precondition for the voting of parliament on a bill (i.e. if a bill is passed in parliament, the president has already approved it) (Kawamura, 2010, p. 13).

Concerning the MPR, the Second Amendment allowed the MPR to hold Annual Sessions to discuss and hear the yearly report of high state institutions and the president. The MPR hears and discusses the progress reports and may adopt MPR decisions. At the end and beginning of the five-year term of office of the MPR, General Sessions take place. The beginning sessions will, among other things, establish the Broad Outlines of State Policy. The sessions at the end will evaluate the presidential accountability report. Special Sessions (*Sidang Istimewa*) can be convened by the DPR. The purpose of a Special Session is to substitute a permanently incapacitated vice president or president or to evaluate and hear an accountability report of the president (NDI, 2000, p. 9). When the General Session rejects an accountability report at the end of an MPR term, the outgoing president is not allowed to stand for re-election. The president has a right of reply if an accountability report is disapproved at a Special Session. The MPR is allowed to impeach the president if that reply is also disapproved. If a president and/or vice president is impeached, its replacement will finish the current term of office (NDI, 2000, p. 10).

MPR decisions consist of MPR resolutions, MPR decrees, and the 1945 Constitution and amendments to it. Recommendations regarding the implementation of MPR decisions was specified as a new form of MPR decree and obliged that at the following Annual Session a report on its progress is submitted. As previously, MPR decrees can issue directives for state administration's policy. Moreover, the MPR's Working Body obtained the task of review of the implementation of MPR decrees by the executive and is given permanent status (NDI, 2000, p. 9).

A 2000 MPR decree established Indonesia's hierarchy of laws. This contributed to creating a more independent judiciary and greater rule of law. The decree defines Pancasila, unwritten (traditional) laws, and the 1945 Constitution and its amendments as sources underpinning legislation. Seven tiers now make up the composition of the hierarchy of laws: (1) the 1945 Constitution and amendments; (2) MPR decrees (*ketetapan*); (3) laws (*undang-undang*); (4) government regulations in lieu of laws (*peraturan pemerintah pengganti undang-undang or perpu*); (5) government regulations (*peraturan pemerintah*); (6) presidential

decrees for administrative purposes (*keputusan presiden or keppres*); and (7) regional regulations (*peraturan daerah or perda*). *Perpu* were to be only issued by the president in cases of urgency and require subsequent ratification by the DPR and are limited to the goal of government and state administration. Introduced for the first time are the regional regulations. These are issued in conjunction with the head of the district or provincial executive by the relevant DPRD (NDI, 2000, p. 10). Inferior legal instruments may not interfere with superior ones. Decisions of state or government agencies and the Supreme Court must be in accordance with the hierarchy of laws. Judicial review of the constitution versus MPR decrees and laws was delegated to the MPR (NDI, 2000, p. 10). The Supreme Court can issue advisory opinions (NDI, 2001, p. 10).

Pressure continued for decentralisation of power to the regions to be placed in the constitution. The Second Amendment reflects the spirit of the laws 22/1999 and 25/1999 (regional autonomy initiative) in the constitution. On any subject that is not subscribed to the central government regions may act. This principle created a highly regional flavour (NDI, 2000, p. iii).

After confrontation between the legislative and executive branch, the DPR started an impeachment process against Wahid (Ziegenhain, 2009, p. 39). A fixed five-year term for the President was established in the 1945 Constitution. The annotations to the constitution provided that a Special Session can be called by the MPR to call the president to account if the DPR believes the president has violated 'state policy' (NDI, 2001, p. 1). The MPR that selected Abdurrahman Wahid as the fourth president of Indonesia, impeached him nineteen months later, on July 23 2001, in favour of his vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri (NDI, 2001, p. 5; Dagg, 2007, p. 49). Since the impeachment of the president took place after losing political support in the legislature, the impeachment process seemed less legal and more political (NDI, 2001, p. 10).

#### *Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004)*

Major constitutional reforms were passed during the presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri. The power of the legislature has been significantly strengthened since 2002 (Bünter & Ufen, 2009, p. 15). With the Third Amendment to the Constitution in 2001: "*the DPR gained important new powers to enact legislation (in some cases without the final approval of the executive), to fix the budget, to supervise the executive and other state agencies, to pass final judgement on presidential decrees and regulations, and to approve or express opinions on major proposed presidential and judicial appointments*" (Dagg, 2007, p. 49). The Third Amendment is the start of abandoning most of the unique Indonesian presidential system towards a conventional presidential system (NDI, 2002, pp. 5-6).

The Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution also marked an important change with regard to constitutional checks and balances: It formalised an independent judiciary and the basic principle was removed from the elucidation (*penjelasan*) into the main body of the constitution (NDI, 2002, p. 5; Indrayana, 2008, p. 202). The commitment of Indonesia in being “*a state based on law*” (*rechtstaat*) was removed from the elucidation and incorporated in the main text (Ellis, 2002, p. 141; Harijanti & Lindsey, 2006, p. 145; Indrayana, 2008, p. 198).

A Constitutional Court was established at the same level as the Supreme Court with powers of judicial review of legislation against the constitution, deciding on the dissolution of political parties, solving conflicts concerning the constitutional powers of state institutions, deciding on disputes regarding general elections results, and is obliged to provide its legal opinion in an impeachment process (Indrayana, 2008, p. 202). The extent of the Constitutional Court to interpret the constitution remains vague. For regulations below the level of laws judicial review remains with the Supreme Court (NDI, 2002, p. 6). The nine persons of the Constitutional Court are confirmed in office by the president of which three are nominated by the president, three by the DPR, and three by the Supreme Court (article 24c, 3 of the constitution) (Indrayana, 2008, p. 202). Moreover, a corruption eradication commission, an ombudsman’s commission, numerous auditing bodies, and specialist anti-corruption courts were established (Bünte & Ufen, 2009, p. 15).

Other major points of the Third and Fourth Amendment (2002) and subsequent legislation are:

The MPR unanimously stripped itself from its power in appointing the president with the adoption of a full direct election for the presidency and vice presidency in 2004 (Lindsey, 2002, p. 267). Both are elected as one ticket in a direct election (Bünte & Ufen, 2009, p. 15). Parties or coalitions of parties can nominate tickets for a first round direct election (NDI, 2002, p. 6). Tickets are to be “*proposed prior to the holding of the general election by political parties or combinations of political parties which are participants in the general election*” (Ellis, 2002, p. 141). Any pair of candidates that receives over 50 per cent of the total votes and at least twenty per cent of the votes in at least half of the provinces is elected. If there is not a pair of candidates that fulfils these criteria, the two highest polling pairs compete in a second round election. In 2004, parties or coalitions must have either five per cent of the DPR vote or three per cent of the seats in the DPR to enter the first round of the presidential election (NDI, 2003a, p. 2). Other requirements are that all candidates may not have been convicted of a felony of which the possible punishment is five years or more and at least must have a high school diploma. Candidates must be mentally and physically capable for the job and must be at least 35 years old (NDI, 2003a, p. 4). Maximally three months after declaring the results of the elections for the DPRDs, DPD (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*), and DPR, the first round of the presidential election takes place (NDI, 2003a, p. 3).

Moreover, the MPR doesn't have the constitutional function of the Broad Guidelines of State Policy anymore (NDI, 2002, p. 6). Setting up policy is the sole area of the executive (Lindsey, 2002, p. 262). Next to that, the law clarifies the MPR as being a separate body and not a joint session of the DPD and DPR. The DPD and DPR members make up the composition of the MPR. They serve until the new members after a general election are confirmed by oath. This is different from a congressional system since a Congress usually consists of a senate and a lower house as bodies (NDI, 2003b, p. 2).

The MPR's Working Body will no longer be a permanent institution. Its function to call meetings will be replaced by a separate leadership. Organising the MPR meetings for the confirmation by oath of the vice president and president every five year will be done by a separate secretariat. Ad hoc committees can be established by the MPR if necessary (NDI, 2003b, pp. 2-3). The constitution states the authorities of the MPR. These concern the consideration of a decision by the Constitutional Court relating to impeachment claims, the confirmation by oath of the president and vice president, constitutional amendments, and conducting the election for vacancies for president and vice president (NDI, 2003b, p. 3). Functional group representation was abandoned with the announcement of the military that their role didn't concern politics, but defence and security. Consequently, in 2004, they would no longer have a place in the representative institutions (Ellis, 2005, p. 14). They lost their 38 reserved seats in the DPR (Lindsey, 2002, p. 268).

A Regional Representative Council, regional chamber, or DPD is established (NDI, 2002, p. 6). Members of the DPD are to be *"elected from every province through a general election"* (Indrayana, 2008, p. 201). The DPD has legislative powers concerning natural resource management, centre/region relations and financial balance, and regional autonomy. Moreover, it may provide considerations to the DPR on draft legislation concerning religion, education, and tax, and on the state budget (NDI, 2002, p. 6). The DPD may *"propose to the DPR"* and *"participate in the discussion of"* *"bills related to regional autonomy, the relationship of central and regional government, the formation, expansion and merger of regions, the management of natural resources and other economic resources, and financial balance between the centre and the regions"*. It has the right to *"provide considerations to the DPR on the state budget and on bills relating to taxation, education or religion"*. Moreover, the DPD has the power of oversight over the implementation of laws on any of these subjects and to submit the results of this to the DPR (Ellis, 2002, p. 142). Four members elected from every province make up the composition of the DPD. During DPD sessions they live in Jakarta and they serve until the new members after a general election are confirmed by oath (NDI, 2003b, pp. 3-4).

Main functions of the DPD are to give considerations on legislation regarding religion, education, and tax, to give considerations on the budget, and to participate in debates about legislation that concerns the

regions. Moreover, the DPD provides considerations to the DPR on reports and candidates from the State Audit Agency. Concerning legislation that falls under its power, the DPD has the function of oversight on its implementation, but the DPD does not possess the right of summons as the DPR has (NDI, 2003b, p. 4). Draft legislation on regional issues are bilaterally discussed when submitted by the DPD. The usual joint discussion procedure between the government and the DPR starts after this. The DPR, DPD, and government will trilaterally discuss if the draft legislation on regional issues is submitted by the government or the DPR. Afterwards the government and DPR begin the bilateral discussion procedure using the trilateral discussion as input, after which the DPR's session of decision-making takes place (NDI, 2003b, p. 4).

The DPR's 550 elected members are based in Jakarta and serve until the new members after a general election are confirmed by oath. Three major functions of the DPR are legislation, oversight, and budget making. The DPR has the right to summon private bodies, private citizens, and officials to give information (NDI, 2003b, p. 3). It also got more control in the formation of cabinets. The president may appoint and dismiss ministers, but the formation of a cabinet and the change and dismissal of ministers is to be determined through law (Lindsey, 2002, p. 260). Moreover, the Third Amendment stated that "*the President may not suspend and/or dissolve the DPR*". Although a similar provision already existed in the elucidation it was now adopted into the main body of the constitution (Indrayana, 2008, p. 200).

Members of the DPRD are to be elected every five years (Indrayana, 2008, p. 201). They are confirmed by oath after a general election and reside in the provincial capital (for provinces (*provinsi*)), within the regency (*kabupaten*), or city (*kota*) (NDI, 2003b, p. 4). Legislation, oversight, and budget making are the three main function of the DPRD. Removal and appointment of the head and the deputy head of the regional executive is another right of the DPRD. Moreover, it has the right of receiving informational reports regarding the implementation of decentralisation which is the responsibility of the head of the regional executive as well as to give considerations and opinions on international agreements that affect the region. The DPRD may, in the exercise of its functions, summon private bodies, private citizens, and officials to give information (NDI, 2003b, p. 5).

Impeachment relating to the president and vice president was set up. Dismissal based on policy grounds is excluded and the Constitutional Court decides on the impeachment's legal decision (NDI, 2002, p. 6). Corruption is specifically included in the constitution as possible ground for impeachment (Lindsey, 2002, p. 260). Other grounds are treason, bribery, other high crimes, or proven to no longer fulfil the requirements of the office of the presidency (Article 7a). The voting requirement for impeachment is an absolute majority instead of a simple majority. Also, the vote has to be attended by at least three-quarters

of the total number of members and should include the approval of at least two-thirds of the MPR members present (Article 7b, 7) (Indrayana, 2008, p. 200).

An independent Judicial Commission is established that deals with proposals for Supreme Court appointments and judicial ethics issues (NDI, 2002, p. 6). The constitution states that the Judicial Commission has the power to “*propose candidates for appointment as justices of the Supreme Court*” and is expected to, “*maintain and ensure the honour, dignity and behaviour of judges*” (Article 24b, 1). The commission’s members are “*appointed and dismissed by the president with the approval of the DPR*” (Article 24b, 3) (Indrayana, 2008, p. 203).

Sovereignty of the people is now implemented in accordance with the constitution instead of being exercised in full through the MPR (NDI, 2002, p. 6). The sovereignty of the people is “*in the hands of the people and implemented in accordance with this Constitution*” (Ellis, 2002, pp. 140-141). This marked the end of the doctrine of MPR supremacy in which the MPR was the highest authority in the conduct of state affairs with unlimited power, since sovereignty of the people was vested in it as stated in the 1945 Constitution (Indrayana, 2008, p. 199).

The number of parties competing in the parliamentary elections declined from 48 in the 1999 elections to 24 in the 2004 elections (Tan, 2006, p. 91; Dagg, 2007, p. 50). This came about due to the revised election law in 2003 stating that current parties needed to hold three per cent of seats in the DPR plus four per cent of seats in DPRDs in half the provinces or in half the total number of cities in Indonesia (Horowitz, 2013, p. 182). A party that did not fulfil these criteria could merge with an existing party or attempt to create a new party meeting the criteria (Tan, 2006, p. 112). Moreover, parties that didn’t reach a certain minimum of the votes (in 2004 three per cent) had to dissolve themselves. Most parties, however, changed their names and continued to compete in elections (Mietzner, 2009, p. 21). New parties would need executive committees as well as permanent offices in two-thirds of the provinces and in two-thirds of the regencies/cities in those provinces. Moreover, they needed 1.000 party members (or 1/1000<sup>th</sup> of the population, whichever is smaller) in each regency/city where the party is organised (Tan, 2006, p. 112). In the 2004 elections there were competing parties whom based on their performance in the 1999 elections could automatically compete, parties representing splinters from other parties, reworkings of parties that had tried in the 1999 elections and renamed themselves, and a new party (Tan, 2006, p. 91).

Following the constitutional amendments for the 2004 elections, the DPR began to form the legal framework (NDI, 2004, p. 3). It addressed one of the main complaints relating to two factors resulting from the usage of proportional representation: A disconnect between elected representatives and their constituents seemed apparent at all levels. Since the province was used as electoral district it was difficult

for citizens to decide on their representative in heavily populated provinces, because there were many representatives. Second, the usage of the closed-list system for determining elected candidates resulted in legislators owing their position more to party leaders that determined their candidates ranking on the closed lists than to the voters themselves (NDI, 2004, p. 4).

The DPR acted on the first aspect by mandating the election law. Constituencies for the DPR as well as DPRDs could compose of between three and twelve members (NDI, 2004, p. 4). The electoral commission created constituencies containing between six and twelve seats (Horowitz, 2013, pp. 183-184). Nonetheless, this was a great contrast with the DPR elections in 1999: 82 (West Java) to four (East Timor). Consequently, certain provinces had to be divided into multiple electoral districts. This divide followed municipal and regency boundaries. The eleven of 32 least-populous provinces kept the province as the electoral district for the DPR. In both directions, this change should foster closer links between citizens and elected representatives: Citizens have fewer legislators to choose from and hold accountable and a smaller constituency is represented by most legislators (NDI, 2004, p. 4). In the 2004 elections the number of constituencies was 69 (Horowitz, 2013, p. 183).

Regarding the second aspect, the partial open-list system was introduced by the DPR. Parties still made the ranking of lists of candidates, but voters would be allowed to choose a party as well as one candidate from the same party. However, the DPR significantly mitigated the impact of this innovation by adding the clause that in order to be elected under this system, a candidate must meet a quota of votes. When not fulfilling the quota (ranging between 8,33 per cent and 33,33 per cent of the valid votes) the seats are filled according to the candidate's ranking on the list. It was hard enough for the 24 parties competing in the election to win a quota of votes, let alone for individual candidates (NDI, 2004, p. 4).

Parties can control parliamentarians with their power of recall, but parties are strongly divided and party splits are ever-present. These splits are almost inevitable since there is small room for challenge, reform, and leadership renewal due to the lack of internal democracy in the parties and the all-powerful natures of the party centres. Between 1999 and 2004 most of the major parties experienced significant splinters and internal fractionalisation and some of them experiencing multiple significant divisions (Tan, 2006, p. 108).

Applied in 1999 and carried over to the 2004 elections are the different geographical demands with regard to members and party structures. They require parties to be national in scope and rule out regional parties. Making it more difficult for smaller parties to obtain seats is another result of reducing the district magnitude. It serves the purpose of providing a 'seat bonus' to the larger parties and thus reducing the representativeness of the party system and proportionality of the PR system. In response to public demands for a greater accountability of legislators, a system was created that reduces the amount of

political pluralism (NDI, 2004, p. 5). Three main criteria are provided in the elucidation of the election law for the establishment of constituencies for the DPR. Between 325.000 and 425.000 residents should be represented by each seat, new provinces need at least three seats, and no province can have less seats as it has in the current DPR (NDI, 2004, pp. 6-7). The election law, moreover, encourages parties to nominate at least 30 per cent women as their candidates, but does not require it (NDI, 2004, p. 9).

The Fourth Amendment mentions a central bank of which the independence shall be regulated by law (Ellis, 2005, p. 16). The MPR avoided the usage of 'Bank Indonesia' as to identify the central bank. The central bank now enjoys a greater constitutional protection as the constitution mentions that the bank should be independent in nature. However, the meaning of 'independent' is not clarified, since the constitution states that further details are to be regulated by statute (Indrayana, 2008, p. 234).

Interestingly and lastly, the Fourth Amendment makes the unitary state an entrenched and non-amendable article of the constitution (Indrayana, 2008, p. 236). Article 37, 5 states: "*Provisions relating to the form of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia may not be amended*". With the Fourth Amendment the MPR completed its four rounds on August 10 2002 (Harijanti & Lindsey, 2006, p. 138).

The Constitutional Court immediately showed that it was willing to take potentially unpopular and independent decisions. On February 24 2004, it struck down, in a majority ruling of eight out of nine justices, the article of the election law stating that legislative candidates "*must not be former members of the banned Indonesian Communist Party, including its mass organizations, nor individuals directly or indirectly involved in the September 30, 1965 coup, nor members of other banned organizations*" (NDI, 2004, p. 5). This article reflected the anti-communist paranoia that was a characteristic of Indonesian politics since 1965. With the dismantling of this article the Constitutional Court recognised that individual rights could be limited by a statute, but that those limitations must be based on "*strong, reasonable, proportional and not extreme grounds*". The Constitutional Court further reasoned that the ban on communist-linked candidates was solely based on political grounds and were neither reasonable nor strong (Harijanti & Lindsey, 2006, p. 149).

#### *Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014)*

Six of the seven largest parties nominated tickets for the 2004 presidential elections, although one of these was disqualified from running. None of the smaller parties that could form a coalition to present a candidate did (NDI, 2004, p. 2). In the first ever direct election for the presidency and vice presidency in Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected. He gained a sufficient majority in the national parliament and his cabinet included representatives of almost all major parties (Bünte & Ufen, 2009, p. 16). Indonesia became a presidential democracy and in April 2004 the legislative election produced a

multiparty parliament in which the 550 seats were divided among seventeen parties (Liddle & Mujani, 2006, p. 132). As of 2004, the MPR consists entirely of popularly elected representatives: The members of the DPR and DPD (Carnegie, 2008, p. 523; Bunte & Ufen, 2009, p. 15). The DPD is the new institution consisting of 128 members. The need for permanent representation of regions in the legislative process at the national level is met with the establishment of the DPD. The previous appointed regional MPR members were replaced by four representatives elected from all provinces. They were elected as individuals instead of being from party lists. The right to amend the constitution was kept by the MPR as well as its role in impeachment of the executive. It lost its powers of setting the direction of public policy and the selection of the president and the vice president (Dagg, 2007, p. 49), except in cases of mid-term vacancy (NDI, 2003b, pp. 2-3). The way that the DPR leadership exercised their new power was as equally important as the laws enacting them. The DPR became its own force. No president was able to govern or survive politically without its cooperation (Dagg, 2007, p. 49).

As of 2004 the president and vice president are directly elected (Bunte & Ufen, 2009, p. 15). This resulted in more balance between the powers of the executive and the legislative branches of government (Ziegenhain, 2009, p. 45). The president and vice president have to stand as a team, which is supposed to encourage moderate candidates with the capacity to form alliances (Carnegie, 2008, p. 524). Since no candidate scored over 50 per cent of the votes in the first round, a run-off election was held (Tan, 2006, p. 91). The direct election also changed the dependency of the president and vice president on the legislature. Since they were no longer selected by political parties they no longer, to some extent, owed them. Moreover, the constitutional amendments made impeachment more difficult. Most important, the president enjoyed an independent mandate from the people. This new kind of relationship held the potential of improving performance and accountability of both the branches of government (Dagg, 2007, p. 49). The VAP turnout for the presidential election in 2004, 2009, and 2014 was approximately 75, (.), and 80 per cent respectively. The voter turnout was approximately 68,5, 72, and 69,5 per cent.<sup>42</sup>

2004 was also the year in which for the first time a new voting system was applied for the parliamentary elections. It changed from a closed to a partial open-list proportional representation system. People were allowed to choose both a party and a candidate. Parties are strongly embedded in Indonesia's system of government. Only parties (and parties of a certain size) can nominate candidates for parliament at all levels, the presidency, and province/district heads. The idea was to mitigate the power of parties by changing the voting system (Tan, 2006, pp. 105, 106). 71 per cent of the voters made use of this system (NDI, 2004, p. 4). Another notable aspect of the 2004 campaigns was that the traditional 'politics of personalities' seemed to be outweighed by the 'politics of issues'. The voters seemed immune (or allergic)

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<sup>42</sup> <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=101>

to biased ideology and useless political rhetoric (Hainsworth et al., 2007, p. 45). The VAP turnout for parliamentary elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014 was approximately 88, 74, and 83 per cent respectively. Voter turnout was approximately 84, 71, and 75 respectively.<sup>43</sup> In the DPR almost 70 per cent of the seats were filled by people who were new to the body (Tan, 2006, p. 93). Seventeen parties won seats in the parliament, representing a slight shrinkage from 1999 in which 21 parties earned representation at the national level. The Effective Number of Parties in Parliament after the 2004 elections was 7,07 (Gallagher, 2015, p. 18). In 2004 the reformed DPR consisted of 550 members, all of them elected (Dagg, 2007, p. 49) and was therefore also the first year in which the military completely lost their guaranteed seats in the legislature (Dagg, 2007, p. 49; Bunte & Ufen, 2009, p. 15).

The establishment of the DPD, the Regional Representatives Council, is a significant step for improving representation. In effect, it creates a bicameral second chamber of parliament that acts as a sort of upper house, however with extremely limited powers (Carnegie, 2008, p. 523). The DPD does not have the usual veto power of a second chamber (Bunte & Ufen, 2009, p. 15). It possesses no veto power over the budget (Carnegie, 2008, p. 523). The DPD is said to be a weak cousin to the party-dominated parliament. The notionally party-less body is not free of strong connections between members and the existing political parties (Tan, 2006, p. 106). The role of the DPD is thus not entirely clear. It is empowered to initiate legislation on regional matters, but the DPR has to agree to carry the new proposed legislation forward. The DPD does have advisory and oversight functions relating to regional matters, taxation, the budget, education, and state audits (Dagg, 2007, p. 49).

A nationwide democratic election of local government executives for the first time in Indonesian history was held in 2005 (Tan, 2006, p. 88; Liddle & Mujani, 2006, p. 136). This included, in separate elections, around 190 governors, district heads, and mayors, all directly elected by voters in their regions (Liddle & Mujani, 2006, p. 136). The presidential elections as well as the regional election contests have focused more on personalities than on parties (Tan, 2006, p. 97).

In 2008 electoral laws were adopted creating a parliamentary threshold of 2,5 per cent for the 2009 elections (Mietzner, 2009, p. 8; Horowitz, 2013, p. 183). Moreover, parties would need branches in 60 per cent of Indonesia's 33 provinces. In 2009 the number of constituencies was increased to 77, but the average number of seats per constituency declined. A constituency in 2009 consisted of between three and ten seats, which makes it harder for smaller parties to compete. The number of seats in the DPR was increased from 550 to 560 (Horowitz, 2013, pp. 182-184). The Effective Number of Parties in Parliament

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<sup>43</sup> <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=101>

after the 2004 elections was 6,13 (Gallagher, 2015, p. 18). Lastly, only parties with 20 per cent of the seats or 25 per cent of the votes are to nominate presidential candidates (Mietzner, 2009, p. 16).

### 3.4 A Lijphartian (2012) analysis of Indonesia's institutional development

Lijphart's (2012) distinction between the executives-parties dimension and the federal-unitary dimension in distinguishing between the majoritarian model and the consensus model of democracy applies as well to the development of Indonesia's institutions of democracy between 1990 and 2010 and sheds light on some interesting developments.<sup>44</sup> Within Lijphart's first dimension, the percentage of minimal winning one-party cabinets is a particularly strong element. This variable can be viewed as conceptually close to the essence of the distinction between concentration of power and the joint exercise of power. The second key variable in this dimension is the effective number of parties. The variable of unitary versus federal governments is the strongest element of the second dimension. Conceptually, this variable can be viewed as being at the heart of the federal-unitary dimension (Lijphart, 2012, p. 240).

#### *Executive power-sharing*

Lijphart's (2012) first distinction on the executives-parties dimension is between concentration of executive power in majority, single-party, cabinets and executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions. During the New Order executive power was clearly concentrated, although not in a single-party majority cabinet, but particularly in a single office: The presidency of Suharto (Liddle, 1985). Habibie<sup>45</sup> ensured free and fair legislative elections in 1999 (Bourchier, 2000), after which Wahid became president and Sukarnoputri vice president (Bünthe & Ufen, 2009; Hainsworth et al., 2007). The usage of the proportional system resulted in no clear majority party forcing the parties to negotiate and form coalitions. Wahid's cabinet, the National Unity Cabinet or rainbow cabinet, was a grand coalition that included all the significant political parties (NDI, 1999; Mietzner, 2008, p. 262; Bünthe & Ufen, 2009). This claim is supported by Maleki's<sup>46</sup> calculation of the LNPG (Logarithm of Number of Parties in Government) score for Indonesia for 1999-2004 of 0,490, being a relatively high score.

In Lijphart's (2012) terms it's clear that this cabinet is a broad multiparty coalition. However, single-party majority cabinets and broad multiparty coalitions differ in two respects, which should be kept in mind when calculating this distinction. Firstly, whether the cabinet consists of one party or a coalition.

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<sup>44</sup> Although in this master thesis, the focus is on established democracies in determining their model of democracy and not autocracies or dictatorial regimes, it proves interesting for now to sometimes shortly refer to the period of the New Order in making the development of the Indonesian institutions even clearer. This is in no sense an appeal nor an attempt to describe the institutions of the New Order as democratic.

<sup>45</sup> Although I do not want to understate the important activities of Habibie in ensuring that important changes were made, it is, for the purpose of this research difficult to 'measure' his presidency in terms of Lijphart (2012), since he himself, as well as the MPR and DPR at the time, were remnants of the New Order regime (Fitriani, Hofman & Kaiser, 2005, p. 60).

<sup>46</sup> I am truly grateful to dr. A. Maleki for providing his (quantitative) insights of his (2015) work: *Patterns of Culture and Models of Democracy: Towards the Cultural Compatibility Thesis of Democracy*. The data can be obtained via the author: a.maleki@tilburguniversity.edu or through the secretariat of the Tilburg School of Politics and Public Administration: frw.tspb.secretariaat@tilburguniversity.edu.

Secondly, the support base the cabinet has which can be minimal winning, oversized, or minority (undersized) (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 79-80). Lijphart (2012) argues, moreover, that a few differences between parliamentary systems of government and presidential cabinets have to be kept in mind here. Since presidents are usually directly elected for a fixed term they only need legislative support as so far it concerns presidential legislative proposals. They are, therefore, in one respect, minimal winning by definition. Secondly, parliamentary executives are collegial cabinets while presidential cabinets are one-person executives by definition, although it clearly constitutes a difference whether the presidential cabinet is made up of one party or multiple (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 93-94).

Interestingly, though, Lijphart's (2012) train of thought here doesn't quite fit the picture for Indonesia for the period 1999-2004. The president and vice president, in 1999, were elected by the MPR (NDI, 1999) and the president could be dismissed by the MPR for a breach of the GBHN (Ellis, 2002). Nonetheless, Wahid's cabinet composed of the PKB, PDI-P, PAN, PK, Golkar, PPP, PBB, and military and non-party affiliates (NDI, 2009, pp. 43-44). Together, these parties seats combined, including the political party of military representatives, is 594 out of 700 in the MPR. Excluding the military, their seats combined is 556 out of 700 in the MPR (NDI, 1999, p. 42). In terms of Lijphart (2012) this is a clear 'oversized cabinet'<sup>47</sup>. On July 23 2001 Wahid was impeached by the MPR and replaced by his vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri (NDI, 2001, p. 5; Dagg, 2007, p. 49).

With the direct election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president in 2004, Lijphart's (2012) mentioned differences between parliamentary systems of government and presidential cabinets become relevant again. Moreover, the MPR can no longer impeach a president for a breach of state policy (i.e. based on policy grounds) (NDI, 2002, p. 6). After the Third Amendment the DPR became the focus of legislation and supervision of the executive (Dagg, 2007, p. 49). Its membership rose to 550 all-elected members (NDI, 2003b, p. 3). Yudhoyono's first cabinet (2004) included members of seven parties together holding 402 seats (73 per cent) of the 550 seats in the DPR. His second cabinet (2009) included members of six parties together holding 421 (75 per cent) of 560 seats in the DPR (Aspinall, Mietzner & Tomsa, 2015, p. 8). These cabinets, again, in Lijphart's (2012) terms constitute clear oversized cabinets.<sup>48</sup> For the 2004 and 2009 cabinet, this is also supported by Maleki's provided dataset, including the LNPG score of 0,534.

The first variable of Lijphart (2012) discussed here characterises the difference between majoritarian and consensus models of democracy and can be regarded as the most typical variable (Lijphart, 2012, p. 79). For the case of Indonesia, there's a clear consensus-form of democracy relating to the first variable.

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<sup>47</sup> Even though Wahid himself, allegedly, had no intention of maintaining this multi-party coalition he used with the single purpose of facilitating his election (Mietzner, 2008, p. 262).

<sup>48</sup> Although some assess these arrangements as 'party cartelisation' (Aspinall et al., 2015, p. 8).

### *Executive-legislative relationship*

The second of Lijphart's (2012) variables constitutes the difference between executive-legislative relationships with a dominant executive versus a balance of power between the executive and legislature. In the majoritarian model there is executive dominance. The consensus model is characterised by a more balanced executive-legislative relationship. In practise, there are varieties of patterns between complete balance and severe imbalance (Lijphart, 2012, p. 105). Similar differences as with the first variable are apparent between the presidential and parliamentary system of government (e.g. legislative confidence, popularly elected presidents, and (non)collegial executives) (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 106-107). Although the distinction between a parliamentary and presidential system is of great importance, it does not bear directly on the distribution of power in executive-legislative relationships (Lijphart, 2012, p. 115).

There are three sources of which presidents derive their powers. The first is the power of presidents defined in the constitution. These consist of 'reactive powers', in particular a presidential veto power, and 'pro-active powers', in particular the ability to legislate by decree in certain areas (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, pp. 463-464). Second is the strength and cohesion of the parties the president belongs to in the legislature. Thirdly, the strength presidents derive from their direct popular election (Lijphart, 2012, p. 116). Nonetheless, how can these powers be measured (Lijphart, 2012, p. 116)? For the index of executive dominance, Lijphart (2012) uses average cabinet life, although adjustments are needed for the presidential systems. Finding the proper values is difficult and experts tend to disagree on the relative power of presidents in different countries (Lijphart, 2012, p. 119).

During the New Order there existed clear executive dominance. This claim is supported by the fact that in general parliament exercised virtually no control over the government and did not challenge any of the policies of the government (Ziegenhain, 2009, p. 38). Moreover, the electoral system was managed by the executive all of which making the MPR and DPR, basically, a rubber stamp (Dagg, 2007, pp. 47-48). After the 1999 elections, the president was elected by the MPR, making him, in fact, heavily dependent on the 'confidence' of the legislature (Ziegenhain, 2009, pp. 38-39). Moreover, the president was also accountable through the GBHN (NDI, 2000, p. 7; Lindsey, 2002, pp. 247-248). With the First Amendment, a great array of powers was transferred from the executive to the legislature (Ellis, 2002, p. 126; Indrayana, 2008 p. 132), making the DPR the sole body to establish laws instead of the president. Moreover, the presidential term became maximised to two five-year terms (NDI, 1999, p. 18; Lindsey, 2002, p. 249).

With the Second Amendment, the general desire to limit the powers of the presidency, further progressed by expanding the powers of the legislature. This includes the right of interpellation of the DPR (NDI, 2000, pp. 7-8). The Second Amendment clarified the functions of the DPR in terms of its legislative

function, oversight, and budget. Moreover, it established that the legislature of Indonesia (including provincial and regional) would be fully elected by 2004 (NDI, 2001, p. 9). The presidential ‘pocket veto’ was also abolished (NDI, 2000, p. 8), although it is argued that the president still effectively has a ‘veto right’ (Indrayana, 2008, p. 169; Kawamura, 2010, p. 13). The Third Amendment further strengthened the powers of the DPR (Dagg, 2007, p. 49). As of 2004 the MPR no longer elects the president with the adoption of a direct election for the presidency and vice presidency (Lindsey, 2002, p. 267). Lastly, the GBHN is no longer a constitutional function of the MPR and impeachment of the president excludes removal on policy grounds (NDI, 2002, p. 6).

Relating to the pro-active powers of the president, Article 22 of the Constitution states that the president may establish government regulations in lieu of laws if “*exigencies compel*”, which have to be approved by the DPR in the following session and are otherwise overturned. These regulations, in the hierarchy of laws in Indonesia, are below the level of laws (NDI, 2000, p. 10). As Lijphart (2012) mentions himself, finding the proper values to measure executive dominance is difficult (Lijphart, 2012, p. 119). Average cabinet life will not be analysed since Indonesia had three (indirect) popularly elected executives between 1990 and 2010, all of which served their entire term although one president was removed through an impeachment process. Moreover, as Lijphart (2012) himself states is cabinet durability the best indicator for parliamentary systems (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 116-117).

All of this seems to show that Indonesia uses a model of democracy in which there exists a balanced relationship between the executive and legislature. This claim is supported by Fish & Kroenig (2009) whom in their work *The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey* (online excerpt), want to evaluate the powers on the national level of the central representative institutions for all the countries of the world, based on the Legislative Powers Survey, which is a list of 32 items measuring separate indicators of the legislature’s strength (Fish & Kroenig, 2009, p. 1). In reading their online excerpt they index Indonesia’s legislature not as a commanding force, but as still influential (Fish & Kroenig, 2009, p. 2). Their online index provides the House of Representatives of Indonesia with a score of 0,56 in 2007 (Fish & Kroenig, 2009, p. 4). Kawamura (2010) argues that the presidential system of Indonesia is transformed from executive-superior to legislative-superior, as well as into a system of separation of powers and concludes that the Indonesian presidential system after the reforms is relatively ‘weak’ and comparatively ‘legislative-heavy’ (Kawamura, 2010, pp. 46-48).

### *The party-system*

The third variable distinguished by Lijphart (2012) is the usage of a two-party (majoritarian) or multiparty (consensus) system. It epitomises between concentration of power on the one hand and power-sharing on the other. The type of party system is a strong component of and correlates almost as strongly with the

executives-parties dimension as the first variable and more strongly than the other three variables (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 60-61). In determining the number of parties in a party system, the most important problem is whether to count small parties, and, if not, how large a party has to be in order to be included in the count (Lijphart, 2012, p. 63). The index of effective number of parties (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) is most commonly used. Basically, in all cases where the parties are equal, the effective number will be the same as the raw numerical count. When parties are not equal in strength, the effective number is lower than the actual number of parties (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 66-67).

With the ENPP scores provided by Maleki for Indonesia it becomes clear that Indonesia uses a multiparty system. The ENPP score between 1999-2004 is 4,67, between 2004-2009 7,07, and as of 2009 6,13. Since a score of around ten is, in practice, the highest number (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 6) it furthermore proves the usage of the multiparty system of Indonesia. The LENP score for Indonesia between 1999-2004 is 0,669, between 2004-2009 0,849, and as of 2009 0,787. In 1999 the number of parties in the DPR was 21 (NDI, 1999, p. 8), in 2004 seventeen (Tan, 2006, p. 93), and in 2009 nine (Higashikata & Kawamura, 2015, p. 36). With all this, it is safe to assume that on Lijphart's (2012) third variable, Indonesia with its multiparty system fits in the consensus part of the distinction. There exists an extremely strong relationship between party systems and types of cabinets. When the Effective Number of Parties in Parliament increases, the occurrence of one-party minimal winning cabinets decreases (Lijphart, 2012, p. 101). Indonesia appears not to be an exception on this rule.

#### *The electoral system*

Lijphart's (2012) fourth distinction of majoritarian and consensus models of democracy is in the usage of majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus systems of proportional representation. Electoral systems are explained on the basis of six basic aspects: Electoral formula, district magnitude, electoral threshold, degree of (dis)proportionality, and influence of presidential elections<sup>49</sup> (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 131-132). Three types of systems of proportional representation are distinguished, one of them being the list PR system. Although there are minor variations in list formulas they basically entail that parties nominate lists of candidates in multimember districts, that voters cast their ballot for one party or another (although they are sometimes allowed to split their votes), and that seats are allocated to party lists in proportion to the number of votes they have collected. The systems of list PR can be further subdivided accordingly their formula used to translate votes into seats (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 134-135).

An electoral district denotes the number of candidates to be elected in that district. PR systems require multimember districts (Lijphart, 2012, p. 137). District magnitude varies greatly in PR systems, which has

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<sup>49</sup> Lijphart (2012) distinguishes moreover between malapportionment and party links.

a strong impact on the degree of proportionality. High-magnitude PR districts tend to maximize proportionality and facilitate the representation of small parties. In this sense, district magnitude and thresholds can be seen as two sides of the same coin: The barrier against small parties through any threshold essentially has the same function as the barrier implied by district magnitude (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 139-140). Another influencing factor for proportionality is the size of the body to be elected; the number of seats available for the translation of votes into seats is an integral part. However, for legislatures with a hundred members or more, size becomes relatively unimportant. Also, populous countries tend to have large legislatures in which the size of the legislature tends to be roughly the cube root of the population (Lijphart, 2012, p. 141).

During Suharto's New Order, Indonesia had six elections in which voting was compulsory (Tan, 2006, p. 105) and were managed. Moreover, the MPR composed of a large number of appointed members (Dagg, 2007, pp. 47-48). Discussing Indonesia's electoral system under Suharto, therefore, serves no purpose in this part of this research. After the fall of Suharto, however, Indonesia started working towards a true democratic electoral system (Ziegenhain, 2009, p. 38). For the 1999 elections a hybrid system was created combining proportional representation by province and assignment of candidates to districts (NDI, 1999, p. 5). The size of electoral districts were reduced and a conditional threshold was introduced. Lastly, the number of non-elected members was reduced. The MPR's size was reduced to 700 members (Dagg, 2007, pp. 48-50). 500 members from the DPR and the other 200 appointed members (Thompson, 1999, p. 6). Under Suharto, the DPR still had 75 seats reserved for appointed military representatives (Bourchier, 2000, pp. 17-18). Their number was reduced to 38 seats in the 1999 DPR (Dagg, 2007, pp. 48-49).

As of 2004, the MPR became an all-elected body consisting of the DPR and the DPD (Carnegie, 2008, p. 523; Bünte & Ufen, 2009, p. 15). The DPR consisted of 550 members. The DPD consisted of four members elected from each province (NDI, 2003b, p. 3). The election law was changed in 2003 creating criteria for competing in the elections (Tan, 2006, p. 112; Mietzner, 2009, p. 21). These conditions in fact ruled out regional parties (NDI, 2004, p. 5). The usage of the province as electoral district was also changed to newly created electoral districts consisting of between three and twelve members. Smaller parties would have more difficulty in obtaining seats by reducing the district magnitude (NDI, 2004, pp. 4, 5). Lastly, the voting system changed from a closed-list system to a partial open-list system (NDI, 2004, p. 4). The legal threshold, as of 2009, for parties to gain seats in the legislature is 2,5 per cent of the votes (Mietzner, 2009, p. 8). Indonesia's number of constituencies rose from 69 in 2004 to 77 in 2009 and contained of between three and ten seats and the number of seats in the DPR increased to 560 (Horowitz, 2013, pp. 183, 184).

It appears to be that, next to the usage of a system of proportional representation in Indonesia, three important policy decisions were made regarding this variable. First off is the creation of a truly popularly elected legislature, which happened over the years with the usage of free and fair elections and the abandonment of assigned and reserved seats. Second is the increase in accountability of representatives by reducing the magnitude of electoral districts. As a consequence it reduced proportionality as well as the facilitation of representation of small parties (Lijphart, 2012, p. 140). Thirdly, and connected to the second aspect, are the various requirements for parties to compete in elections as well as the legal threshold<sup>50</sup>. They rule out regional parties for competing in national elections as well as make it harder for smaller parties to gain seats. This somewhat reduced the Indonesian system's representativeness through the declining proportionality of the PR system (NDI, 2004, p. 5). Lastly, although the size of the legislature did change over time, as Lijphart (2012) states for legislatures with more than hundred members, size becomes relatively unimportant (Lijphart, 2012, p. 141). The data of Maleki (2015) supports the claims made for Indonesia. The parliamentary disproportionality between 1999 and 2004 was at 3,54. Between 2004 and 2009 at 4,45 and as of 2009 at 6,84.

The tendency of presidential systems having an indirect but strong effect (i.e. advantage of larger parties for the presidency which tends to carry over into legislative elections) on the effective number of parliamentary parties is especially strong when the presidential election is decided by plurality and when the legislative elections are held at the same time or shortly after the presidential election (Lijphart, 2012, p. 142). Under Suharto's New Order the president was elected by the MPR (Bourchier, 2000, p. 18). With the MPR being basically a rubber stamp Suharto was always re-elected (Dagg, 2007, p. 48). In 1999 it was still the job of the MPR to elect the president (Bourchier, 2000, p. 23), however, a multitude of the seats of the MPR were now popularly elected (NDI, 1999, p. 12). The president and vice president were chosen separately and needed a majority instead of a mere plurality (NDI, 1999, p. 6). As of 2004 the president and vice president of Indonesia are directly elected as a pair (Bünthe & Ufen, 2009, p. 15). Entry requires parties or coalitions having either three per cent of the seats in the DPR or five per cent of the DPR vote (NDI, 2003a, p. 2). Any candidate pair that gets more than 50 per cent of the total votes as well as at least 20 per cent in half the provinces is elected. The presidential election takes place at most three months after the elections results for the DPRDs, DPD, and DPR are declared (NDI, 2003a, p. 2). The constitution states that if no candidate pair of president and vice president is elected, the people will choose between the two pairs that received the highest number of votes (Article 6a, 4). As of 2009, only parties with 20 per cent of the seats or 25 per cent of the votes are to nominate presidential candidates (Mietzner, 2009, p. 16).

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<sup>50</sup> Although the effect of the legal threshold is pretty much mitigated by the effective threshold.

The threshold for the presidential election is also reflected in the data provided by Maleki. Between 2004 and 2009 presidential disproportionality was at 39,38 and as of 2009 at 39,20. To aggregate the results of disproportionality over all parties, Lijphart (2012) uses the index of Michael Gallagher (1991) that weighs the deviations by their own values, thus making large deviations account for a great deal more in the summary index than small ones (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 144-145). However, the influence of presidential elections, being inherently disproportional, should be taken into account in the measurements of disproportionality for a country. For this, the geometric mean is used (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 146-147), which is also applied by Maleki & Hendriks (2015, p. 8) in calculating the TEP score. The data provided by Maleki provides the following picture: Between 1999 and 2004 the TEP score for Indonesia is 0,965 being a pretty high score. Between 2004 and 2009 this score slightly decreased to 0,868, and as of 2009 to 0,836, still being a relatively high score.

#### *The interest group system*

The last variable of the first dimension concerns the interest group system. In a majoritarian democracy the system is typically competitive and uncoordinated composing of independent groups. In the consensus democracy interest groups constitute a coordinated and compromise-oriented system of corporatism<sup>51</sup>. Corporatism, essentially, has two distinct conceptual meanings. Firstly, it refers to an interest group system in which groups are organised into national, specialised, hierarchical, and monopolistic peak organisations. Secondly, it refers to interest groups being incorporated in the policy formation process (Lijphart, 2012, p. 158). As mentioned before, this variable in Lijphart's (2012) dimensions is the only one relating to the institutionalised relations between the state and society (Hendriks, 2010, p. 51). Since, the following part of this research will focus itself in more length on societal culture and the relation between state and society, I will briefly address the way the system of interest groups is organised in Indonesia, referring to labour unions. Moreover, reliable data of Indonesia on this variable is not available (Croissant & Schächter, 2009, p. 6). The state-backed All-Indonesia Workers' Union (SPSI) is the largest and most influential union in Indonesia. The SPSI is a so-called 'legacy union', a state-backed union inherited from the previous nondemocratic regime (Caraway, 2008, pp. 1371, 1372). Legacy unions benefit from union fragmentation and in contrast are hurt by union concentration (Caraway, 2008, p. 1376). The formation of new unions is showing a steep decline and rival unions are fragmented into many competing federations. This comes about due to the Trade Union Act of 2000 stating that ten workers are needed for establishing a union, and five unions to form a federation (Caraway, 2008, pp. 1380, 1381). Although this short paragraph in no way provides a full picture of the complex context of the interest group system of Indonesia, and more research on this subject is clearly needed, it does show an

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<sup>51</sup> Being a synonym of democratic corporatism here. Therefore, the 'interest group system' during the Suharto years will not be discussed.

interesting paradox in terms of Lijphart (2012). The state-backed union of SPSI would suggest a tendency of Indonesia towards the consensus distinction. However, it is thus argued, that the state-backing itself and the existence of legacy unions create a fragmented and competitive system of interest groups making Indonesia fall more in the majoritarian distinction. Looking at the Trade Union Act of 2000 itself, with its low threshold, one could argue that the system is indeed oriented towards the majoritarian distinction.

### *Unitary versus federal*<sup>52</sup>

The first variable of the second dimension of Lijphart (2012) is the federal-unitary dimension, which constitutes the distinction between unitary and centralised government versus federal and decentralised government. This variable can be seen as the most typical and drastic method of dividing power.

Federalism, as a term in political science, is normally used as a synonym for ‘division of power’ (Lijphart, 2012, p. 174). Although there are various definitions of federalism, there is broad agreement on its most basic characteristic: a guaranteed division of power between central and regional governments (Lijphart, 2012, p. 175). Elizar (1997) adds: Federalism constitutes a fundamental distribution of powers, not the devolution of powers (Elazar, 1997, p. 239). Here, we immediately arrive at an interesting point. As federalism tends to be used in relative large countries and plural societies (Lijphart, 2012, p. 193) one could assume that Indonesia practices a system of federalism. However, federalism itself is a longstanding taboo in Indonesia (Bourchier, 2000, p. 26) and as we have seen, the unitary state-form of the Republic of Indonesia is a non-amendable part of the constitution. In addition, processes of decentralisation bypassed the provincial level to avoid proposals of federalism that could endanger the unitary state (Hainsworth et al., 2007, p. 44). Nonetheless, in all democracies, power is necessarily divided between central and non-central governments. In the majoritarian democracy this division is highly one-sided, being unitary and centralised. The consensus model of democracy uses federalism and decentralisation, which guarantees strong non-central governments and a division of power between central and non-central levels of government (Lijphart, 2012, p. 175). One nuance to be made here is directly evident: On the one hand Indonesia is, at least in words, a unitary state, but how does the country divide its power then?

After the fall of Suharto, Habibie embarked on a course to decentralise power (Bünthe & Ufen, 2009, p. 3) through his regional autonomy initiative (Hainsworth et al., 2007, pp. 43-44). In the following years, decentralisation to the regions continued with the Second Amendment stating that regions are allowed to act on any topic that is not subscribed to the central government by law (NDI, 2000, pp. ii, iii). At the national level, the Regional Representative Council was established with legislative powers concerning natural resource management, financial balance and centre/region relations, and regional autonomy (NDI,

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<sup>52</sup> Before starting this part it is important to note that there exists extensive criticism on Lijphart’s (2012) federal-unitary dimension, for example, that it has almost no statistical effects (Bormann, 2010, p. 2). For an extensive reading of the criticism see Bormann (2010).

2002, p. 6). In fact, the decentralisation process of Indonesia is also called ‘Big Bang decentralisation’. From 1998 to 2004 Indonesia saw its number of local government increase from 292 to 434 (Fitriani, Hofman & Kaiser, 2005, pp. 58, 63). When looking at Indonesia’s Regional Authority Index, it developed from a 5,95 in 1998 to 20,78 out of 30 in 2010 (Hooghe et al., 2015). The question whether Indonesia fits the unitary model or federal model of democracy proves then to be a difficult one. Arguably, decentralisation in Indonesia definitely exists. However, there are still policy-areas in which the subnational governments do not have legislative powers. Therefore, in Lijphart’s (2012, p. 175) and Elizar’s (1997, p. 239) terms, there is not a guaranteed division or fundamental distribution of power. This would mean that Indonesia practises a unitary type of government, however to a certain extent being decentralised, making it unitary-decentralised. Nonetheless, to some extent this is still arbitrary and mostly a result of the chosen definition and interpretation of federalism.

Luckily, there are some concrete criteria that can be applied as well. Lijphart (2012) mentions the following characteristics of federalism: “*a bicameral legislature with a strong federal chamber to represent the constituent regions, a written constitution that is difficult to amend, and a supreme court or special constitutional court that can protect the constitution by means of its power of judicial review*” (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 176-177). Although Indonesia does have a Regional Representative Council at the national level, it is argued to be a weak cousin of the DPR (Tan, 2006, p. 106) with extremely limited powers (Carnegie, 2009, p. 253). The constitution of Indonesia, as will be discussed in the following part, is flexibly amendable. There does exist a Constitutional Court, however, its standpoint is debated (Butt, 2015, pp. 85-86). One last concrete criterion applies as well: Do states have formal federal constitutions that they can amend freely within certain limits set by the federal constitution (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 177, 183). This is not the case for Indonesia. Therefore, I can safely conclude that Indonesia fits within the unitary party of the distinction, albeit to some extent being decentralised. Croissant & Schächter (2009, p. 11) come to the same conclusion giving Indonesia a score of two on the scale of centralisation (scale 1-5).<sup>53</sup>

#### *Unicameral versus bicameral*

The second variable of the second dimension of Lijphart (2012) constitutes the difference between legislative power being concentrated in a unicameral legislature versus legislative power that is divided between two equally strong but different constituted houses. There are three common features of bicameralism: Second chambers tend to be smaller than first chambers (although there is great variety of how much smaller they are), legislative terms of office tend to be longer than in first chambers, and their

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<sup>53</sup> A lot has been written about decentralisation in Indonesia and this short overview does in no sense provide a full picture of the vast and complex context of the decentralisation process. For more extensive readings I suggest e.g.: (Fitriani, Hofman & Kaiser, 2005; Carnegie, 2008; Alm, Aten & Bahl, 2010).

staggered election. However, these features do not affect the question of whether it's a truly strong and meaningful institution (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 190-192).

Three features determine the strength or weakness of bicameralism. First, the formal constitutional powers that the two chambers have. Second is their method of selection (e.g. direct or indirect in relation to democratic legitimacy). The direct election of a second chamber may compensate for its limited formal power. Based on these two features bicameralism can be classified as symmetrical or asymmetrical. Symmetrical are those with relatively equal constitutional powers and democratic legitimacy. Highly unequal chambers in these respects are asymmetrical. Third is the crucial difference between the two chambers in that second chambers may be elected by different methods or designed as to overrepresent certain minorities. In this case their composition may be called incongruent. The greatest degree of overrepresentation is when there is equality of state, provincial, or cantonal representation regardless of the population of these 'federal' units (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 192-194).

With the adoption of the DPD Indonesia's both chambers have their own constitutional powers. The newly formed DPD as of 2004 has legislative powers on natural resource management, financial balance and centre/region relations, and regional autonomy as well as rights to propose considerations to the DPR on draft laws relating to religion, education, and tax, and on the state budget (NDI, 2002, p. 6). With regard to selection of the two chambers it becomes clear that under Suharto the MPR was not popularly elected (Dagg, 2007, p. 48). In the 1999 MPR, still 200 members were appointed (Thompson, 1999, p. 6) and of the DPR were still 38 seats reserved for appointed military representatives (Dagg, 2007, pp. 48-49). As of 2004 the entire MPR is popularly elected (Carnegie, 2008, p. 523). However, the DPD consists of four representatives whom are elected from each province (Dagg, 2007, p. 49). Therefore, in Lijphart's (2012) terms, the bicameral system of Indonesia can be called incongruent. There exist four principal categories: strong, medium-strength, and weak bicameralism, and unicameralism (Lijphart, 2012, p. 198). It is argued that the DPD has extremely limited powers (Carnegie, 2009, p. 253) and is a weak cousin to the party-dominated parliament (Tan, 2006, p. 106). However, for the purpose of measuring the division of legislative power, weak bicameralism still represents a degree of division (Lijphart, 2012, p. 200).

#### *Introduction to constitutional rigidity and judicial review*

Relating to the third and fourth variable of the second dimension, Lijphart (2012) proposes a four-point scale to measure both constitutional rigidity and judicial review. In the pure consensus model the constitution is rigid and protected by judicial review and in the pure majoritarian model there exists a flexible constitution and absence of judicial review. However, in practise there are degrees of flexibility or rigidity of constitutions and, when there exists judicial review, degrees to which it is actively used.

Moreover, Lijphart analyses that rigid constitutions usually are more protected through judicial review than the more flexible constitutions (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 204-205).

### *Constitutional rigidity*

Although countries have very different degrees of constitutional rigidity, they can be reduced to four basic types, based on the distinction between approval by ordinary/simple majorities (i.e. complete flexibility) and by larger than ordinary/extraordinary majorities: Ordinary majorities, between two-thirds and ordinary majorities, two-thirds majorities or equivalent, and supermajorities greater than two-thirds (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 206-208)<sup>54</sup>.

For the case of Indonesia, Article 37 of the Constitution provides insights into the constitutional amendment procedure. A proposal to amend an article of the constitution can be submitted to the agenda of an MPR session when it is submitted by a minimum of 1/3 of the total MPR membership (Article 37, 1). During the specific MPR session, at least 2/3 of the total MPR membership should be present (Article 37, 3). An agreement has to be reached of at least 50 per cent plus one member of the total MPR membership (Article 37, 4). Lastly, article 37, 5 states that provisions regarding the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia are not amendable. Within the original 1945 Constitution, Article 37 provided that amendments to the constitution can only be made with two thirds of the MPR present as well as approval of two thirds of the MPR.

### *Judicial review*

Especially with supreme and Constitutional Courts, its impact of judicial review only partly depends on its formal existence and much more on the force and frequency of its usage by the courts. A fourfold classification derives from the distinction between the presence and absence of judicial review and on three degrees of how actively courts assert this power: No judicial review, weak judicial review, medium-strength judicial review, and strong judicial review (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 214-215).

With the adoption of a Constitutional Court in Indonesia by the Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution in 2001, the discussion in 2003 focused itself on, among other things, the question whether judicial review should be full or limited. Decided was that decisions of the Constitutional Court should be final and binding (Law Number 24 of Year 2003, art. 47). During the drafting of the Constitutional Court Law of 2003 the question of which laws should be susceptible to judicial review by the Constitution Court was also settled. Article 50 of the 2003 law states: “[t]he laws that may be appealed for review are those which have been enacted after the introduction of the amendments to the 1945 Constitution of

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<sup>54</sup> One major adjustment has to be taken into account: The classification of special majorities by plurality elected parliaments, which are clearly less constraining than the same majorities in PR systems (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 207, 209). This is, however, not the case for Indonesia.

*Indonesia*". This limitation on the powers of the Constitutional Court was overturned and declared invalid through Court Decision Number 066/PUU-II/2004. By November 16 2014, the Constitutional Court decided 175 judicial review cases (of 650 cases brought forward in relation to 325 laws). 24 decisions concerned the settlement of disputes between state institutions (Siregar, 2015, p. 211). Nonetheless, it is argued that the Indonesian Constitutional Court is more focused on interests than on rights, allowing legislation that limits or even ignores constitutional rights that are expressly non-derogable (Butt, 2015, pp. 85-86).

Lijphart (2012) argues that there are two reasons to expect that the variables of constitutional rigidity or flexibility and the strength of judicial review will be correlated. Firstly, constitutional rigidity and judicial review are anti-majoritarian mechanisms and complete flexible constitutions and the absence of judicial review permit unrestricted majority rule. Secondly, they are logically linked. Judicial review can work effectively only if it is backed up by constitutional rigidity and vice versa. With strong judicial review, but a flexible constitution, the majority in the legislature can easily respond to a declaration of unconstitutionality by amending the constitution (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 218-219). Other factors that affect the majoritarian or consensual nature of these courts are the sizes of the courts, the methods of electing justices, their terms of office, and the internal decision-making rules of the court (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 223-224).

#### *The central bank*

Lijphart's (2012) last variable in the federal-unitary dimension is the distinction between independent central banks and central banks being dependent on the executive. Independent banks are yet another way of dividing power, fitting the consensus model of democracy whereas banks being dependent on the executive fit in the logic of concentrating power in the majoritarian model of democracy (Lijphart, 2012, p. 227).

As for Indonesia, with the adoption of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, an independent bank was created of which the independence is regulated by law (Ellis, 2005, p. 16). Economists have developed precise measures of central bank independence. Lijphart (2012) uses five measures of central bank independence (Lijphart, 2012, p. 227). For a more recent quantitative analyses of Indonesia's central bank independence, I turn to Dincer & Eichengreen (2014). Interestingly, their numbers show the same independence number from 1999 until 2010. This means, that central bank independence of Bank Indonesia was already present, directly after the fall of the New Order and not just after the mentioning of it in the Fourth Amendment.

### Independence (CBIW) by Country and Region

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Indonesia	–	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73

**Table 3:** CBIW (Central Bank Independence Unweighted) score of Indonesia 1998-2010 (Dincer & Eichengreen, 2014, p. 224).

However, unfortunately, their number shows no actual development and/or change in the rating of independence of Bank Indonesia. This is where I turn to Arthe & de Haan (2010). They show that in 1999 with Act 23/1999 the legal independence of Bank Indonesia significantly increased from 0,22 to 0,73. Parliament, however, considered Bank Indonesia as too independent and replaced Act 23/1999 with Act 3/2004 resulting in a decrease of the legal independence score to 0,63 (Artha & de Haan, 2010, pp. 13-14). Artha & de Haan (2010), building on, among others, Cukierman (1992), developed an indicator of actual independence of Bank Indonesia capturing institutional and economic factors affecting central bank independence. They find that before 1999 legal and actual independence of Bank Indonesia differed greatly and afterwards converged (Artha & de Haan, 2010, p. 1). The legal as well as actual independence of Bank Indonesia are shown in tables 4 and 5.

#### Legal Independence Index of Bank Indonesia, 1953 -2008

No	Description of variable	The Act 11/1953	The Act 11/1955	The Act 84/1958	The Act 13/1968	The Act 23/1999	The Act 3/2004
<b>Average Index</b>		<b>0.39</b>	<b>0.41</b>	<b>0.39</b>	<b>0.22</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.63</b>

**Table 4:** Average index of legal independence of Bank Indonesia, 1953-2008 (Artha & de Haan, 2010, p. 14).

#### Actual Independence Index of Bank Indonesia, 1953-2008

No	Description of variable	1953- 1958	1959- 1965	1966- 1982	1983- 1998	1999- 2003	2004- 2008
<b>Actual independence of Bank Indonesia</b>		<b>0.54</b>	<b>0.47</b>	<b>0.51</b>	<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.78</b>	<b>0.66</b>


**Table 5:** Actual independence index of Bank Indonesia, 1953-2008 (Artha & de Haan, 2010, p. 24).<sup>55</sup>

### 3.4.1 Conclusion

To provide a more precise overview of the placing of Indonesia’s model of democracy within the framework of Lijphart (2012), I qualitatively constructed figure 11, visualising Lijphart’s (2012) distinctions for the case of Indonesia. This visualisation helps to place Indonesia’s model of democracy within the majoritarian, consensus, or hybrid model of democracy for the year 2009. The 1-9 scale ranges

<sup>55</sup> This index is constructed based on the indicators of actual independence of Artha & de Haan (2010, pp. 37-41).

from complete majoritarian towards complete consensus respectively, with a score of 5 representing the grey area in which a variable is categorised as neither majoritarian nor consensus.



**Figure 11:** A Lijphartian (2012) visualisation of Indonesia's model of democracy.

### *Executives-parties dimension*

Lijphart's (2012) first distinction of the first dimension is between single-party majority cabinets and executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions. After the fall of Suharto, Indonesia's usage of the proportional system forced parties to negotiate and form coalitions creating a grand coalition cabinet. During 1999 and 2004, moreover, the president was dependent on the support of the legislature, since the MPR could impeach him. After 2004 this dependency was removed. Nonetheless, Indonesia still established oversized cabinets. The 2004 cabinet consisted of seven out of seventeen parties together holding 73 per cent of the seats of the DPR. The 2009 cabinet consisted of six out of nine parties together holding 75 per cent of 560 seats in the DPR (Aspinall et al., 2015; Higashikata & Kawamura, 2015). The data provided by Maleki, moreover, shows an LNPG score of 0,534 for the years 2004 and 2009. Therefore, I can safely conclude that on Lijphart's (2012) variable of executive power-sharing, Indonesia scores high on the consensus part of the distinction.

The second distinction is between an executive-legislative relationship in which a dominant executive exists versus executive-legislative balance of power. With the Constitutional Amendments after the fall of Suharto, Indonesia started strengthening the power of the DPR. The DPR became the sole body to establish laws and the presidential term became maximised to two five-year terms (NDI, 1999; Lindsey, 2002). On the other hand it is argued that the president, effectively still has a 'veto right' (Indrayana, 2008; Kawamura, 2010) and the president does have pro-active powers (NDI, 2000). Nonetheless, it is argued that Indonesia developed from executive-superior to legislative-superior (Kawamura, 2010). Others, describe the legislature of Indonesia as influential, but not as a commanding force (Fish & Kroenig, 2009). Nonetheless, it is safe to assume that on this variable Indonesia falls within the consensus part of the distinction.

The third distinction is between the usage of a two-party (majoritarian) or multiparty (consensus) system. Looking at the LENP scores provided by Maleki, we can see that Indonesia clearly falls within the consensus part of Lijphart's (2012) distinction. The LENP score for Indonesia between 1999-2004 is 0,669, between 2004-2009 0,849, and as of 2009 0,787. The ENPP score between 1999-2004 is 4,67, between 2004-2009 7,07, and as of 2009 6,13. A score of around ten is, in practice, the highest number (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 6). The high ENPP score for Indonesia thus proves the usage of the multiparty system by Indonesia. In 1999 the number of parties in the DPR was 21 (NDI, 1999), in 2004 seventeen (Tan, 2006), and in 2009 nine (Higashikata & Kawamura, 2015). With all this, it is safe to assume that on Lijphart's (2012) third variable, Indonesia fits in the consensus part of the distinction.

The fourth distinction is between majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus systems of proportional representation. Here, special attention needs to be paid to the effect of presidential systems. Indonesia practises a system of proportional representation. When looking at the data provided by Maleki we see that the TEP score for Indonesia between 1999 and 2004 was 0,965, between 2004 and 2009 0,868, and as of 2009 0,836. This relatively high score makes Indonesia fall within the consensus part of the distinction, even though the proportionality of the system clearly declines over the years. This will be discussed in the next part when making the connection between cultural dimensions and models of democracy.

The fifth and last distinction of Lijphart's (2012) first dimension relates to the interest group system, being competitive and uncoordinated composing of independent groups or being a coordinated and compromise-oriented system of corporatism. The placement of Indonesia on this variable proves to be more difficult. First off, reliable data on this variable is not available (Croissant & Schächter, 2009). Secondly, with the All-Indonesia Workers' Union (SPSI) as an indicator, it becomes clear that a part of Indonesia's interest group system consists of 'legacy unions': A state-backed union inherited from the

previous nondemocratic regime (Caraway, 2008). While this could be an indication of Indonesia tending to practise a consensus type of interest group system, it is argued that rival unions are fragmented into competing federations, of which the legacy unions benefit. Moreover, looking at the Trade Union Act of 2000 creating low thresholds for establishing unions and federations (Caraway, 2008), it seems that Indonesia's interest group system is inclined towards the majoritarian type being competitive and uncoordinated composing of independent groups. Therefore, I did place Indonesia's interest group system within the majoritarian part of Lijphart's (2012) distinction, however blurred as to indicate that additional research is definitively needed. Nonetheless, for the purpose of 'measuring' Indonesia's model of democracy on the executives-parties dimension (Lijphart, 2012) this provides no difficulties since Lijphart (2012) himself argues that the first four elements of this dimension are structurally connected, but that for the interest group variable there exists no such structural connection (Lijphart, 2012, p. 300).

#### *Federal-unitary dimension*

Lijphart's (2012) first distinction of the second dimension is the federal-unitary dimension, constituting the difference between unitary and centralised government versus federal and decentralised government. This distinction is the most typical and drastic method of dividing power (Lijphart, 2012). Interestingly, the unitary state-form of the Republic of Indonesia is a non-amendable part of the constitution (Hainsworth et al., 2007). After the fall of Suharto, processes of decentralisation took place within Indonesia allowing regions to perform on any of the topics not subscribed to the central government (NDI, 2000). Moreover, the Regional Representative Council was established at the national level and an increase in local governments took place (Fitriani et al., 2005). Indonesia's Regional Authority Index rose from a 5.95 in 1998 to a 20,78 out of 30 in 2010 (Hooghe et al., 2015). Nonetheless, the DPD is argued to be a weak cousin of the DPR (Tan, 2006) with extremely limited powers (Carnegie, 2009). The constitution of Indonesia is flexibly amendable and the Constitutional Court's standpoint is debated (Butt, 2015). Lastly, there aren't formal federal constitutions for 'states'. All in all, it is safe to conclude that Indonesia fits within the unitary party of the distinction, albeit to some extent being decentralised.

The second distinction constitutes the difference between legislative power being concentrated in a unicameral legislature versus legislative power being divided between two equally strong, but different constituted houses (Lijphart, 2012). As of 2004, there exist two legislative chambers at the national level of Indonesia. However, it is argued that the DPD has extremely limited powers and in fact is a weak cousin to the party-dominated parliament (Carnegie, 2009; Tan, 2006). Indonesia's system of bicameralism can thus be described as asymmetrical. Moreover, the system can be described as incongruent since its seats are divided among provinces equally (four from each province). However, weak bicameralism, for the purpose of measurement, still represents a degree of division (Lijphart, 2012)

and therefore formally Indonesia's system of bicameralism falls within the consensus part of the distinction. The third distinction is between rigid and flexible constitutions: Constitutional rigidity. Article 37 of the constitution shows that Indonesia has a flexibly amendable constitution, needing an agreement in the MPR of 50 per cent plus one and 2/3 of the MPR membership present. This makes Indonesia fit in the majoritarian part of the distinction. The fourth distinction is between systems where the legislature itself decides on the constitutionality of their own legislation versus systems where Supreme or Constitutional Courts decide on the constitutionality of laws. Indonesia established a Constitutional Court in 2001 with the Third Amendment. Although at first its reach was limited by the legislature, the Constitutional Court immediately overturned this limitation on its powers. The Constitutional Court, however, allegedly, is more focused on interests and allows legislation that contradicts constitutional rights (Butt, 2015). Nonetheless, there indeed exists a Constitutional Court, thus in Lijphart's (2012) typology making Indonesia fall in the consensus part of the distinction.

The fifth and last distinction of Lijphart's (2012) second dimension constitutes the difference between independent and dependent central banks. Indonesia established an independent bank with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of which the independence is regulated by statute (Ellis, 2005; Indrayana, 2008). Artha & de Haan (2010) show that with Act 23/1999 the legal independence of Bank Indonesia significantly increased from 0,22 to 0,73 and Act 3/2004 resulted in a decrease of the legal independence score to 0,63. Nonetheless, Bank Indonesia is still relatively independent. The fact that the independence of Bank Indonesia is further regulated by statute, is mentioned as criticism (Indrayana, 2008). This variable, moreover, is the only variable of the federal-unitary dimension on which Indonesia clearly practises within the consensus part of the distinction. Lijphart (2012) argues that the first four of the five elements of the federal-unitary dimension of consensus democracy are structurally and functionally linked to the requirement of operating a federal system. But, there exists no such link with central bank independence. *"Instead, the most likely connection is a political-cultural predisposition to think in terms of dividing power among separate institutions"* (Lijphart, 2012, p. 300).

#### *Hybrid, majoritarian or consensus?*

Lastly, I turn to the question whether Indonesia's model of democracy, in Lijphart's (2012) terms, is either a hybrid, majoritarian or consensus. Looking first at the executives-parties dimension, the only difficult (and probably deviating) variable concerns the interest group system. However, Lijphart (2012) argues himself that the first four elements of this dimension are structurally connected, but for the interest group variable there exists no such structural connection (Lijphart, 2012). Within the first dimension is the percentage of minimal winning one-party cabinets a particularly strong element that can be viewed as conceptually close to the essence of the distinction between concentration of power and the joint exercise

of power (Lijphart, 2012, p. 240). It's thus quite logical (in Lijphart's (2012) reasoning) that Indonesia for four of the five variables of the first dimension falls within the consensus part of the distinction of the executives-parties dimension of Lijphart (2012). The difficulties, however, really begin when analysing the second dimension: The federal-unitary dimension of Lijphart (2012).


In discussing Indonesia's model of democracy on the second dimension of Lijphart (2012) it is once more important to note that his work is heavily debated. Especially noteworthy here, is the following criticism: The federal-unitary dimension has almost no statistical effects, the implicit combination of the two dimensions into an effectively one-dimension, either consensus or majoritarian, interpretation, and that only established democracies are investigated in constructing the typology, therefore making it incapable of capturing democracies outside of the original scope (Bormann, 2010, pp. 4-6). Lijphart (2012) argues that the first *"four of the five elements of the federal-unitary dimension of consensus democracy are structurally and functionally linked to the requirement of operating a federal system"* (Lijphart, 2012, p. 300). Moreover, it is argued that the federalism and decentralisation variable is the strongest element of the second dimension and can be seen as *"conceptually at the heart of the federal-unitary dimension"* (Lijphart, 2012, p. 240). Whether the reversed reasoning for operating a unitary type of government applies as well remains unclear and is therefore not assumed by me. Looking at Indonesia's positioning on the federal-unitary dimension in figure 11, it immediately becomes clear that this reversed reasoning at least would not apply to the case of Indonesia. Within Lijphart's (2012) second dimension, the federal-unitary dimension of democratic institutions, Indonesia does not show a clear pattern towards any distinction. All in all, this means that Indonesia, in Lijphart's (2012) typology, practices a hybrid model of democracy. On the executives-parties dimension Indonesia clearly operates within the consensus part of the distinction, while its placement on the federal-unitary dimension remains inconclusive. This difficulty clearly relates to the mentioned criticism (Bormann, 2010).

Lastly, the Lijphartian (2012) analysis of Indonesia's model of democracy shows the disadvantage of thinking in dichotomies, focussing on the formal democracy at the macro-political level, because it's insensitive to the non-formal democracy (Hendriks & Michels, 2011, p. 309). In-depth studies are needed to be able to truly grasp a model of democracy beyond the majoritarian-consensus dichotomy. Labelling variables of a country's model of democracy as consensus purely on the basis of having bicameralism, or having a Constitutional Court, for example, can construct quite a superficial image. Moreover, this Lijphartian (2012) analysis of Indonesia's model of democracy has shown that only thinking in pure types of democracy, either majoritarian or consensus, to be distinguished and kept apart, is insufficient. Broadening the conceptualisation, and paying attention to the non-formal expressions of democracy in

addition to formal and national ones, already creates a different and more mixed picture (Hendriks & Michels, 2011, p. 314).

### 3.5 Models of democracy and dimensions of national culture<sup>56</sup>

As mentioned, Hendriks's (2010) study is one of the few that conceptualises the relationship of compatible socio-political culture and models of democracy (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 4). He argues that there are compatible social cultures and political cultures that are the foundations underpinning the different models of democracy. The compatible citizenship styles and leadership styles are the visible expressions of the models of democracy (Hendriks, 2010, p. 32). Putting all these together, it creates the following figure:



**Figure 12:** Models of democracy, expressions, and foundations (Hendriks, 2010, p. 33).

<sup>56</sup> This chapter is important since the questionnaire and interview of the field research are constructed accordingly the phrasing of Hendriks (2010) as provided in this chapter. The (results of the) field research will be discussed in chapter 6. For the questionnaire and interview I refer to appendix A and B.

*Democracy and political culture*

Models of democracy are shaped through institutions that tend towards integrative or aggregative democracy and towards direct or indirect democracy. Underneath, lie more or less durable patterns of thought and action that can be described as political culture or, more specifically, democratic ethos: The political and cultural attitude towards democracy (Hendriks, 2010, p. 34). There are four ideal types that can be distinguished on two dimensions (Hendriks, 2010, p. 37):

- **Power distance or power equality?** Democratic ethos is characterised by the notion that everyone has their own specific responsibility. In mass democracy it's the leading politicians versus the voting mass and in guardian democracy it's the professional agents versus those they represent. Or it is characterised by the notion that all count equally on a level playing field. In a protectionist democracy citizens stand up for their interests and in grassroots democracy participants have to get on with it together.
- **Contest or convergence?** The democratic culture is characterised by a logic of contest and competition. In mass democracy one chooses between candidate one or two and in protectionist democracy one chooses between proposition A or B. Or it is characterised by a logic of convergence and accommodation. In guardian democracy this becomes apparent through elite collaboration and in grassroots democracy through bottom-up consensus-building.

	<i>Contest</i> (Weeding out)	<i>Convergence</i> (Melting together)
<i>Power distance</i> (Each to their niche)	Mass democracy	Guardian democracy
<i>Power equality</i> (All count equally)	Protectionist democracy	Grassroots democracy

**Figure 13:** Political culture and democratic ethos (Hendriks, 2010, p. 37).

*Democracy and societal culture*

For societal culture, Hendriks (2010) utilises the typology of Douglas (1978), which distinguishes four basic types of participation in social life: Individualism, egalitarianism, hierarchy, and atomism. These are ideal-typical, relating to empirical cultural manifestations as primary colours do to real-world colour varieties. In culture, hybridity is the rule, however, the one ideal type may be more noticeable than the other (Hendriks, 2010, pp. 37-38).

- **Group: me or we culture?** This refers to the extent to which people's thought and actions are driven by their involvement in a social group. The ideal-typical low-group culture (me culture) defines individuals as autonomous beings in their own right. The ideal-typical high-group culture (we culture) defines people by having strong solidarity and commitment to the group.
- **Grid: roles ascribed or roles achieved?** This refers to the extent to which position-related roles (i.e. role-requirements that specify how people are supposed to act in certain positions) drive people's thoughts and actions. In the ideal-typical low-grid culture roles are achieved. People decide themselves about the script they play out and are free and equal in doing so. In the ideal-typical high-grid culture roles are ascribed. Roles are allocated from the outside and are strongly specifying and guiding for people in particular social positions.

	<i>Low-group</i> (Me culture)	<i>High-group</i> (We culture)
<i>High-grid</i> (Roles ascribed)	Atomism	Hierarchy
<i>Low-grid</i> (Roles achieved)	Individualism	Egalitarianism

**Figure 14:** Societal cultures (Hendriks, 2010, p. 38).

#### *Citizenship and democracy*

The key question in determining democratic citizenship is: What role do citizens play in democracy? The common answers are positioned on two dimensions (Hendriks, 2010, p. 41):

- **Spectator or player?** Citizens can be mainly spectators in an audience democracy as if they are watching a play in which they are only involved at certain moments (e.g. in general elections), which relates to indirect democracy. Or citizens can be on the stage as leading players in initiatives, referendums or voting assemblies, which relates to direct democracy.
- **Voter or speaker?** Citizens can play the role of voters in an electorate. They are (s)electors after which a numerical addition is made, which relates to aggregative democracy. Or they can be actors. Together with others they have a speaking part in a talkative and dialogical process of consulting, which relates to integrative democracy.

	<i>Voter</i> (S)electing)	<i>Speaker</i> (Conferring)
<i>Spectator</i> (In the audience)	Spectator/voter	Spectator/speaker
<i>Player</i> (On the stage)	Player/voter	Player/speaker

Figure 15: Citizenship styles (Hendriks, 2010, p. 42).

*Leadership and democracy*

With ‘taking the lead in democracy’ as principal meaning, leadership roles can be distinguished on two dimensions (Hendriks, 2010, p. 43):

- **Protagonist or facilitator.** The one in the leading role may act as the head that embodies a particular movement or alignment, which relates to indirect democracy. Or he/she acts as the chief supporter of players who, in principle, play their own game in the public domain, which relates to direct democracy (Hendriks, 2010, p. 43).
- **Bridge-builder or prizefighter.** The one in the lead can act as a moderator or intermediary in a communicative process which requires different voices to be harmonized, which relates to integrative democracy. Or he/she can act as a ‘prizefighter’, being focused on winning (and certainly not losing) a highly competitive game which will lead to a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’. This suits aggregative democracy (Hendriks, 2010, p. 43).

	<i>Prizefighter</i> (Winning over)	<i>Bridge-builder</i> (Tying together)
<i>Protagonist</i> (Deciding)	Gladiator	Regent
<i>Facilitator</i> (Supporting)	Advocate	Coach

Figure 16: Leadership styles (Hendriks, 2010, p. 44).

## Chapter 4    The concept of culture

### *Introduction*

*“(…) in societies where individual ambition and success are highly valued, the organisation of the economic and legal system is likely to be competitive (…). In contrast, a cultural emphasis on group well-being is likely to be expressed in more cooperative economic and legal systems” (Schwartz, 1999, p. 25).*

Some scholars argue that ‘inclusive institutions’ are most important, or that ‘just institutions matter’, when it comes to the interaction and role of democratic institutions and culture (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 3). For example, Rothstein (1998) argues that institutions not only change what individuals conceive to be rational and as lying in their own well-considered interest, but they also influence what they regard as right and just. Instead of focusing on various factors in the surrounding society, he points to political institutions as the central explanation for variations in social norms (on an aggregate level) (Rothstein, 1998, p. 217). The heart of the theory of Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) is the link between inclusive economic and political institutions and prosperity. They argue that inclusive economic institutions that enforce property rights, create a level-playing field, and encourage investments in new technologies and skills are more favourable to economic growth than extractive economic institutions. Inclusive economic institutions are supported by, and support, inclusive political institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 429-430). All in all, the notion that the behaviour of people in the social, economic, and political realm is codetermined by value orientations is largely accepted (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 8).

If we look once more at figure 3 we see that Inglehart & Welzel (2005) study the relation between culture and performance of democracy and focus on the relationship between the existence of self-expression values as most crucial for democracy (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 2). They conclude that the support of democracy by the public is less important than broad civic values relating to self-expression and freedom, since these values indicate an intrinsic, not an instrumental, preference for democracy. Moreover, the system-level of democracy is negatively linked with attitudes that emphasize social conformism (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 41). Linder & Bächtiger (2005) focus on democratisation in African and Asian countries by researching culture cross-nationally and develop an index for power-sharing (Linder & Bächtiger, 2005, p. 861). They underscore the pivotal role of culture, and the strong negative role of extended family and kinship ties (familism) for processes of democratisation. A crucial predicament for democratisation might be developing trust beyond family systems and social capital (Linder & Bächtiger, 2005, p. 875).

## 4.1 Democracy, culture and religion

### *Introduction*

Democracy is practiced in different parts of the world. Shouldn't it be better to discuss Western and/or Asian democracy, for example (Neher, 1994, p. 958)? And what about the relation between Islam and democracy? Indonesia, being a predominantly Muslim populated country, in fact the world's largest Muslim-majority country (Anwar, 2010, p. 37), shouldn't Indonesia's democracy be discussed in relation to Islam and religion?

### *Is democracy a universal value?*

Let's start with the before mentioned distinction between democracy as an ideal and an actuality (Dahl, 2000, p. 26). Is democracy a universal value? Is there an essential difference between, for example, Asian and Western values in relation to democracy? Zakaria (2007) discusses constitutional liberalism in referring to a deep seeded tradition in Western history, which seeks to protect an individual's autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source (e.g. state, church, society). The term marries two closely connected ideas. First, it is liberal, drawing on the philosophical strain, beginning with the Greeks and Romans, that emphasises individual liberty. Next to that, it is constitutional, because it places the rule of law at the centre of politics (Zakaria, 2007, p. 19). This 'Western model of government' (Zakaria, 2007, p. 20) originated from the development of constitutional liberalism in Western Europe and the United States as a defence of individual's right to life and property and the freedoms of religion and speech. In securing these rights, constitutional liberalism, emphasized checks on the power of government, the separation of church and state, equality under the law, and impartial courts and tribunals. Moreover, in almost all of its variants, constitutional liberalism argues that human beings have certain natural (or 'inalienable') rights. Governments must accept this as a basic law and limit its own powers to secure them (Zakaria, 2007, pp. 19-20).

Liberal democracy, Zakaria (1997; 2007) argues, is "*a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property*". Liberal democracy and constitutional liberalism (the bundle of freedoms) is not intrinsically linked with democracy (Zakaria, 2007, p. 17). It is theoretically different and historically distinct from democracy (Zakaria, 1997, pp. 23-24). Illiberal democracies are the democratically elected regimes, however regularly overstep the constitutional limits on their powers as well as strip citizens of basic rights and freedoms (Zakaria, 1997, p. 22). He argues, moreover, looking at the many Non-Western transitions to liberal democracy over the last three decades that one can see that the countries who have moved furthest towards liberal democracy, followed a version of the European pattern; capitalism and the rule of law first, and then democracy (Zakaria, 2007, p. 55).

Simply put, I do not disagree with his core message. As Fukuyama (1995) states: Economic development tends to be followed by political liberalisation (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 20). There are few relationships between social, economic, and political phenomena that are stronger than that between the level of economic development and the existence of democratic politics (Huntington, 1991, p. 30). In this research I do, however, assert that the values towards and of democracy are not either Western or Asian based. For example, when looking at Asian values, it has been claimed that Asians traditionally value discipline, not political freedom, and thus the attitude to democracy must inevitably be much more sceptical in these countries (Sen, 1999, p. 13). Moreover, it is argued that Asia will not continue to democratise in the future or that the form of democracy will be so specifically rooted in Asian traditions that it will be unrecognisable to ‘Westerners’ (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 24). Neher (1994) argues that because none of the Asian countries fit precisely into the Western definition of liberal, the question arises whether or not it is even useful to use the term democracy to describe Asian political systems (Neher, 1994, p. 958). Confucius is the usual author for interpreting Asian values (Sen, 1999, p. 14). Huntington (1991), for example, states that in practice Confucian or Confucian-influenced societies have been inhospitable to democracy, because traditionally Confucian societies lacked a tradition of rights against the state to the extent that where individual rights did exist, they were created by the state. Moreover, harmony and cooperation were preferred over disagreement and competition and the maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy were central values. The conflict of parties, groups, and ideas was viewed as dangerous and illegitimate (Huntington, 1991, p. 24). ‘Confucian democracy’, clearly is a contradiction in terms (Huntington, 1991, p. 26).

Asia is a very large area containing 60 per cent of the world’s population. Generalisations about such a vast set of peoples is not easy. Confucius is the usual author for interpreting Asian values, but there are many more intellectual influences spreading out through Asia (e.g. Buddhist traditions, Christian presence) (Sen, 1999, p. 14). Although it is not difficult to find authoritarian writings within Asian traditions, the same goes for Western classics (Sen, 1999, p. 15). For example, the Bible has its authoritarian tendencies as well. Solomon, portrayed as the wisest man of all, was, after all, an absolute monarch (Zakaria, 2004, p. 4). Therefore: *“To dismiss the plausibility of democracy as a universal value because of the presence of some Asian writings on discipline and order would be similar to rejecting the plausibility of democracy as a natural form of government in Europe or America today on the basis of the writings of Plato or Aquinas (not to mention the substantial medieval literature in support of the Inquisitions)”* (Sen, 1999, p. 15).

To put this in perspective, at one point many scholars argued that Catholicism was an obstacle to democracy (Huntington, 1991, p. 30). Building on multiple arguments as to why Confucianism is

compatible with democracy (e.g. a meritocratic institution with egalitarian implication, focus on education, relative tolerance, intense familism), Fukuyama (1995) therefore concludes that there is no fundamental cultural obstacle to the democratisation of contemporary Confucian societies and that there is reason to assume that these societies will move in the direction of greater political liberalisation as they grow wealthier (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 32).

### *Islam and democracy*

What about Islam? Islam is often portrayed as fundamentally intolerant of and hostile to individual freedom, but the presence of diversity and variety within a tradition applies very much to Islam as well (Sen, 1999, p. 15). Islam rejects any distinction between the religious community and the political community. Hence, political participation is linked to religious affiliation (Huntington, 1991, p. 28). Classical Islam contains few of the ideas that are associated with democracy today (Zakaria, 2004, pp. 3-4). There is nothing in the political traditions of Islam, which might make familiar, or comprehensible, the organising ideas of constitutional and representative government. The idea of a state as a specific territorial entity endowed with sovereignty, popular sovereignty as the foundation of governmental legitimacy, the notion of representation, of elections, of popular suffrage, of political institutions regulated by laws laid down by a parliamentary assembly, of these laws being guarded by an independent judiciary, the ideas of a secular state, of society being composed of a multitude of self-activating, autonomous groups and associations – all these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition (Kedourie, 1992, pp. 5-6). However, similarly to the bible, little is to be gained by searching in the Koran for clues to Islam's true nature. The Koran is an extensive book, filled with poetry and contradictions – much like the Bible and the Torah (Zakaria, 2004, p. 4). But more importantly, in my view, is that Islam, like any religion, is not what books make it, but what people make it (Zakaria, 2004, p. 5).

Let's start with the following: Political activists, journalists, and even professors sometimes misleadingly equate Islam with Arab culture (Stepan, 2000, p. 48), which creates the false impression that there are no Muslims living in democratic regimes. A rough estimate of 190 million Muslims in Indonesia, 120 million in India, 65 million in Turkey, and 20 million Muslims living under democratic regimes in areas such as Western Europe, North America, and Australia leads to at least 395 million Muslims living in democratic regimes (Stepan, 2000, p. 48, 49). In Indonesia, for example, Suharto's rule was one of a military authoritarian regime, but Islam was never a major part of Suharto's power base (Stepan, 2000, p. 49). The two largest and most influential Islamic organisations, both with over 25 million members, at the start of the transition in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, were led by respectively Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais, both leaders in the struggle against Suharto. After Suharto's fall Amien Rais created a new political party, The National Mandate Party (PAN), which was not explicitly

Islamist and included non-Muslims in its leadership (Stepan, 2000, p. 49). Abdurrahman Wahid (former president of Indonesia) also created a new political party, The National Awakening Party (PKB), and throughout the 1999 electoral campaign he argued against an Islamic state and in favour of religious pluralism. Moreover, Abdurrahman Wahid, collaborated often with Megawati Sukarnoputri and her secular nationalist party (PDI) which includes secular Muslims, Christians, and many non-Muslim minorities. Abdurrahman Wahid constantly argued that tolerance was one of the best parts of Indonesia's religious tradition. Muslim identities in Indonesia are often moderate, pluralist, and syncretic (Stepan, 2000, p. 50).

Of course, it is not all positive only. After the fall of Suharto, Islamic militants bombed or burnt Christian churches and inter-religious and inter-ethnic battles erupted resulting in thousands of deaths. In October 2002, Islamic militants bombed a nightclub in Bali (killing 202 people), followed in August 2003 by the bombing of the Marriot Hotel in Jakarta (killing nineteen people), the Australian Embassy bombing (killing 9 people) in September 2004, and the second Bali bombing of three restaurants (killing 23 people) in October 2005 (Hainsworth, Turner & Webster, 2007, p. 42).

However, politically, despite inter-ethnic and religious conflicts, often tolerated and at times supported by parts of the armed forces, no Islamic fundamentalist party developed a significant mass following. In June 1999, the first free election in over four decades, the orthodox Islamic party: The Crescent Star Party (PBB), only polled 1,94 per cent of the total popular vote (Stepan, 2000, p. 50; Buehler, 2009, p. 60). More radically oriented Islamist parties fail to mobilise the electorate and consequently saw their share of votes decline considerably (Buehler, 2009, p. 59). In fact, the total vote share of Islamic parties (including Orthodox Islamic Parties, progressive Islamic parties, traditional Islamic parties, modernist Islamic parties, nationalist-religious parties (Buehler, 2009, pp. 58-59), in contrast to secular parties, has never reached 40 percent (Higashikata & Kawamura, 2015, p. 36). See table 6. Some political movements still advocate that Islamic law should, constitutionally, apply to all Muslims. Popular support for this seems to be limited to no more than one-sixth of the voting population (Webber, 2006, p. 398). Certainly, democracy has not yet become the 'only game in town'. Religious violence continues to cause dangerous tensions and breakdowns of law. Nonetheless, against great initial odds, democracy is still on the agenda in Indonesia (Stepan, 2000, p. 50).

	1999-2004		2004-2009		2009-2014		2014-2019	
	Vote Share	Seat Share						
PDIP	33.7%	30.6%	18.5%	19.8%	14.0%	16.8%	19.0%	19.5%
Golkar	22.4%	24.0%	21.6%	23.1%	14.5%	18.9%	14.8%	16.3%
PD	---	---	7.5%	10.2%	20.9%	26.4%	10.2%	10.9%
Gerindra	---	---	---	---	4.5%	4.6%	11.8%	13.0%
Hanura	---	---	---	---	3.8%	3.0%	5.3%	2.9%
NasDem	---	---	---	---	---	---	6.7%	6.3%
PPP	7.1%	6.8%	8.2%	10.6%	5.3%	6.8%	6.5%	7.0%
PKB	12.6%	10.2%	10.6%	9.5%	7.9%	5.0%	9.0%	8.4%
PAN	7.1%	6.8%	6.4%	9.6%	6.0%	8.2%	7.6%	8.8%
PKS	1.4%	1.4%	7.3%	8.2%	7.9%	10.2%	6.8%	7.1%
Others	9.1%	8.4%	16.1%	9.1%	15.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Secular Parties Total	62.4%	62.8%	61.7%	57.6%	70.8%	69.8%	68.6%	68.8%
Islamic Parties Total	37.6%	37.2%	38.3%	42.6%	29.2%	30.2%	31.4%	31.3%

**Table 6:** Indonesian parliamentary election results, 1999-2019 (Higashikata & Kawamura, 2015, p. 36).

In all this, it is important to keep in mind that cultural traditions like Islam and Confucianism are highly complex bodies of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, assumptions, and behavioural patterns. Any major culture has some elements that are incompatible with democracy, just as both Protestantism and Catholicism are clearly undemocratic (Huntington, 1991, p. 30). Catholic popes combined religious as well as political power in a way that no Muslim ruler has even done (Zakaria, 2004, p. 4). Next to that, a major pitfall of focusing only on Islam in relation to democratisation, is that one neglects the overall socio-political, military, ethnic, economic and international contexts (Stepan, 2000, p. 52).

Finally, I assert that, for example, the advocacy of discipline or order is not regional in character and that the heterogeneity of values seems to characterise most, perhaps all, major cultures. The claim that democracy is a universal value cannot be disposed of by imagined cultural taboos or assumed civilizational predispositions imposed by our various pasts (Sen, 1999, p. 16). As Hendriks (2010) states: *“The universalist concept of ‘Western democracy’ – a concept that might be ‘bestowed’ or ‘forced’, depending on one’s point of view, on ‘non- Western countries’ – does not match the multiform reality of democracy”* (Hendriks, 2010, p. 30). Therefore, this research adopts a more universalistic approach to democracy, placing the democracy of Indonesia in the context where it belongs. The model of democracy and democratic institutions of Indonesia are investigated in a manner which does not contribute to the question whether one model of democracy is better than the other, but rather places the workings of a model of democracy in the context of the investigated country itself; its cultural context.

## 4.2 Measuring national culture

There is no agreement about the term ‘culture’ among social scientists (House et al., 2002, p. 5). For Schwartz (2006) culture is the prevailing rich complex of beliefs, meanings, norms, symbols, and values among people in a society (Schwartz, 2006, p. 139). The collective programming of the mind, distinguishing between members of one category or group of people from another, is Hofstede’s (2001) definition of culture (Hofstede, 2001, p. 9). For the GLOBE research program (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness), culture is the shared values, motives, identities, beliefs, and interpretations or meanings of notable events. These are transmitted across age generations and are the result of common experiences from members of collectives (House et al., 2002, p. 5). Although there are many definitions of culture, there is wide agreement that culture consists of shared elements that provide the standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating, communicating, and acting among those who share a language, a historic period, and a geographic location (Triandis, 1996, p. 408). In general, social scientists use culture to refer to a set of parameters in collectives that differentiate the collectives from each other. Focus is on the ‘sharedness’ of cultural indicators among members of the collective (House et al., 2002, p. 5). Dominant cultural orientations are relatively stable and only change slowly (Schwartz, 2006, p. 139).

A society’s culture is inherent in its values (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 8). Culture presupposes a collectivity and values are held by individuals as well as collectivities. Values are broad inclinations towards certain states of affairs (Hofstede, 2001, p. 5). The prominence of values express shared conceptions of what is good and desirable in the culture, the cultural ideals. The cultural values (e.g. freedom, prosperity, security) underpin specific norms of behaviour telling people what is appropriate in various situations. Individual and group goals, beliefs, and actions are shaped and justified by cultural values emphases. The way societal institutions function (e.g. the family, education, economic, political, religious systems) and their goals and modes of operation, are expressions of cultural value priorities (Schwartz, 1999, p.25; Schwartz, 2006, p. 139). Because human mental programs cannot be observed directly, one has to turn to attitudes and words relating to actual deeds or hypothetical dilemmas. What is called: ‘dimensionalisation’ of culture is a popular method to establish core values that underlie mental programs and to understand cross-cultural differences (Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 108) since Hofstede’s first index was established. Cultural dimensions are human constructs representing a bundle of interdependent values that are tied together by certain similarities (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 8).

Dimensionalisation of culture quantitatively targets the national level of nations where people’s values are measured by asking people’s opinions (e.g. through questionnaires) and classifying them by statistical methods into numbers representing dimensions of national culture. Cross-national comparison on a large-scale becomes possible through this (Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 108). Hofstede’s (1980) study

introduced the ‘dimensions’ paradigm, by presenting that cultural differences can be meaningfully measured and ordered along a set of discrete dimensions that represent different answers to universal problems of human societies (Hofstede, 2006, p. 883). Nonetheless, this line of thought has been often criticised by more qualitatively anthropologists “*as overly simplistic, methodologically flawed, lacking in nuance and complexity, and failing to demonstrate how underlying social mechanisms operate*” (Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 108). For example, Heine, Lehman, Peng & Greenholtz (2002) focus on the ‘reference-group effect’. Because social comparison theory maintains that people think about themselves in comparison with similar others, those in one culture compare themselves with different others and standards than do those in another culture, thus potentially entangle cross-cultural comparisons (Heine et al., 2002, p. 903). Nonetheless, the academic literature that apply sets of dimensions to cultural differences have undergone a spectacular evolution in the past three decades, especially when it comes to generating country scores (Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 108). Moreover, the findings from Schwartz (2006) suggest that studying basic values is a desirable path to follow with values being particularly significant dimensions for comparing cultures, because they affect so many different aspects of life (Schwartz, 2006, p. 178).

#### **4.2.1 Authors measuring dimensions of national culture**

##### *Hofstede*

Hofstede’s (1980, revised 2001), book was based on a research project starting with the IBM survey in 1966 (Hofstede, 2001, p. xv) covering 116.000 survey questionnaires collected between 1967 and 1973. The data bank covered matched populations of employees in national subsidiaries in 64 countries. Of the 72 different national subsidiaries, only the 40 largest were selected for the analysis (Hofstede, 1990, p. 287). The IBM data revealed the structure of four largely independent dimensions of differences among national value systems: ‘power distance’ (large vs. small), ‘uncertainty avoidance’ (strong vs. weak), ‘individualism’ vs. ‘collectivism’, and ‘masculinity’ vs. ‘femininity’ (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv & Sanders, 1990, p. 288). Power Distance is about perspectives relating to the unequal distribution of power. Uncertainty Avoidance is about perspectives relating to handling the unfamiliar and unknown. Masculinity vs. Femininity concerns attitudes related to achievement, competition, and gender roles, and Individualism vs. Collectivism concerns attitudes relating towards interpersonal ties (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 8). After this, other cross-cultural researchers and teams introduced and empirically derived different dimensions (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 8), sometimes similar, sometimes different, and sometimes partially overlapping (Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 107). In Hofstede (1991) he added a fifth dimension, namely Long- vs. Short-Term Orientation (relating to postponement of gratification) (in Hofstede, 2006, p. 883). This fifth dimension was derived from the Chinese Value Survey (CVS), a

questionnaire with a deliberate non-Western bias, but a Chinese culture bias. The statistical analysis yielded again four dimensions. However, uncertainty avoidance had no equivalent in the CVS. The fourth CVS dimension combined values orientations on either the future or on the past and present. This dimension was named Long (vs. Short)-Term Orientation and is treated as a fifth universal dimension (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, pp. 30-31).

*Hofstede & Minkov*

Minkov (2007), introduced a new dimension based on analysis of the World Value Survey (WVS) which he called ‘Monumentalism vs. Flexumilty’. This dimension is defined by items that measure various types of pride, which he interprets as similar to a concern for face, and items that measures religiousness, which he interprets as similar to personal stability (in Minkov & Hofstede, 2012, p. 5). Furthermore, he introduced the dimensions of Exclusionism vs. Universalism, and Indulgence vs. Restraint. Indulgence vs. Restraint was adopted by Hofstede as a sixth dimension (Hofstede, 2010, p. 14; Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 110). His Exclusionism vs. Universalism became integrated into the Individualism vs. Collectivism dimension. The adopted fifth dimension Long- versus Short-Term Orientation, became a new dimension after combining elements of Minkov’s Monumentalism vs. Flexumilty dimension with additional WVS items (Hofstede, 2010, p. 14).

Cultural dimension	Description	Cultural dimension	Description
<b>Hofstede</b>		<b>Minkov</b>	
Individualism vs. Collectivism	Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: A person is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which continue to protect them throughout their lifetime in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.	Exclusionism vs. Universalism	Exclusionism is defined as the cultural tendency to treat people on the basis of their group affiliation and reserve favors, services, privileges for in-groups while excluding out-groups from those who deserve such privileged treatment. Universalism is the opposite cultural tendency; treating people primarily on the basis of who they are as individuals and disregarding their group affiliation.
Power distance	The extent to which the less-powerful members of society expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.	Monumentalism vs. Flexumilty (Self-Effacement)	Monumentalism stands for pride and high self-regard, demonstration of status and generosity with money, favors and services, consistency between feelings and outward expression and avoidance of dialectical feelings and thoughts, including greater religiousness. Flexumilty (Flexibility + Humility) is characterized by the opposite characteristics.
Uncertainty avoidance	The extent to which members of society feel uncomfortable with uncertain, unknown, ambiguous, or unstructured situations. The fundamental issue here is how a society deals with the fact that the future can never be known.	Indulgence vs. Restraint	Indulgence is defined as a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of some desire and feelings (leisure, casual sex, spending, and consumption). Restraint stands for the tendency to curb the gratification of desires and feelings by strict social norms and prohibitions.
Masculinity vs. Femininity	Masculinity represents a preference in society for achievement, competition, heroism, assertiveness, and material reward for success. Its opposite, femininity, stands for a preference for cooperation, consensus, modesty, caring for the weak, and quality of life. This dimension is also related to the division of emotional roles between women and men.		
Long- vs. Short-term orientation	Long-term Orientation stands for a society that fosters virtues and is oriented toward future rewards, in particular perseverance and thrift. Short-term orientation stands for a society that fosters virtues related to the past and present, in particular respect for tradition, preservation of "face," and fulfilling social obligations.		

**Table 7:** Cultural dimensions of Hofstede (2001) and Minkov (2007) (in Maleki & de Jong, 2014, pp. 133-134).

### *Inglehart's World Value Survey*

Inglehart in 1997, by analysing aggregated nation-level data from 43 societies included in the 1990-1991 World Values Survey, found large and coherent cross-cultural differences. Survival vs. Self-Expression and Traditional vs. Secular-rational were the two main dimensions that emerged (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 23). For over 20 variables, these dimensions were responsible for more than 70 per cent in cross-national variances (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 9). Using the data from three waves of the World Value Surveys, which include 65 societies and 75 percent of the world's population, Inglehart & Baker (2000) found evidence of both massive cultural change and the persistence of distinctive cultural traditions. Cultural change is path dependent. Moreover, the cultural heritage (e.g. religion, communism) leaves an imprint on values that endures. Once established, cross-cultural differences become part of a national culture (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 19). Cross-cultural variation, thus, is highly constrained. If for example, people of a given society place a strong emphasis on religion, the position of that society on many other variables can be predicted (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, pp. 28-29).

Cultural dimension	Description
Traditional vs. Secular-Rational values	In traditional cultures religion is very important and a main goal in most people's lives is to make their parents proud; they idealize large families, and have large numbers of children. They also have high levels of national pride, favor more respect for authority and reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all these topics.
Survival vs. Self-Expression	Self-expression dimension reflects a syndrome of tolerance, trust, emphasis on subjective well-being, civic activism, and self-expression that emerges in postindustrial societies with high levels of existential security and individual autonomy. At the opposite pole, people in societies shaped by existential insecurity and rigid intellectual and social constraints on human autonomy tend to emphasize economic and physical security above all.

**Table 8:** Cultural dimensions of Inglehart (Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 134).

### *Schwartz's cultural values*

In his work *A Theory of Cultural Values and Some Implications for Work*, Schwartz (1999) tries to capture a full range of potentially relevant value dimensions of culture (Schwartz, 1999, p. 24).

Schwartz's definition of values is: "*conceptions of the desirable that guide the way social actors (e.g. organisational leaders, policy-makers, individual persons) select actions, evaluate people and events, and*


*explain their actions and evaluations*” (Schwartz, 1999, pp. 24-25). His framework was developed, first, theoretically and after that empirically examined using large-scale multi-country samples. The value survey of Schwartz was used including 56 attributes by which individual’s value priorities can be operationalised (Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 112; Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, pp. 8-9). Schwartz (1999) focuses on the culture of national groups. His descriptions of national culture for heterogeneous nations refer largely to the dominant, majority group (Schwartz, 1999, p. 25).

In his later work *A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications*, Schwartz (2006) presents his theory of seven cultural value orientations that form three cultural value dimensions (Schwartz, 2006, p. 138). The author specifies a coherent, integrated system of relations among the dimensions, suggesting that they are interdependent. Analysis of data from 73 countries validates the seven cultural dimensions and the structure of interrelation among them (Schwartz, 2006, p. 137). In short, Schwartz (1999; 2006) distinguishes three bipolar cultural dimensions and a total of seven dimensions: Embeddedness (or Conservatism, Schwartz, 1999; Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 112) versus Autonomy, Hierarchy versus Egalitarianism, and Mastery versus Harmony (Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 112). Autonomy constitutes of two types: Intellectual autonomy and Affective autonomy (Schwartz, 2006, p. 140).

Cultural orientations	Description
Embeddedness (conservatism)	A cultural emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidarity group or the traditional order (embedded value items: social order, respect for tradition, security, obedience, wisdom)
Intellectual autonomy	A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing their own ideas and intellectual directions (embedded value items: curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity)
Affective autonomy	A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing affectively positive experience (embedded value items: pleasure, exciting life, varied life)
Hierarchy	A cultural emphasis on the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of power, roles and resources (embedded value items: social power, authority, humility, wealth)
Egalitarianism	A cultural emphasis on transcendence of selfish interests in favor of voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of others (embedded value items: equality, social justice, freedom, responsibility, honesty)
Mastery	A cultural emphasis on getting ahead through active self-assertion (ambition, success, courage, competence)
Harmony	A cultural emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the social and natural environment (unity with nature, protecting the environment, world of beauty)

**Table 9:** Cultural dimensions of Schwartz (1999) (Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 135).

A societal emphasis on a cultural type at one pole of a dimension is typically accompanied by a de-emphasis on the polar type, with which it tends to conflict, see figure 17. The cultural dimensions are interrelated based on compatibility among them, because certain dimensions share assumptions and are therefore easier to affirm and acted on them simultaneously in a culture (e.g. embeddedness and hierarchy share the belief that persons' roles in and obligations to collectives are more important than their unique ideas and aspirations) (Schwartz, 2006, p. 141). The shared and opposing assumptions, produce a coherent circular structure of relations among them. Adjacent in the circle are the compatible cultural dimensions and distant around the circle are the incompatible (Schwartz, 2006, p. 142).



**Figure 17:** Prototypical structure of cultural dimensions (Schwartz, 2006, p. 142).

### *The GLOBE project*

GLOBE's intent is to explore cultural values and practices in a variety of countries as well as identifying the impact of them on leadership attributes and organisational practices. It is a multi-phase, multi-method project. Almost 150 social scientists as well as management scholars are engaged, originating from 61 cultures and all major regions in the world. Their main goal is to develop an empirically based theory to describe, understand, and predict the impact of specific cultural variables on leadership and organisational processes and the effectiveness of these processes (House et al., 2002, p. 3). GLOBE examines culture as practices and values. Practices are acts (i.e. "the way things are done in this culture"), and values are artefacts, because they are human made and, in this particular case, are judgements about "the way things should be done". GLOBE checked their results against works of authors like Hofstede, Schwartz & Inglehart (House et al., 2004, p. xv). Instead of Hofstede's (1980) Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, and Uncertainty Avoidance, the GLOBE researchers use Future Orientation, Gender Egalitarianism (or Gender Equality), Assertiveness, Uncertainty Avoidance, Power Distance,

Performance Orientation, Institutional Collectivism, In-group Collectivism, and Humane Orientation (House et al., 2002, pp. 5-6; House et al., 2004, p. xvi).

Cultural dimension	Description
Performance orientation	the extent to which an organization or society encourages and rewards group members for performance improvement and excellence
Future orientation	the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies engage in future-oriented behavior such as planning, investing in the future, and delaying gratification
Gender egalitarianism	the extent to which an organization or a society minimizes gender role differences and gender discrimination
Assertiveness	the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social relationships
Institutional collectivism	the degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action
In-group collectivism	the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organizations or families
Power distance	the degree to which members of an organization or society expect and agree that power should be unequally shared
Humane orientation	the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies encourage and reward individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others
Uncertainty avoidance	the extent to which members of an organization or society strive to avoid uncertainty by reliance on social norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices to alleviate the unpredictability of future events

**Table 10:** Cultural dimensions of the GLOBE project (House et al., 2002, pp. 5-6; Maleki & de Jong, 2014, pp. 135-136).

The GLOBE project was designed as a replication and elaboration of Hofstede's (1980) study (Hofstede, 2006, p. 893) in a theory-driven manner. However, the definitions and interpretations of dimensions are different and Hofstede criticised GLOBE's methodology and dimensions (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 9). Hofstede's (2006) main criticism focusses on the questionnaire items that may not have captured what the researchers wanted to measure (Hofstede, 2006, p. 885). Despite the debates on GLOBE's cultural model, some of the used dimensions are distinctive and not dealt with by other cultural models (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 9).

### 4.3 Indonesia's dimensions of national culture

As seen, multiple authors have presented their dimensions of national culture to understand cultural differences. Since some of the dimensions (partially) overlap, Maleki & de Jong (2014) describe the current state of affairs as enriched and messy and therefore propose a set of clusters of cultural dimensions based on systematic theoretical and statistical analysis (Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 107). Firstly, the spirit of team-work, or the preference of people to work together in performing social tasks. The empirically based cultural dimension for collaborativeness is the cultural dimension of institutional collectivism from GLOBE (Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 121). Secondly, the acceptance of position-related roles and hierarchical relations is reflected by power distance or hierarchy. To this cluster belong Schwartz's hierarchy vs. egalitarianism and GLOBE's and Hofstede's power distance (Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 117). Minkov's monumentalism is suggested as an appropriate representative of traditionalism (Maleki & de Jong, 2014, p. 130). Last, are the dimensions of GLOBE's in-group collectivism and Hofstede's individualism, which are alternatives and virtually exchangeable (with reverse direction) (Maleki, 2015, p. 201). For the purpose of this research, I will utilise Indonesia's cultural dimensions that are relevant for the analysis of compatibility with Indonesia's model of democracy (table 11).

Cultural dimension	Country score	Attribute
Hierarchy (Schwartz)	2.65	Relatively high
Embedded (high) or autonomous (low) (Schwartz)	4.50	High
Mastery (competitiveness) (Schwartz)	3.62	Low
Individualism (Hofstede)	14	Low
Uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede)	48	Relatively low
Future orientation (GLOBE)	3.86	Relatively low
Institutional collectivism (collaborativeness) (GLOBE)	4.54	Average
Monumentalism (Minkov)	21	Low

**Table 11:** Indonesia's cultural dimensions scores (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010; Irawanto, 2009; Licht, Goldschmidt & Schwartz, 2007; Minkov, 2008).

## Chapter 5 Indonesia's compatibility

### Introduction

*“If only culture matters, then in practise we should have seen successful democracies only in countries with a set of similar cultural orientations, or if only institutions matter, then we should have had successful democracies with the same institutional arrangement” (Maleki, 2015, p. 10).*

This research aligns itself with this statement of Maleki (2015). I acknowledge that there is a debate on the relation between culture and democratic institutions including the question whether cultural factors or institutional arrangements are important for the performance of governance and the failure or success of democracy. I assert that institutional and constitutional choices as well as culture matters for the successful consolidation and transition of democracy, but that the interaction or compatibility of these two matters most (Maleki, 2015, p. 10). The operationalised dimensions of democracy in the previous section (Integrative Dimension of Democracy and Participative Dimension of Democracy) consist of six components, which are affected by institutional choices/elements. There exists an interrelation between cultural orientations and underlying institutional elements generating dimensions of democracy. In adopting and selecting institutional and constitutional elements the role of cultural orientations should be involved (Maleki, 2015, p. 180). So how is the preference of a society towards different institutional elements affecting components of a model of democracy codetermined by different cultural orientations (Maleki, 2015, p. 183)? Moreover, looking at the scores of cultural dimensions of Indonesia; how do they relate to the institutional development of Indonesia between 1990 and 2010?

### 5.1 Compatibility between Indonesia's model of democracy and dimensions of national culture

#### *The Integrative Dimension of Democracy (IDD)*

Except for India and Turkey, countries with a presidential system have a higher hierarchy (Schwartz) score. It is assumed that political institutions follow societal culture, since the latter is antecedent to the former (Maleki, 2015, p. 183). Moreover, GLOBE's in-group collectivism (excluding USA and Namibia), Schwartz's embeddedness vs. autonomy, and Hofstede's individualism correlate significantly (excluding the USA) with regime type. Inglehart's traditionalism correlates with regime type as well (Maleki, 2015, p. 185). Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance and GLOBE's future orientation correlate with the regime type of Presidentialism. Almost all countries that score low on future orientation have a presidential system. The assertion that countries that score low on uncertainty avoidance and high on future orientation have a stronger affinity with the parliamentary system is confirmed (Maleki, 2015, pp. 186-187). Lastly, GLOBE's institutional collectivism shows a correlation with regime type. Lower collaborativeness shows an inclination towards the presidential system (Maleki, 2015, pp. 187-188).

Indonesia having a presidential system is congruent with the high score on the dimension of Schwartz's hierarchy. Moreover, Indonesia scores low on the Hofstede's individualism dimension and high on Schwartz's bipolar dimension of embeddedness versus autonomy. Minkov's monumentalism score for Indonesia, being relatively high, also corresponds with Indonesia having a presidential system. Since in these societies charismatic characters are praised and encouraged, a powerful president is more expected (Maleki, 2015, p. 185). Indonesia scores relatively low on the dimension of Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance and GLOBE's future orientation. This is relatively congruent with the expected pattern since countries with presidential systems are expected to score low on the dimension of future orientation. However, the relatively low score for uncertainty avoidance would suggest that, culturally, Indonesia favours a parliamentary system. Moreover, the average score on GLOBE's collaborativeness corresponds not entirely with the expected pattern, since a presidential system should be accompanied by a low collaborativeness score.

Schwartz's mastery orientation correlates with the electoral system of a country in that the majority/plurality electoral system is accepted, and even preferred, in mastery-oriented cultures. In low mastery cultures the system of proportional representation is more popular. Schwartz's hierarchy correlates significantly with the electoral system as well. In societies with a low power distance culture a PR system is more likely to develop. Electoral systems using the majority/plurality rule (including mixed systems) are more accepted in societies with a higher hierarchy orientation (Maleki, 2015, pp. 189-190). Interestingly, the cultural dimensions of Indonesia show a mixed picture in relation to the expected pattern. Indonesia indeed scores low on Schwartz's mastery dimension, being congruent with the pattern that in those cultures the system of proportional representation is more popular. However, Indonesia scores high on Schwartz's hierarchy dimension suggesting that Indonesia would prefer to practise a mixed system. This claim is supported by Maleki (2015) in that Indonesia is culturally compatible with the mixed system (Maleki, 2015, p. 215).

Selecting a legal threshold or institutional elements forming an implicit threshold is negatively associated with the cultural dimension of teamwork spirit. There exists a significant negative correlation between GLOBE's institutional collectivism and logged effective threshold. The correlation is stronger when only considered systems of proportional representation (Maleki, 2015, pp. 191-192). The same applies for future orientation which is also negatively associated with the electoral threshold. There exists a significant correlation between the effective threshold and GLOBE's future orientation for countries with the system of proportional representation (excluding Namibia) (Maleki, 2015, p. 193). These findings correspond quite well with the cultural dimension scores of Indonesia. However, Indonesia scores average on GLOBE's collaborativeness and relatively low on GLOBE's future orientation. In the next part this

will be more elaborated on when discussing Indonesia's institutional development in relation to cultural compatibility.

The three components of the Integrative Dimension of Democracy (i.e. ENPP, NPG and TEP) are indirectly affected by cultural orientations through the association they have with institutional elements (e.g. regime type, electoral system and electoral threshold), but cabinet inclusiveness and the effective number of parties is directly influenced by societal culture. The effective number of parties is negatively associated with Schwartz's mastery orientation (excluding India, Israel, and Brazil) with a strong, significant correlation (Maleki, 2015, p. 194). Indonesia's ENPP score thus follows the expected pattern with its low score on Schwartz's mastery orientation and high number of effective parties in parliament. GLOBE's institutional collectivism shows a correlation with the LNPG. A tendency towards more inclusive cabinets (excluding Brazil) is found in societies with a higher teamwork orientation (collaborativeness) (Maleki, 2015, p. 195). Cabinet inclusiveness (excluding Brazil as semi-outlier) correlates with cultures that score higher on GLOBE's future orientation (Maleki, 2015, p. 196). Cabinet inclusiveness and the TEP of Indonesia will be elaborated on in the next part when discussing Indonesia's institutional development in relation to cultural compatibility.

#### *The Participative Dimension of Democracy (PDD)*

Electoral participation can be promoted by compulsory voting and can therefore affect the participative dimension of democracy. Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance correlates with compulsory voting: In societies that score higher on this cultural dimension, compulsory voting is more expected and accepted (Maleki, 2015, p. 197). GLOBE's institutional collectivism shows a correlation with compulsory voting as well. In societies with lower collaborativeness (teamwork orientation) compulsory voting could be more employed (Maleki, 2015, p. 199). Indonesia scores relatively low on Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance confirming the expectation that it doesn't have compulsory voting<sup>57</sup>. On the cultural dimension of GLOBE's collaborativeness Indonesia scores average. This could mean that Indonesia shows some cultural tendency to practise a system of compulsory voting.

An important institutional regulation that promotes direct democracy is referendum provision. The assertion that weak power distant and strong individualistic cultures would score higher on referendum provisions is confirmed using GLOBE's in-group collectivism (negative), Hofstede's individualism (positive) and Schwartz's hierarchy orientation (negative) (Maleki, 2015, p. 199). Indonesia did not have any referenda between 1990 and 2010 and there exists no referendum provision.<sup>58</sup> However, as mentioned earlier, in 1999 there was an independence referendum for East Timor, asking whether the people wanted

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<sup>57</sup> <http://www.idea.int/db/countryview.cfm?id=101>

<sup>58</sup> <http://www.idea.int/db/countryview.cfm?id=101>

special autonomy within Indonesia. 344580 people voted ‘no’ and 94388 people voted ‘yes’.<sup>59</sup> This referendum nonetheless is considered as a referendum of East Timor. With Indonesia’s scores on the cultural dimensions of Hofstede’s individualism, being low, and Schwartz’s hierarchy score, being high, Indonesia follows the expected pattern of culturally not being inclined to use referenda.

As for the turnout in general elections, it is argued that electoral participation is encouraged by the cultural orientation of individualism. GLOBE’s in-group collectivism indeed shows a correlation with the turnout in general elections (excluding USA and Switzerland). The expectation that there is a positive association between future orientation and electoral participation using GLOBE’s future orientation is confirmed (Maleki, 2015, p. 201). In this respect, Indonesia is somewhat of an outlier. With an electoral turnout higher than a country as the Netherlands (Maleki, 2015, p. 202) Indonesia defies the expected pattern scoring low on Hofstede’s individualism and relatively low on GLOBE’s future orientation. However, the popularity of elections during a reformation might cause this high turnout (Maleki, 2015, p. 223).

Non-electoral (or protest) participation requires more involvement than electoral participation and the popularity and acceptance of it is codetermined by societal culture. The same cultural orientations as for electoral participation apply here. GLOBE’s in-group collectivism shows a high and significant negative correlation with non-electoral participation. Moreover, there is a significant correlation (excluding Malaysia and New Zealand) between non-electoral participation and GLOBE’s future orientation (Maleki, 2015, p. 203). Lastly, there exists a correlation between Schwartz’s cultural dimensions of hierarchy and non-electoral participation. In societies with lower power distance it is expected to have more non-electoral participation (Maleki, 2015, p. 205). Looking at the data provided by Maleki we see that the NEP score for Indonesia is very low. With Indonesia’s low score on Hofstede’s individualism, this is congruent with the expected pattern as well as with Indonesia’s relatively low score on GLOBE’s future orientation. The last variable proves also consistent; Indonesia’s high score on Schwartz’s hierarchy dimension.

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<sup>59</sup>[http://www.c2d.ch/synopticresult.php?insti=&year=&country=10156&canton=0&city=0&level=1&res=&continent=Asia&table=country\\_information&sublinkname=country\\_information](http://www.c2d.ch/synopticresult.php?insti=&year=&country=10156&canton=0&city=0&level=1&res=&continent=Asia&table=country_information&sublinkname=country_information)

## 5.2 The Cultural Compatibility Thesis replicated

The Cultural Compatibility Thesis (CCT) argues that the adaption, adopting, and opting of political institutions is codetermined by the cultural orientations of a society and asserts that the compatibility of cultural orientations with institutional choices is important. Since institutional elements are associated with several cultural orientations it is hypothesised that multiple institutional choices for a country emerge through the interaction and integration of cultural orientations. On the other hand, institutional choices in a democratic country can be culturally in-compatible. Changes in institutional elements can be investigated and evaluated accordingly the CCT (Maleki, 2015, p. 210). The CCT asserts that the involvement of societal culture in the process of adaption, adopting, and opting of political institutions is necessary, though not sufficient (Maleki, 2015, p. 231).

The CCT indicates that in designing a model of democracy for countries in transition it is as important to take into account the societal culture as other socio-economic factors (Maleki, 2015, p. 224). For the reforming of institutions in established democracies is the compatibility of institutional design and societal culture important as well (Maleki, 2015, p. 228). The Cultural Compatibility Thesis alone will not guarantee the effectiveness of adopted institutions. The success and formation of democratic political institutions is affected by many factors. Societal culture is, less studied, but considered one of the important factors affecting a model of democracy's workability and credibility. A non-functional democracy might be created if the cultural orientations and compatibility with democratic institutions are not considered. Therefore, one shouldn't focus on finding *the best model*, but on *the most compatible model*. Moreover, cultural orientations (discussed here) are assumed as being different, not good nor bad. Different cultural orientations correspond with the principle of democracy. However, a specific model of democracy can be mutually incompatible with some cultural orientations. Important to note, it is supposed "*that in principle none of the dimensions of societal culture should be interpreted in a way that justifies any violation of basic human rights and democratic principles*" (Maleki, 2015, p. 229). When societal culture isn't beneficial for a functional democracy, institutional arrangements shouldn't be adjusted to it. To design a proper institutional arrangement the pros and cons of that societal culture should be taken into account (Maleki, 2015, p. 230).

<b>Presidential</b>	<b>Regime type</b>	<b>Parliamentary</b>
Low -----	Individualism-----	High
High -----	Traditionalism (Monumentalism)-----	Low
High -----	Power distance (Hierarchy)-----	Low
High -----	Uncertainty avoidance-----	Low
Low -----	Future orientation-----	High
Low -----	Collaborativeness-----	High
<b>Majority/plurality</b>	<b>Electoral system</b>	<b>P R</b>
High -----	Mastery -----	Low
High -----	Power distance (Hierarchy) -----	Low
<b>High threshold</b>	<b>Electoral threshold</b>	<b>Low threshold</b>
Low -----	Collaborativeness -----	High
Low -----	Future orientation -----	High
<b>Compulsory</b>	<b>Compulsory voting</b>	<b>Non-compulsory</b>
Low -----	Collaborativeness -----	High
High -----	Uncertainty avoidance -----	Low
Low -----	Individualism -----	High
Low -----	Future orientation -----	High

**Table 12:** Institutional choices and corresponding compatible cultural orientations (Maleki, 2015, p. 209).

Table 12 presents four operationalised aspects of contestation and participation and their relation with different dimensions of culture. Maleki (2015) extracts a Culturally Compatible Score (CCS) for each institutional element of democracy (Maleki, 2015, p. 210). Furthermore, the distinction is made between the actual score and the culturally-compatible score. A difference shorter than 0,75 is accepted (for regime type, electoral system) (Maleki, 2015, pp. 211, 215). The Cultural Compatibility Thesis has an application as descriptive and prescriptive. Its descriptive application is in explaining how a model of democracy is compatible with the national culture of a country. It can also provide insights into the functionality and legitimacy of different models of democracy. The CCT can, moreover, provide recommendations for institutional reform and institutional design. This is its prescriptive application (Maleki, 2015, p. 233).

**5.2.1 Indonesia’s institutions and the CCT**

As mentioned earlier, there are some countries with a presidential system and a multi-party cabinet, which is more common for semi-presidential systems where a cabinet needs parliamentary support (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, p. 24). Looking at Indonesia’s scores on the several cultural dimensions relating to regime type, a mixed pattern emerges. For four of the six cultural dimensions, Indonesia confirms the expected pattern of using a presidential system. However, on the two dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and collaborativeness, Indonesia defies the expected pattern. In practise, this is shown by the inclusive cabinets of Indonesia. Between 1999 and 2009 the cabinets of Indonesia consisted of 594/700, 402/550, and 421/560 of the seats respectively. It might thus be more appropriate to discuss Indonesia’s regime type as semi-presidential, even though only between 1999 and 2004 the president was dependent on the

support of the parliament and after 2004 is chosen directly by the people. This claim is supported by Maleki (2015). He states that Indonesia shows a cultural tendency to deviate from absolute presidentialism and towards the semi-presidential system. In practice, Indonesia operates like a semi-presidential system. Moreover, the system of proportional representation compensates for the full presidential system (Maleki, 2015, pp. 214, 215).

Looking at the electoral system of Indonesia, again a mixed picture emerges. Indonesia, practising a system of proportional representation, defies on one cultural dimension the expected pattern. With a high score on Schwartz's hierarchy cultural dimension, it would be expected that Indonesia favours an electoral system of majority/plurality. However, with a low score on Schwartz's mastery dimension, Indonesia uses the expected system of proportional representation. The cultural tendency of Indonesia to deviate from a system of proportional representation is reflected by the context of the actual electoral system; disproportionality and the electoral threshold. Disproportionality is an important indicator of the electoral system (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015, pp. 7-8). The data provided by Maleki shows that the TEP in 1999 was 0,965 and slowly declined to 0,868 in 2004, and 0,836 in 2009. Over time the proportionality of Indonesia's electoral system thus declined. Another aspect to make the electoral system less proportional and more similar to a mixed model is increasing the electoral threshold (Maleki, 2015, p. 217).

The threshold of Indonesia (Maleki, 2015, p. 219) does not correspond completely with the expected pattern, since Indonesia scores averagely on GLOBE's collaborativeness and relatively low on future orientation. When it comes to an electoral threshold (i.e. the needed percentage of votes to receive parliamentary seats) there is a difference between the legal (or explicit) threshold and the implicit (natural) threshold. The legal threshold is a rule in systems of proportional representation dictating that if small parties don't obtain a certain minimum amount of votes they don't receive parliamentary seats. The number of constituencies and legislative size establish the implicit threshold. However, the effective threshold is usually the largest one of the two. In a democratic model the electoral threshold is an important institutional choice (Maleki, 2015, p. 191). The (effective) electoral threshold reflects the proportionality of the electoral system (Andrews & Jackman, 2005, p. 78). Lijphart (1999, p. 153) proposes the following formula to measure the implicit threshold<sup>60</sup>:

$$T = 75\% / M + 1$$

T is the implied threshold and M is the average district magnitude. Using the formula of Maleki (2015, p. 191) for implicit threshold ( $T = 75\% / (S/E + 1)$ ) in which T is the implicit threshold, S the number of seats,

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<sup>60</sup> Although Taagepera (1998) criticises the formula, he also states that this formula "is found to have the most desirable characteristics" (Taagepera, 1998, p. 393).

and E the number of constituencies (S over E is the district magnitude), the implicit threshold for Indonesia as of 2009 can be measured for the People's Representative Council:

$$75\% / (560/77 + 1) = 0.09065934065$$

The number of seats in parliament is 560 and the number of constituencies is 77. The legal electoral threshold is 2,5 per cent of total votes.<sup>61</sup> However, as just calculated, the implicit/effective threshold for the People's Representative Council of Indonesia is 9,07 per cent. The legal threshold in 2009 is 2,5 per cent of the votes (Mietzner, 2009, p. 8). The implicit threshold for the 2004 elections was 8,36 per cent ( $75\% / (550/69 + 1)$ ). The implicit threshold for the 1999 elections was 4,14 per cent ( $75\% / (462/27 + 1)$ ). We thus see a pattern in increasing the effective threshold. However, culturally, we should expect a pattern of slightly decreasing the threshold to around seven per cent (Maleki, 2015, p. 19). This might be explained as to make the model of proportional representation more similar to a mixed-electoral system (Maleki, 2015, p. 217).

Lastly, compulsory voting. The Culturally Compatible Score for compulsory voting assesses if countries should adopt compulsory voting to enhance electoral participation (Maleki, 2015, p. 221). Indonesia scores relatively low on Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance and low on individualism. Moreover, Indonesia scores averagely on GLOBE's collaborativeness and relatively low on future orientation. Indonesia thus shows some cultural inclination towards compulsory voting. Interestingly though, Indonesia has a high average turnout. Whether this is due to the popularity of the first elections during the reformation and might reduce in the future (Maleki, 2015, p. 223) remains to be seen.

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<sup>61</sup> <http://www.opemam.org/node/1244?language=en>

## Chapter 6

## Field research

### 6.1 Introduction and method

While this research investigates the national level of democracy of Indonesia on multiple variables, it is also interesting to investigate how certain ‘other’ democratic actors (i.e. civil society organisations) operate. In this part of the research I will turn to the theory of Hendriks (2010), in particular to figure 12, describing four models of democracy and their vertically associated styles and cultures having ‘elective affinity’ (Hendriks, 2010, p. 39) or conceptual similarity (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014a, p. 271). The bases of different models of democracy are the societal and political cultures. Patterns of citizenship and leadership are the visible expressions of the different models of democracy (Hendriks, 2010, p. 32).

Central to this field research is the following question: *What model of democracy is practised by Indonesia Mengajar and Perludem and how does this relate to the model of national democracy of Indonesia?* The conclusion of this chapter will also reflect on the model itself concerning the mentioned elective affinity as well as the assumed transferability of this model: From models of democracy at the country level to models of democracy of organisations.

The field research itself focuses on the perception of the respondents. Their experience is presented. The questionnaire and semi-structured interview are presented in appendix A and B. They are constructed (almost literally) in accordance with the phrasing of Hendriks (2010) justifying the different models. These texts are subsequently converted into questions. In the questionnaire every of the five dimensions is distilled into two choices and one control-question as to check if the answers match each other. The distinctive questions are dichotomous. For example, as to determine whether a respondent places its organisation in the high-group or not, the following question is asked: Tick the box that resembles the factual situation most closely. In my organisation: (1) Individuals are defined as autonomous beings in his or her own right, or (2) Individuals have strong solidarity with and commitment to the group. The control-question provides four possibilities and respondents are asked to tick one of them. The possibilities are constructed accordingly the phrasing of Hendriks (2010).

To be able to provide a full and qualitative picture of the model of democracy the organisations practice, semi-structured interviews are held as to provide more insights into the dichotomous choices of the questionnaire. The questionnaire and semi-structured interview are thus complementary. The reliability of the results of this field research is increased through the control-question in the questionnaire as well as the complementary nature of the questionnaires and interviews.

Ultimately, two organisations are investigated: Indonesia Mengajar and Perludem. In Indonesia Mengajar nine questionnaires were filled in and six interviews were held. In Perludem fifteen questionnaires were filled in and four interviews were held.

### **6.1.1 Indonesia Mengajar**

#### *Organisational introduction*

Indonesia Mengajar started in 2010 and was founded by, among others, the current minister of Education and Culture of Indonesia: Anies Baswedan. Indonesia Mengajar recruits and trains best graduates to be an elementary teacher for one year in remote areas across Indonesia. Indonesia Mengajar believes that educational issues cannot only be tackled by the private sector, for example, but that civil changes are necessary. Indonesia Mengajar works with 34 staff-members.

Pengajar Muda, as the teachers are called, do not necessarily have an educational background in teaching. Indonesia Mengajar recruits those with good leadership skills, because they believe that basic teaching skills are also basic leadership skills. This is mainly due to the fact that the Pengajar Muda are expected to not only be a teacher, but also an agent of change (in the remote areas).

As of today, Indonesia Mengajar have send over 500 hundred Pengajar Muda to seventeen districts in Indonesia. Another aspect of their work is class inspirasi. Indonesia Mengajar believes that education is a movement and not only a task for schools or government. So, with class inspirasi, Indonesia Mengajar invites professionals to take a one-day leave and donate that day to teach in public schools in the cities in Indonesia as to support involvement in the educational movement. Class inspirasi, as of today, has been held in more than 80 cities across Indonesia in collaboration with 15.000 involved professionals.

#### *Societal culture*

As for the questionnaire, Indonesia Mengajar shows quite a clear tendency towards egalitarianism with 8/9 respondents choosing we-culture and 6/9 respondents low-grid. However, the control question creates a fuzzier image between hierarchy and egalitarianism. The interviews show a clear 'we-culture'. "*We-culture is very obvious in this organisation. It comes from the mission of this organisation that is to empower people*". Whether the organisation fits the high-grid or low-grid model is less clear.

#### *Political culture*

Indonesia Mengajar, quantitatively, differentiates between power equality and power distance (5/9 vs. 4/9 respectively). It's very clear, however, with the results of the questionnaire and interviews that the organisation fits in the convergence part. The control question shows two options, grassroots democracy and guardian democracy (5/9 vs. 4/9 respectively) fitting the expected difference relating to power

equality and power distance. Looking at the interviews, it too shows a difference in opinions. One interviewee probably said it best: *“Concerning our job description, everyone has their own distinct responsibility. However, we work (voluntarily) across divisions so the ‘power’ of people shifts, making it equal.”*

#### *Model of democracy*

Indonesia Mengajar shows a clear fit with the integrative model. In the interviews there were answers like: *“We spend a lot of time to engage with every person”* and *“If there is time, the organisation will try to find a solution that upholds all the interests”*. Whether it practises a direct or indirect model is fuzzier (3/8 direct vs. 5/8 indirect). The interviews show a tendency towards practising the indirect model: *“Naturally, everything is decided by the director”* and *“For important decisions the board of directors will have the privilege”*. However, the control question of the questionnaire shows a clear tendency towards participatory democracy (6/9) and much lesser towards consensus democracy (2/9).

#### *Citizenship style*

9/9 respondents of Indonesia Mengajar chose spectator on the first dimension. On the second dimension 8/9 chose speaker, putting them in the spectator/speaker model. Interestingly, though, on the control question 8/9 chose for player/speaker. The interviews provide also a clear tendency towards the player-aspect: *“Everyone here is a player”*. The discrepancy here, might be related to the questionnaire’s dichotomy focusing on ‘voting’. This is also reflected in the voter/speaker dimension of the interviews: *“it’s 80 per cent speakers and 20 per cent voters”*.

#### *Leadership style*

Whether the leaders of Indonesia Mengajar act as representatives or facilitators shows mixed signs (4/9 vs. 5/9 respectively). It’s clear however that they act as bridge-builders (8/9). The control question shows signs of the leadership being coaches as well as regents (5/9 vs. 3/9 respectively). The interviews portray the leadership of Indonesia Mengajar as being facilitators: *“They will ask everyone’s opinion if they need it and they also know how to delegate”*. It also becomes clear that the leadership acts as bridge builders: *“A bridge-builder. Definitely”*.

#### *Conclusion*

Indonesia Mengajar tends to practise a system of participatory and/or consensus democracy in their decision-making including the vertical corresponding styles and cultures. After combining the questionnaire with the interviews it seems that Indonesia Mengajar tends to practise the model of participatory democracy. Interestingly, there was no substantial number of respondents at any of the

questions indicating that Indonesia Mengajar would practise any style, culture, and/or model of democracy vertically corresponding to the aggregative dimension.

### **6.1.2 Perludem**

#### *Organisational introduction*

Perludem's objective is to create a better election system for Indonesia by doing research and advocacy to all policy-makers. Currently, they have two programs. One relates to the advocacy of an omnibus initiative law, which is a compilation of all regulations regarding elections. The second relates to the advocacy targeting campaign finance. Moreover, using API-technology they provide voters with information about the elections. They do this in a non-biased matter, without taking any sides. Lastly, they have programs regarding the advocacy of voter registration and a voter-education program spread out through Indonesia.

Perludem was first established in 2005. In that time some research was conducted, but due to responsibilities elsewhere it was not very active yet. As of 2010 the organisation was rebuilt and became active again with research, advocacy, and trainings. Perludem works with a staff of 30 people, including the executive members.

#### *Societal culture*

Perludem shows a clear tendency towards the 'we-culture' in the questionnaire (12/15). During the interviews the distinction was best described by one interviewee: "*The commitment to the group is for the work, the commitment to help each other and to make Perludem bigger. The autonomous part is that we can express ourselves*". Whether Perludem fits in the high-grid or low-grid distinction becomes less clear from the questionnaire (7/13 vs. 6/13 respectively). Although within the interviews the distinction is made between the Standard Operating Procedure, socially, it is argued: "*For behaviour I cannot say that a position will change someone's behaviour. We operate inside the organisation on the same bases as outside the organisation*", relating more to low-grid. The questionnaire's control question here provides a clear answer; 11/15 respondents chose egalitarianism.

#### *Political culture*

Relating to political culture, Perludem shows a clear picture of power distance (10/15) and convergence (14/15), fitting the guardian model of democracy. The questionnaire's control question, however, is clearly directed towards the grassroots model of democracy (13/15). This contrast might be related to the dichotomy of the question in that even though everyone has its own distinct responsibility (i.e. job-description), there still can be a context of bottom-up policy making in which everyone's contribution

gets equal attention and respect in the communicative process. The interviews confirm this image: *“We are treated as equals in this office and we can act independently”*.

#### *Model of democracy*

The questionnaire shows Perludem practising within the integrative dimension with 9/14 checking this box. 11/15 argue that Perludem operates within the direct dimension. This is validated with the control question of which 12/15 respondents stated that Perludem uses a model of participatory democracy. The interviews provide more of a mixed picture. Although ‘the biggest possible majority’ is indeed confirmed, it is also stated by one interviewee that: *“If then a simple majority agrees, the decision is made. That’s how it works and what we call democracy”*. Contradictory to the questionnaire, moreover, is that the interviews show a tendency towards the indirect dimension. To the question, who eventually makes the decision, it is stated: *“The representative, by considering the participants contribution”*.

#### *Citizenship style*

Perludem’s respondents stated with 10/15 that they fit in the spectator distinction. 14/14 stated them being speakers. The control question, however, puts Perludem with 12/15 respondents in practising the model of player/speaker. The discrepancy here, again, might be related to the questionnaire’s spectator/player dichotomy focusing on ‘voting’. This is reflected in the interviews: *“Player. Everyone is heard. People can directly contribute”*. The interviews also show a tendency towards them being speakers, corresponding, indeed, with the player/speaker model.

#### *Leadership style*

As for the leadership style of Perludem, 12/15 respondents stated that the leadership acts as representatives. 15/15 respondents stated that the leadership acts as bridge-builders. The control question, however, shows a fuzzier image. 7/14 describe the leadership of Perludem as regents and 5/14 as advocates. The interviews, to some extent, show a different image. Most interviewees stated that the leadership acts as facilitators: *“In our meeting she will ask questions creating a chance to discuss things”*. The image of the leadership being bridge-builders is confirmed, which would lead to ‘coach’. The discrepancy here, could be related to the difference of how the leadership acts within the organisation and the way the leadership operates outside of the organisation, namely literally being an advocate (not a lawyer) in supporting certain standpoints and policies or not.

#### *Conclusion*

Perludem tends to practise the participatory model of democracy and/or the consensus model of democracy and it’s vertically corresponding cultures and styles. Combining the results and the questionnaire does not fully provide a clear picture which of the two models is practised ‘most’. It is

interesting, however, to see that only within one distinction any substantial number of respondents indicated that Perludem would practise any style, culture, and/or model of democracy vertically corresponding to the aggregative dimension. This was with 5/9 respondents stating that the leadership of Perludem acts as an advocate, although this number was less than the 7/9 respondents stating the leadership acts as a regent.

### **6.1.3 Conclusion**

Since there are two organisations of Indonesia investigated with questionnaires and interviews, the results of this field research are, of course, not representative and are neither scalable nor transferrable towards ‘all’ organisations operating within the boundaries of Indonesia. However, this field research does produce multiple interesting results. Moreover, the framework of the questionnaire with its control-question as well as the complementary nature of the questionnaire and the interview make the results more reliable. In the following part, I will assess the results of the field research, evaluate the mentioned elective affinity and the assumed transferability of the model of Hendriks (2010) to organisations, and relate the results of the field research to the national model of democracy of Indonesia as well as pose some challenges for investigating a possible relationship between the model of democracy at the national level and models of democracy of organisations within that country.

To provide a sound answer here, I first have to be critical towards myself. For example, the dichotomy of using ‘voting’ in the spectator/player distinction might have inclined respondents to automatically choose the other answer. The interviews of both organisations, in which they clearly indicate themselves as being a player, confirms this view. Also, practical choices had to be made regarding the questionnaire and interview. I tried to stay as close as possible to the original text of Hendriks (2010), which theoretically is a defensible decision. This also resulted however, in respondents and interviewees connecting the term ‘roles’ almost automatically to their job-description, thus not completely corresponding to the original idea and blurring the results. These experiences should definitely be addressed with future similar endeavours and should thus be interpreted as recommendations for future research trying to investigate models of democracy for organisations using the model of Hendriks (2010).

Looking at the results of which model of democracy these organisations practise, it becomes clear that they both, very clearly, fit within the integrative model of democracy and its vertical associations with cultures and styles. In fact only once a substantial number, but not a majority, of respondents placed its organisation within the vertical association of practising an aggregative model of democracy.<sup>62</sup> This, so clear distinction, is especially interesting since one would expect that the results would correspond more

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<sup>62</sup> As explained, this might relate due to the literal meaning of being an advocate outside of the organisation.

with the fact that in practise models of democracy never occur in their unadulterated purity (Hendriks, 2010, p. 29), albeit this still being the case of course. Secondly, while the distinction of placing ones organisation in either the integrative or aggregative distinction was very clear to the respondents and interviewees, this wasn't the case for the indirect vs. direct distinction and the vertical associations with cultures and styles. On this dimension a discrepancy in the results of the questionnaires as well in the interview became apparent. One of the discrepancies is related to the high-grid versus low-grid distinction. Maleki & Hendriks (2014a) argue that when it comes to Grid and Group, another dimension should be added: Grade. The problem of the theory is that it implies that competition and self-assertion are less favoured in high Grid or high Group cultures. In practise, however, this is not always the case (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014a, pp. 268-269). This is also reflected in the results of this field-research in which both organisations indicated, although fitting within the high-group distinction, that there exists a competitive environment as well. High Grade therefore would represent societies in which dominance and mastery are valued and low Grade cultures favour harmony and compromise (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014a, pp. 268-269).

It is interesting to see that the results of this field research clearly show a difficulty in defining ones organisation as either direct or indirect including the vertically associated cultures and styles. One example is that the dichotomy between power distance and power equality is not clearly made by the respondents. Specifically, it was argued that although everyone has their own distinct responsibility within the organisation, there exists an environment of equality and bottom-up policy-making. All in all, the elective affinity of the integrative vs. aggregative distinction of Hendriks's (2010) model for organisations is definitely confirmed, based on the results of this field-research. The elective affinity of the direct vs. indirect distinction for organisations, based on the results of this field-research, cannot be confirmed. To some extent, the author himself already commented on this in Maleki & Hendriks (2014a).

This conclusion about the elective affinity also relates to the question whether the model of Hendriks (2010) is indeed fitting to place an organisation in it. Respondents and interviewees were able to clearly differentiate between the integrative vs. aggregative dimension. For this dimension, the model of Hendriks (2010) has proven to be very valuable to investigate an organisation's model of democracy. However, the difficulty of respondents and interviewees to clearly differentiate between the direct vs. indirect dimension and the vertically associated styles and cultures indicate a challenge for this transportation. This challenge can be properly exemplified by the following. Although respondents in the questionnaire's control-question indicated that their organisation operates as a participatory democracy, in the interviews they indicated that the organisation operates as a consensus democracy. The people in the investigated organisations indicated that decisions are usually made as a result of deliberation. However,

when asked who eventually takes the decisions, they mostly indicated the executive(s). Therefore, when asking ‘how democratic decisions are taken?’ and ‘who eventually takes the decision?’ (Hendriks, 2010, pp. 26-27), the question can be raised: What kind of decisions are we referring to? The interviewees clearly distinguished between decisions they can make themselves, for example decisions within their own program, division, or in the execution of their daily tasks, and the bigger, for example, strategic decisions that regard the organisation as a whole.

All in all, it’s fascinating to see that all participants were so extremely clear on placing their organisation within the integrative distinction and vertically associated styles and cultures. Even more so, because when looking at the operationalised model of democracy of Indonesia, it clearly falls within the integrative dimension as well (figures 9 and 10). This might indeed be an important indicator of the vitality of Hendriks’s (2010) model since the operationalisation of Maleki & Hendriks (2014b) is partially derived from his model (Maleki & Hendriks, 2014b, p. 4). These observations, though, assume a relationship between the model of democracy at the national level and the models of democracy of organisations within that country. This possible relationship however, poses some challenges.

Looking at the dichotomy of ‘voting’, as mentioned, I assert that the questionnaire for this question was indeed improperly phrased, however, not created completely out of the blue. One of Hendriks’s (2010) models of democracy is called ‘voter democracy’ and one of the citizenship styles is called ‘voter’.

*“Citizens participate in voter democracy by casting their votes in plebiscites, either on a small scale, as in town meetings, or on a large scale, as in referendums”* (Hendriks, 2010, p. 27). Hendriks (2010), in my opinion, is not wrong in calling his conceptions as such to describe models of democracy at the national level. While this type of voting in democracies at the national level can be (quite) common, this is not automatically the case for decision-making procedures in organisations, albeit it being possible of course. The challenge posed here, thus not concerns the model of Hendriks (2010) itself nor the transportation of it to organisations. The challenge concerns a possible discrepancy between the model of democracy at the national level and models of democracy of organisations within that country. Logically, based on the reasoning provided here, results could thus show that while at the national level, for example, a voter democracy exists, that the organisations within that country generally tend to practise a consensus democracy. Defining a definitive connection or relationship between the model of democracy at the national level and the models of democracy practised by organisations within that country can thus be difficult. Note that Hendriks (2010) himself does not suggest that this type of relationship exists. Nonetheless, since I am also trying to explore some type of connection between the national model of democracy of Indonesia and the organisational models of democracy of this field research, I believe it is a valid point to be made here.

Similarly, however reversed, this argument also becomes apparent when looking at the results of the questionnaire's control-question. In both organisations a substantial number of respondents indicated that their organisation operates as a participatory democracy. However, "*Nowhere in the world is participatory democracy the encompassing model of national or local democracy*", although there are some variations ranging in the degree they approach the ideal type (Hendriks, 2010, pp. 117, 118). This reasoning can be strengthened with a logical and practical argument. Simply put, in an organisation with generally far fewer people than actual democracies (whether national or local) it's more plausible that a system of participatory democracy is actually used, even though it of course doesn't have to be. Future research into the relationship between models of democracy at the national level and organisational models of democracy within that country, should take into account these findings, especially when utilising the model of Hendriks (2010).

## Conclusion

Central to this research was the following question: *How did the national democratic institutions of Indonesia develop between 1990 and 2010 and is this development compatible with dimensions of their national culture?* A neo-Lijphartian analysis-approach was adopted that utilises and evaluates different frameworks for categorising models of democracy, all of which are constructed by building on the work of Lijphart (1999; 2012).

The New Order regime in Indonesia, starting in 1966 and lasting for more than 30 years, repressed freedom of expression, political opposition, and other human rights as well as local aspirations for more autonomy. Six elections were held during the New Order, all of which organised under conditions that ensured Suharto's hold on power. Parliament exercised virtually no control. After the fall of Suharto in 1998, important changes were made as to ensure the first free and fair parliamentary elections since 1955. Those elections took place on June 7<sup>th</sup> 1999 and subsequently the MPR initiated four rounds of Constitutional Amendments. From that point on, fundamental change was brought to the structure of the government and the way leaders were elected.

Looking at the different scores of Indonesia's democracy, it is clear that it indeed has developed greatly. In all the indices Indonesia 'jumped' towards democracy in 1999. The Polity IV score for Indonesia developed from a -5 in 1998 to a 6 in 1999 and subsequently developed to a 9 in 2014. In the Democracy Index 2014, Indonesia's democracy ranks 49<sup>th</sup>. These scores are indeed incredible, especially considering the autocratic history of the country and consequently the short experience with a democratic system. It's safe to assume that, at a minimum, Indonesia falls within the category of electoral democracies.

### *Indonesia's model of democracy*

To be able to investigate the development of the national democratic institutions of Indonesia this research used the concept of models of democracy (i.e. a specific set of democratic institutions). Lijphart (2012) differentiates between majoritarian and consensus models of democracy by distinguishing between the executives-parties dimension and the federal-unitary dimension. On the executives-parties dimension Indonesia clearly operates within the consensus distinction. Especially noteworthy, is the fact that Indonesia since 1999 has always established multiparty cabinets, even after instituting the direct election of the president and vice president. Another interesting aspect constitutes the clear usage of a multiparty system, especially in the context of having a presidential system as well. On the federal-unitary dimension, however, the image is blurry. It is on this dimension that Indonesia shows no clear tendency towards any dichotomy of the continuum. While falling within the unitary distinction, being majoritarian, having a Constitutional Court and an independent central bank relates towards the consensus distinction.

Lijphart's (2012) categorisation of models of democracy, however, only focusses on established democracies. This is where this research turned to Maleki & Hendriks (2015) who categorise models of democracy on the dimensions of contestation and participation for 80 electoral democracies between 1990 and 2009. Their results show that on the Integrative Dimension of Democracy (IDD), Indonesia clearly tends towards being integrative. On the Participative Dimension of Democracy (PDD), Indonesia just falls within the participative distinction. The placement of Indonesia, in their model, almost completely overlaps with the placing of Finland. Nonetheless, the two democracies (in practise) are of course not the same. The simple observation of Finland ranking 8<sup>th</sup> and Indonesia ranking 49<sup>th</sup> on the Democracy Index 2014, furthermore proves this.

Another aspect of this research concerned the question whether the development of Indonesia's national democratic institutions is compatible with dimensions of their national culture. This is where this research turned to Maleki (2015). While Indonesia has a presidential system his research shows that, culturally, Indonesia tends towards practising a system of semi-presidentialism. Looking at the electoral system we see that culturally Indonesia tends towards practising a system of proportional representation as well as majority/plurality. Lastly, Maleki (2015) suggests that certain countries may need to adopt compulsory voting to enhance electoral participation. Culturally, to some extent, Indonesia falls within this category of countries.

#### *In-depth development*

While all these evaluations of Indonesia's model of democracy are incredibly valuable for beginning to understand the practised model of democracy (in relation to national culture), they all show an aggregated or average tendency of Indonesia's model of democracy. To truly being able to interpret these evaluations, this research adopted an in-depth developmental approach. By only focusing on Indonesia while investigating the national democratic institutional development, a more fundamental understanding of the development of Indonesia's model of democracy (in practice) emerged.

The Lijphartian (2012) analysis of Indonesia's model of democracy, in particular the federal-unitary dimension, showed the value of not only thinking in dichotomies. With the establishment of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) Indonesia practises a system of bicameralism, being consensus. However, the DPD is described as asymmetrical and incongruent, having extremely limited powers and designed as to overrepresent. The establishment of the Constitutional Court relates as well to being consensus. However, its standpoint is debated since it is argued that it's more focused on interests than on rights. These observations exemplify the value of in-depth studies for truly understanding models of democracy, outside the scope of larger frameworks.

Looking at the institutional development of Indonesia's model of democracy, a few other interesting observations can be made. Indonesia, since 1999, has always established inclusive cabinets, even after the dependency of the cabinet on the legislature was removed. Looking at the development of disproportionality of Indonesia's electoral system, we can see that it clearly increased over the years through the effective threshold and thus making the system more like a mixed model. One last interesting observation is that while culturally, Indonesia seems inclined towards scoring low on the PDD, the turnout for the general elections since 1999 has been high. Whether this is due to the popularity of the first elections during the reformation remains to be seen.

In the field research two organisations, Indonesia Mengajar and Perludem, were investigated using the model of Hendriks (2010) that distinguishes between models of democracy and vertically associated styles and cultures. The results show that the organisations operate very clearly within the integrative dimension. Interestingly, Indonesia's national model of democracy clearly falls within the integrative dimension as well. Whether the organisations operate within the direct or indirect distinction including the vertically aligned associations remains unclear.

#### *Scientific and societal implications*

The results of this research have some scientific implications. The Lijphartian (2012) analysis clearly showed a difficulty in defining the Indonesian model of democracy as either majoritarian or consensus on the federal-unitary dimension. This confirms the criticism that Lijphart (2012) only focusses on established democracies as well as the implicit one-dimensional nature of the framework. The results of the field research confirm the elective affinity of the integrative vs. aggregative dimension. They could not, however, confirm this elective affinity for the direct vs. indirect dimension. The results therefore partly confirm the assumed transferability of the model from the national level to organisations. The explored connection between organisational and national models of democracy is partly confirmed. Both organisations as well as Indonesia's national model of democracy are integrative. Linked to this are some discovered challenges that future similar endeavours should take into account. These challenges relate to practical and logical differences between organisational and national models of democracy, and make defining a clear relationship between the two more difficult. Lastly, this research shows that not thinking only in pure types of democracy and paying attention to the non-formal democracy, creates a different and more mixed image.

The results of this research have some societal implications as well. Especially interesting is the finding of Maleki (2015), confirmed in this research, that Indonesia culturally is predisposed to operating a semi-presidential system. To a great length this is already the case in practise, exemplified by the inclusive cabinets Indonesia established since 1999. This intimate relationship between cultural dimensions and

models of democracy should be considered in the further development of Indonesia's model of democracy. Special attention should be paid to the development of (non-)electoral participation, since Indonesia's cultural dimensions suggest an inclination towards low levels of (non-)electoral participation, albeit this not being the case for electoral participation at the moment. Another finding of this research suggests that Indonesia's combination of a flexibly amendable constitution and judicial review should be reconsidered, since judicial review can only be effective in combination with constitutional rigidity.

*One last point*

As mentioned in chapter 2.3.1, this research set out to describe Indonesia's model of democracy after the reformation in all-encompassing terms. An all-encompassing description, based on the utilised frameworks categorising models of democracy as explained above, is not found. In terms of Lijphart (2012), Indonesia's national model of democracy cannot be described in all-encompassing terms. It's placement within Maleki & Hendriks's (2015) model is clear, however, on the PDD dimension largely the result of the high electoral turnout, which is argued could decline over the years.

Within this entire research, I have found indicators of Indonesia's model of democracy being majoritarian as well as consensus (Lijphart, 2012), spectative, participative, and integrative (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015). However, nowhere, I have found clear and irrefutable indicators of Indonesia's model of democracy being aggregative (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015). *Musyawaharah mufakat*, indeed seems to be a leading principle for Indonesia's democracy.

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## Appendices

### Appendix A            Questionnaire

#### Questionnaire

##### *Introduction*

Dear sir/madam,

It is very important to note that there are no right answers in this questionnaire. It's all about your perception. Not all questions will correlate completely with the factual situation. Please choose the answer that corresponds most with the factual situation.

As part of my master in Public Administration at Tilburg University (the Netherlands), I am currently affiliated with the Atma Jaya University in Jakarta to conduct interviews and collect data. The main subject of my thesis is: *The Development of Indonesian National Democracy between 1990 and 2010*. In this questionnaire, I will look at some living examples of democratic institutions and civic participation in Indonesian democracy.

Thank you for taking the time to fill-in this questionnaire. It will take approximately 10-15 minutes. The results will be handled with great care including anonymity.

##### *General*

1. I am affiliated with the organisation of (*one answer possible*):

- Indonesia Mengajar
- Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW)
- Perludem
- Other, namely ....

2. I am a ... of the before mentioned organisation (*one answer possible*).

- member
- staff member
- volunteer
- executive
- other, namely ...

**Note that in the following the word: 'persons' will be used, whereby this means members, staff and/or volunteers of your organisation.**

3. Tick the box that resembles the factual situation most closely (*one answer possible*).  
In my organisation ...:

- individuals are defined as autonomous beings in his or her own right.
- individuals have strong solidarity with and commitment to the group.

4. Tick the box that resembles the factual situation most closely (*one answer possible*).  
In my organisation ...:

- peoples' roles are allocated from the outside and specify and guide people in particular social positions.
- people decide themselves about the script they play out and are free and equal in doing so.

5. Tick one of the four boxes with statements that resembles the factual situation most closely (*one answer possible*).  
In my organisation ...:

- 5.1
  - we believe that human beings thrive in an inclusive community.
  - convergence and power sharing are preferred to contest and competition .
  - we believe that minority interests should be integrated into decision-making processes as much as possible.
  - we cherish the conviction that positions and roles should be distinctive and discriminatory as little as possible.
  - we feel that everyone should be able to take part in everything, irrespective of age and expertise.
  - we believe that all should be able to speak for themselves.
- 5.2
  - we believe that the individual always takes priority over the community.
  - we believe that contest is preferred to convergence.
  - we believe that decision-making should be sensitive to persons' demands.
  - we believe that people may do or may not do as they please.
  - we believe that persons are very well capable of making their own choices, independent of officials.
  - we believe that self-determination in general is preferred to being patronized.

*SEE OTHER SIDE FOR 5.3 AND 5.4*

- 5.3
  - we cherish the principle that each member of the community is embedded in a comprehensive umbrella unit.
  - convergence goes before competition .
  - we believe that, in decision-making, the parts should be incorporated into the whole as much as possible.
  - we believe that different roles go with different positions.
  - we believe that everyone, each according to ability and merit, has their own responsibilities within the wider group.
  - we believe that the system's division of labour decides who is to represent and who is to be represented.
  - we believe that each individual is a singular unit in a field of other discrete individuals.
- 5.4
  - we believe that each individual must fend for himself rather than appeal to others.
  - we believe that, in decision-making, it is the 'biggest' that carries away the spoils.
  - we believe that the little ones draw the short straw until they themselves can gain enough mass to win the game.
  - we believe that responsibilities differ according to position and ability.
  - we believe that not everyone can take part or be involved in everything.
  - we believe that some have the role and position to govern while others do not.

6. Tick the box that resembles the factual situation most closely (*one answer possible*).

In my organisation ...:

- everyone counts equally on a level playing field.
- everyone has its own distinct responsibility.

7. Tick the box that resembles the factual situation most closely (*one answer possible*)

In my organisation ...:

- is leadership and decision-making the result of competition and contest.
- is leadership and decision-making the result of convergence and accommodation.

*SEE OTHER SIDE*

8. Tick one of the four boxes with statements that resembles the factual situation most closely (*one answer possible*).

In my organisation ...:

- 8.1
  - values centre around self-determination and self-protection.
  - choices require the active consent of anyone who may be impacted by such choice.
- 8.2
  - values centre around concrete action, bottom-up and hands-on policy-making.
  - all participants are equal and everyone's contribution gets equal attention and respect in the communicative process.
- 8.3
  - there exists a decision-making elite that prospers in a certain degree of seclusion.
  - after pacification and accommodation, cautious deliberation, exploring alternatives and getting expert advice, compromises are made on a pragmatic basis.
- 8.4
  - the decision-making elite has a strong focus on mass dynamics, mass psychology, mass communication, and mass media.
  - after being elected, the decision-making elite is not obliged to take into account minority interests.

9. Tick the box that resembles the factual situation most closely (*one answer possible*).

Decisions regarding my organisation are taken...:

- when there is a simple majority.
- only when there is the biggest possible majority.

10. Tick the box that resembles the factual situation most closely (*one answer possible*).

Decisions regarding my organisation are taken...:

- by the persons themselves.
- by representatives of the persons.

*SEE OTHER SIDE*

11. Tick one of the four boxes that resembles the factual situation most closely (*one answer possible*).  
In my organisation ...:

- 11.1
  - power alternates between two competing parties.
  - persons periodically cast their votes and hand over decision-making power to their elected representatives.
  - policy implementation, policy preparation and agenda-setting are taken over from persons by the elected as much as possible.
- 11.2
  - persons participate by casting their votes (e.g. referendums, either on a small or large scale).
  - persons take decisions on organisational matters in assemblies (e.g. by show of hands, counts of 'yes' or 'no').
  - a simple majority decides on binary questions (for or against a particular proposition).
- 11.3
  - decision-making is a process of engaging in thorough, preferably transformative, and usually lengthy deliberations to seek consensus.
  - widespread participation of all - in agenda-setting, policy preparation and implementation - is considered the best way of warranting the legitimacy of collective decision-making.
  - everyone has the same right to raise and debate an issue, and relations are largely horizontal, open, and 'power-free', that is, no one can issue an ultimatum or a veto from a position of power.
- 11.4
  - representatives of groups and sections of the organisation are the prime decision-makers.
  - collective decision-making largely tends to take place in co-producing, co-governing, and coalition-oriented ways and aims to establish consensus and broad-based support.
  - the majority preferably does not overrule substantial minorities by simply counting heads; policies are preferably built on a broad platform of support, both politically and socially.

*SEE OTHER SIDE*

12. Tick the box that resembles the factual situation most closely (one answer possible).

In my organisation ...:

- the persons are active at certain points to (s)elect.
- the persons are active in voting continuously.

13. Tick the box that resembles the factual situation most closely (one answer possible).

In my organisation ...:

- the persons are voters who confer to aggregated results.
- the persons are actors who continuously play an active and dialogical role

14. Tick one of the four boxes with statements that resembles the factual situation most closely (one answer possible).

In my organisation ...:

- 14.1
  - persons' main moment of voting is electing the decision-making elite.
  - persons follow the decision-making elite from a distance awaiting the general election.
- 14.2
  - voting is less decisive than conferring, and such conferring mainly takes place between representatives who will selectively contact persons as spectator/speaker.
  - participation and consultation generally only reach a limited section of persons
- 14.3
  - persons are active in policy preparation and deliberation as well as hands-on interaction and cooperating in the stages of policy implementation.
  - persons contribute in every aspect of decision-making and are considered a crucial and equal actor.
- 14.4
  - persons vote on all matters of organisational interest.
  - persons vote on concrete matters (e.g. do you want this policy? Yes; No).

15. Tick the box that resembles the factual situation most closely (one answer possible).

In my organisation ...:

- our leader represents a movement or alignment in which he/she makes the decisions.
- our leader is mostly a supporter of the decision-making by persons.

*SEE OTHER SIDE*

16. Tick the box that resembles the factual situation most closely (*one answer possible*).

In my organisation ...:

- our leader operates as an intermediary in a communicative process, bringing different opinions together.
- our leader operates as a competitor in which he/she has to win over the opinion of persons which eventually will be aggregated.

17. Tick one of the four boxes that resembles the factual situation most closely (*one answer possible*)

In my organisation ...:

- 17.1
  - leadership is the result of a general election in a winner-takes-all setting.
  - leadership represents a movement within the organisation that must convey massive voter support.
- 17.2
  - leadership represents a movement within the organisation.
  - leadership helps to build bridges for and on behalf of others and thus contributes to (political) peace-keeping.
- 17.3
  - there are high expectations of active persons and low expectations of decisive leadership.
  - leadership is the chief facilitator and bridge-builder among his or her equals who contribute to bridge-building and support processes in equal measure.
- 17.4
  - leadership is someone who, on behalf of others, must swing win-or-lose decision-making processes.
  - leadership must possess a subtle combination of putting up a convincing personal performance, to influence voters in favour of a particular position, and of offering support to others, in facilitating movement from the bottom up.

## **Appendix B                      Semi-structured interview**

### *Introduction*

There are no right answers in this interview. It is all about your perception. By persons I mean members, staff and/or volunteers. Model originally designed to map democracies; not every question might relate entirely. Please, try to pick your answer relating to which represents the factual situation best.

Your results will be handled with great care and standards of anonymity.  
Any questions during the interview, please let me know.

### *General*

- Would you like to start by telling about your organisation? (1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> interview)
  - What is the name of your organisation?
  - What is the objective of your organisation?
  - What is the work that your organisation does?
  - How long has the organisation done this work?
  
  - What's the size of your organisation?
  - What's the structure of your organisation? (members, volunteers, staff)
  
- Would like to (start by) tell(ing) me about your work in the organisation? (all interviews)
  
- Is there a decision-making elite? What or who is it?
  - If yes, is it chosen by members, volunteers, staff?
  - If no, how does anyone become a decision-making elite in your organisation?

### *Societal culture*

This refers to the persons views of how they 'perceive social life' and 'perceive living with others' within your organisation.

- Would you say that in your organisation individuals are defined as autonomous beings or people are defined by their strong solidarity and commitment to the group?
  - o 'Me'-culture?
  - o 'We'-culture?
  
- Can you tell me about roles (behaviour) in your organisation? (Requirements specifying how people are supposed to act in certain organisational positions).
  - o People themselves decide on the script they play out and are free and equal in doing so?
  - o Roles are allocated from the outside and clearly specifying and guiding for people in certain positions?

### *Political culture*

This refers to the political-cultural attitude of persons towards your organisation.

- Would you say that within your organisation everyone has their own distinct responsibility or that everyone counts equally on a level playing field?
  - o Power distance?
  - o Power equality?
- Would you say that within your organisation there exists a logic of contest or convergence (merging)? Why?
  - o Competition: choosing the one and turning down the other?
  - o Convergence and accommodation: accepting both the one and the other?

#### Model of democracy

- Can you tell me how decisions regarding the organisation are being made?
  - o Simple majority? (even when large minority exists?)
  - o Biggest possible majority?
- Who eventually takes the decisions regarding your organisation?
  - o Persons point out representatives?
  - o Persons take the decision themselves?

#### Citizenship style

This refers to the role persons have within your organisation.

- Would you say that persons are more a spectator or a player in your organisation? Why?
  - o Spectator in which persons are at play during certain points?
  - o Active leading players?
- Would you say that persons are more voters or speakers in your organisation? Why?
  - o Voters: vote after which a numerical addition is made?
  - o Speakers having a part in a dialogical process of conferring?

#### Leadership style

This refers to how the leader in your organisation takes the lead.

- Would you say that within your organisation the leader acts as a representative or facilitator? Why?
  - o Representative: embodies a particular movement or alignment?
  - o Facilitator: chief supporter of players who in principle play their own game?
- Would you say that within your organisation the leader acts as a bridge-builder or a prize-fighter? Why?
  - o Bridge-builder: a moderator or intermediary in a communicative process that requires multiple voices to be harmonised?
  - o Prize-fighter: focussed on winning (and certainly not losing) a competitive game that will eventually lead to a 'yes' or 'no'?